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1. Introduction  
 
1.1. Background and research objective  
  
A number of countries in Asia have undergone a rapid and unprecedented economic 
process of development, which has increased their demand for energy and other resources 
to stimulate economic growth. With the increase in energy consumption and strong reliance 
on fossil fuels, the contribution of countries in developing Asia to climate change has 
increased significantly (Rock and Angel, 2005). The urgency of achieving a transition towards 
less carbon-intensive energy systems in Asian countries is therefore increasingly considered 
essential in global efforts to combat climate change (IEA, 2011).  
The sustainable transition literature provides a useful perspective with which to 
address the topic of low-carbon technology diffusion, which is conceptualised as a niche 
development process that unfolds in opposition to a prevailing, resistant regime (Kemp et 
al., 1998; Geels, 2002; 2005; Schot and Geels, 2008). However, most studies conducted on 
low-carbon transitions have hitherto focused mainly on developed countries in which 
supportive environmental and industry policies have played a major role in promoting the 
diffusion of low-carbon technologies. According to Bai et al. (2009), Verbong et al. (2010) 
and Berkhout et al. (2011), more research is therefore needed to examine low-carbon 
transitions in developing countries that could provide valuable insights with relevance for 
policy and planning.  
To promote low-carbon transitions in developing countries, the importance of 
facilitating the transfer of low-carbon technologies has gained much attention in 
international policy discussions, for example, within the United Nations Framework 
Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC). This has resulted in a number of initiatives under 
the UNFCCC aiming to promote the transfer of low-carbon technologies, such as the 
Technology Needs Assessment (TNA) project, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
and the recent Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). Yet, despite the wide 
recognition given to the importance of transferring low-carbon technologies in the climate 
change mitigation policy agenda, this issue has not received much attention in academic 
research until recently.   
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Most studies conducted thus far have analysed the role of CDM projects in 
stimulating the uptake of low-carbon technologies, with a primary focus on the transfer of 
physical hardware and patents (see e.g. De Coninck et al., 2007; Dechezlepretre et al., 2008, 
2009; Seres et al., 2009; Hascic and Johnstone, 2011). A recent number of studies have 
adopted a technological learning and innovation-based perspective to analyse the transfer 
of low-carbon technologies, focusing more on the dynamics of technological capability 
building in developing countries (Ockwell, 2008; Doranova, 2010; Fu, 2011; Fu and Zhang, 
2011; Watson et al., 2011; Ockwell and Mallett, 2012). These studies emphasize the 
centrality of knowledge transfer in contributing to broader processes of development along 
low-carbon trajectories. However, they only provide preliminary insights into the issues of 
low-carbon technology transfer, technological capability building, and innovation in 
developing countries.  
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to advancing further this emerging 
research agenda on the subject of the transfer and diffusion of low-carbon technologies in 
developing countries by adopting a study of the development of biomass power plant 
technologies in Malaysia. Before proceeding, there is a need to introduce briefly some key 
concepts, as these will be addressed in the subsequent section. This thesis understands 
technology diffusion as a process involving the emergence of new technological innovations 
from experimentation activities in protected niches, which are gradually upscaled or 
aggregated towards broader and more widespread market applications in a national context 
(Hoogma, 2000; Raven et al., 2011). Moreover, following (Bell, 1990, 2012; Levin, 1997), in 
this thesis technology transfer denotes the exchange of knowledge through international 
inter-firm linkages, which contribute to enhancing the technological capability of the 
recipient firms, thus enabling them to engage in innovation. 
The remaining synopsis is structured as follows. In the following sub-section 1.2., the 
main research questions guiding the analysis conducted in this thesis will be described. This 
is followed in Section 2 by a description of the conceptual framework used to examine the 
research questions. Subsequently, Section 3 presents the research methodology, and in 
Section 4, a description of the individual papers comprising this thesis is presented. Lastly, 
Section 5 provides the main conclusions and suggests areas of further research.           
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1.2. Research questions  
 
As described above, this thesis is positioned within in a broader research field 
addressing the topic of the transfer and diffusion of low-carbon technologies to developing 
countries. This thesis focuses on the development of biomass power plant technologies in 
Malaysia, and the main research question guiding the analysis is formulated as follows:   
 
-What have been the main factors influencing the transfer and diffusion of biomass power 
plant technologies in Malaysia?     
  
In order to answer this main research question, it has been considered appropriate 
to address the issues of transfer and diffusion separately in a number of sub-research 
questions that are further explored in the individual papers of the thesis (see Table 1 
below). First, the following three sub-research questions, which are analysed in Paper 1 and 
2, have been formulated to address the issue of technology transfer:  
 
-What role have Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects played in the transfer of 
new technology to Malaysia?  
-To what extent has innovative technological capability been developed in the Malaysian 
biomass boiler and power plant equipment industry? 
-What role have different learning mechanisms played in the development of technological 
capability?    
 
Secondly, to explore the topic of the diffusion of biomass power plant technologies 
in Malaysia, the following two sub-research questions have been put forward, which are 
addressed in Paper 3 and 4:  
 
-What have been the critical factors in the development of a palm oil biomass waste-to-
energy niche in Malaysia?  
-What role have donor interventions played in the development of a viable niche in 
Malaysia?   
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Table 1. Overview of papers presented in the thesis    
Paper no. Title Authors  Status  
1 
An empirical case study of the 
transfer of GHG mitigation 
technologies from Annex 1 
countries to Malaysia under the 
Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism 
(CDM) 
Ulrich Elmer Hansen Published 2011 in 
International Journal of 
Technology Transfer and 
Commercialization, 
10(1), 1-20 
2 
Learning and formation of 
innovative capability in clean 
tech industries in emerging 
economies: the case of the 
biomass power equipment 
industry in Malaysia 
Ulrich Elmer Hansen 
and David Ockwell 
Submitted to 
Technovation  
3 
Sustainable energy transitions in 
emerging economies: the 
formation of a palm oil biomass 
waste-to-energy niche in 
Malaysia 1990-2011 
Ulrich Elmer Hansen 
and Ivan Nygaard 
Submitted to Energy 
Policy  
4 
Transnational linkages and 
sustainable transitions in 
emerging countries: exploring 
the role of donor interventions 
in niche development 
Ulrich Elmer Hansen 
and Ivan Nygaard 
Revised and resubmitted 
to Journal of 
Environmental 
Innovations and Societal 
Transitions 
 
Although the topics of technology transfer and diffusion have been separated to 
address the overall research question of the thesis, they may in practice be interrelated. 
Donor programs provide an illustration of this. Although conditions for the diffusion of low-
carbon technologies locally or nationally are greatly influenced by national policies and 
institutional frameworks, factors operating outside national boundaries may also be 
important. International donor programs, for example, may play an important role in 
creating conducive conditions for the diffusion of specific low-carbon technologies by 
promoting supportive national policies or through more direct measures, such as 
investment subsidies and technical assistance to projects. Such donor programs may also 
facilitate the introduction of new technologies from foreign technology suppliers, for 
example, in the form of demonstration projects, with the aim of encouraging their 
subsequent diffusion, thereby acting as a catalyst for the transfer and further diffusion of 
low-carbon technologies. International governance frameworks, such as those under the 
UNFCCC, may potentially play a similar role.   
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2. Analytical frameworks  
 
The thesis draws on two main analytical frameworks to examine its research 
questions. The first is based in the technological capability literature, which conceptualises 
the ability of developing country firms to engage in technological change as a process 
involving various types of learning mechanisms, with a particular emphasis on the role of 
foreign affiliates (Malerba, 1992; Ernst and Kim, 2002; Viotti, 2002). This literature provided 
a basis for analysing technology transfers and the development of technological capabilities 
in the Malaysian biomass boiler and power plant equipment industry. The second 
framework is founded in the sustainable transition literature, specifically the multilevel 
perspective (MLP) on socio-technical systems, which conceptualises the processes 
underlying fundamental transformations in the fulfilment of key societal functions such as 
energy, transportation, communication and housing (Geels, 2002, 2005). This literature is 
considered useful for conceptualising and analysing the diffusion of biomass power plant 
technologies in Malaysia as a niche development process.  
The following two sub-sections 2.1. and 2.2. will provide a description and short 
discussion of the two analytical frameworks adopted, including key concepts and main 
theoretical propositions. Subsequently, some of the conceptual communalities pertaining to 
these analytical frameworks will be discussed in Section 2.3.    
 
2.1. The technological capability framework  
 
The process of building up technological capabilities is a longstanding topic in the 
literature on technological learning and innovation in developing country firms and 
industries. Starting with the early work by Jorge Katz and colleagues in the 1980s (see e.g. 
Dahlman et al., 1987; Katz, 1987; Lall, 1987; Amsden, 1989), this literature subsequently 
progressed in two subsequent phases during the 1990s (see e.g. Hobday, 1995; Lall, 1992; 
Kim 1997; Romijn, 1997) and 2000s (see e.g. Figueiredo, 2003; Marcelle, 2004; Tsekouras, 
2006) (Bell, 2006). The main focus in this field of study has been on the processes whereby 
firms that arrive late on the world industrial scene progress in their level of technological 
capability in order to enhance their global competitiveness (Mathews and Cho, 1999). This 
interest in the formation of innovative capability is based in the recognition of the important 
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role of mastering technological innovation in a competitive global market.  Studies have 
mainly focused on analysing the gradual building of a minimum base of technological 
knowledge in order for developing country firms to be able to carry out innovative activities 
(Dutrénit 2000, 2004). Different stages of technological accumulation have been identified, 
from the acquisition of foreign technology to the development of innovative technological 
capabilities, which allowed some firms to reach the technological frontier, and even to 
develop technological leadership in certain areas (see e.g. Kim 1997, 1998).  
Firm-level technological capabilities are understood as the ability to generate and 
manage technical change (i.e. to engage in innovation activities) in process organisation, 
products and equipment (Bell and Pavitt, 1993, 1995). The accumulation of technological 
capability is considered path-dependant and highly firm-specific. A number of taxonomies to 
describe the achievement of different degrees of firm-level technological capabilities have 
been suggested in the literature. These typically elaborate a number of functions in the firm, 
such as process, product and investment-related activities, and various indicators are used 
to describe the levels of capability achieved within each of these functions (see e.g. Lall, 
1992; Ariffin, 2000, 2010; Figueiredo, 2001; Ariffin and Figueiredo, 2004; Bell, 2007). The 
levels typically form the basic capabilities needed to use and operate existing production 
systems, at the lowest level, to the achievement of the capabilities needed to undertake 
advanced technical change at the highest level.  
The formation of technological capability at the firm level derives from a complex 
process of learning, which comprises the processes by which additional technical skills and 
knowledge are acquired by individuals and through them, by the organisation (Bell, 1984, 
2006). Rather than being an automatic and passive process accrued from the continuation 
of routine-based activities, learning is considered to demand active and dedicated 
investments with the aim of building technological capability. A main interest in this 
literature has therefore been devoted to understanding the nature and dynamics of the 
various learning mechanisms by which firms build up – or fail to build up – their level of 
technological capabilities over time. Thus, firms’ paths of innovative capability-building and 
the underlying learning mechanisms (as sources of capabilities) are placed at the centre of 
those interests (Kim and Nelson, 2000; Dutrénit, 2004).  
Much emphasis in the literature has been placed on the important role of learning 
from technology transfer relationships with foreign and more advanced technology 
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suppliers through different types of dyadic inter-firm linkages (Lee and Lim, 2001; Mathews, 
2002, 2006; Bell and Figueiredo, 2012a,b). These linkages may, for example, be in the form 
of license agreements, parent-subsidiary relationships, joint ventures, technical assistance 
arrangements and strategic alliances (which are typically contrasted with purely transaction-
based linkages, such as imports of and trade in goods) (Bell, 2007). Such inter-firm linkages 
may not necessarily or automatically increase the level of technological capability in 
developing country firms, as this will depend, among other things, on the intensity of efforts 
devoted to leveraging and exploiting the potential learning opportunities from these 
external sources. Studies have also emphasized the importance of learning through in-house 
technological efforts, such as internal training, various types of internal experimental 
activities and investments in formal R&D units (Lall and Latsch, 1998; Jonker et al., 2006). 
Similarly, the role of various forms of learning opportunities locally or regionally, such as 
engineering departments in universities, public R&D organisations, local spin-off ventures, 
strategic recruitment, intra-industry labor turnover and training institutes, have also been 
analysed (Malerba, 1992; Kesidou and Romijn, 2008).  
With a basis in the framework presented above, Papers 1 and 2 conceptualise the 
transfer of biomass power plant technologies to Malaysia as part of broader learning and 
technological capability-building efforts by Malaysian boiler and power plant suppliers. This 
was based on a number of considerations. First, as noted by Ockwell et al. (2010) and Lema 
and Lema (2013), the dominant understanding in the existing literature on low-carbon 
technology transfer in the context of climate change (including in the policy arena) 
emphasizes the importance of the transfer of patents (and related intellectual property 
rights) and physical equipment. This understanding of technology transfer overlooks the 
centrality of the exchange of knowledge, know-how and accumulated experience and skills, 
especially the elements of knowledge that are tacit in nature and therefore difficult to 
transfer in patents and physical hardware (Lall, 2002). Conceptualising technology transfer 
in this thesis as an aspect of developing country firms' learning and technological capability 
accumulation efforts places greater emphasis on the development implications of 
technology transfer. This allows an understanding of technology transfer as having the 
potential to stimulate an additional learning process in recipient firms, enabling them to 
engage in further independent innovation on the basis of the acquired technology (Bell, 
1990; Wei, 1995) .  
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Secondly, as mentioned above, the technological capability framework also 
highlights the important role of learning and technological capability-building through firms' 
internal technological efforts. Firms’ own efforts to modify, adapt and further develop 
technologies acquired from foreign sources to suit new conditions may provide one example 
of this, which is widely recognised in the technological capability literature (Bell, 2007). 
While such efforts may often be of an incremental nature, they may nonetheless be an 
important stimulus to increase the level of technological capability in developing country 
firms. This is contrasted with the widespread understanding in the extant innovation 
literature that innovation is mainly conducted in developed country firms and subsequently 
transferred to developing country firms, for example, through license agreements or joint 
ventures. This greatly overlooks the additional improvement and technical change 
undertaken by developing country firms, which comprise more than the passive acquisition 
of imported technology (Bell and Pavitt, 1993, 1995).  
While the technological capability framework was considered well-suited to 
addressing the topic of technology transfer in this thesis, one analytical weakness merits 
mentioning. As was shown above, in the literature the individual firm is ascribed a principal 
role in learning and technological capability formation, which according to Bell and 
Figueiredo (2012a; 19) reflects "]..the well-trodden assertion that learning in the sense of 
building and deepening capabilities to innovate is conscious, purposive and costly, rather 
than automatic and passive]". It may be argued, though, that this firm-centered perspective 
places too much emphasis on individual firms when compared, for example, to broader 
changes in the global division of labor and macro-political and economic structural 
conditions. It should be noted, however, that much research has addressed the role of 
industrial systems, national industrial policy and the regulatory environment on firm-level 
technological capability formation (see e.g. Figueiredo, 2008; Amann and Cantwell, 2012).  
     
2.2. The multilevel perspective  
 
 The multilevel perspective (MLP) has been developed as a heuristic model for 
structuring analyses of socio-technical transition processes (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Kemp et 
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al., 1998; Geels, 2002)1. Studies adopting the MLP framework have mainly addressed the 
barriers and opportunities for the diffusion of technological innovations that may lead to 
wider sustainability transitions at a societal level. The MLP conceptualises how such 
transitions take place through the interaction between processes at three different levels of 
social aggregation, namely the socio-technical landscape, the regime and the niche level.  
 At the macro-level, the socio-technical landscape denotes the large-scale and 
exogenous structural context that influences dynamics at the regime and niche levels. 
Examples include global macro-economic conditions, international geopolitics, overarching 
global political discourses, demography, resource scarcities and changes in cultural and 
normative values. At the meso-level, socio-technical regimes comprise relatively stable 
configurations of institutions, techniques and artefacts, as well as rules, practices and actor 
networks that determine the ‘normal’ development and use of technologies. Regimes thus 
constitute the dominant and semi-stable institutional, regulatory and technological 
infrastructure that fulfils socially valued functions such as energy supply, transport, 
communication and housing. Sustainable transitions are understood in the MLP as changes 
in the manner in which existing regimes are configured to provide key social functions. At 
the micro-level, socio-technical niches constitute local platforms or incubation rooms from 
which new and alternative socio-technical trajectories may emerge to the dominating way 
of fulfilling functions within existing regimes. Niches play a central role in the MLP according 
to which the emergence of viable niches is understood as constituting a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for transitions (Hoogma, 2000).   
 As a result of stabilising mechanisms, regimes are characterised by path-
dependency, structural lock-in and resistance to change (Raven, 2006). This proneness to 
inertia and stability is conceptualised in the MLP as effectively hindering alternative 
sustainable technological innovations from emerging and breaking through at the regime 
level (Unruh, 2000). In the energy sector, this could involve a situation in which the 
continuation of an incumbent fossil fuel-based energy system is stabilised by regulations, 
sunk investments in the infrastructure, subsidies, or the vested interests of incumbent 
actors such as utilities (Verbong and Geels, 2007; Rohacher, 2008). For a niche to evolve and 
1 The MLP may be considered part of a number of (related) analytical perspectives that address the overall 
issue of sustainable transitions, which also include the Transition Management and Technological Innovation 
Systems literatures (Coenen et al., 2010).   
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eventually progress towards large-scale societal transitions, a central assumption in the MLP 
is that niche proliferation is contingent upon destabilising tensions that open ‘windows of 
opportunity’ at the regime level (Verbong et al., 2008). Such destabilising tensions may arise 
from processes at the landscape level that provide opportunities for alternative practices 
and novel innovations to break through from niches. Whether such opportunities will be 
exploited, on the other hand, also depends on the viability of the niche in development.     
 According to the MLP, the viability of niches is influenced by three internal niche-
level processes, which comprise: i) The shaping and alignment of expectations; ii) the 
formation of a social actor network; and iii) learning processes, which have been further 
elaborated in the literature on strategic niche management (SNM) (Schot and Geels, 2008). 
Increasing alignment of expectations involves niche-level actors increasingly sharing similar 
visions, beliefs, strategies, agendas and interests. Following Geels and Raven (2006), a high 
level of expectations is generally conducive for niche development, although the envisaged 
opportunities need to become more specific and to rely on positive tangible results. The 
second niche-level process concerns the formation of a social constituency behind a new or 
alternative socio-technical trajectory consisting of a network of engaged actors. It is 
generally assumed in the MLP that the formation of close social ties and regular interaction 
among actors stimulates niche development. Furthermore, the composition of the actor 
network plays a central role, and the involvement of a broader and more varied actor 
network also promotes niche development (Van der Laak et al., 2007; Coenen et al., 2010). 
Lastly, learning processes involve learning about the technological aspects of various niche-
level experiments, including technical design, functionality and performance. Although the 
MLP accentuates the role of learning through techno-economic optimisation efforts, 
broader learning processes pertaining to the social embeddedness of these play an equally 
important role. The later involve various actors, and society at large, learning about many 
aspects of the technology, including regulatory conditions, user preferences, institutional, 
economic (e.g. business models, profitability and financing sources), infrastructure, socio-
cultural and environmental aspects. Among the three niche-level processes there is a 
dynamic interplay, which may reinforce each other in a manner that is conducive to the 
development of a promising and viable niche. An initial ‘technological niche’ may therefore 
gradually evolve into a ‘market niche’ in which the technology in question becomes 
independently competitive and protection may be phased out (Raven, 2006).  
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 With a basis in the framework presented above, Papers 3 and 4 conceptualise the 
diffusion of biomass power plant technologies in Malaysia as a niche development and up-
scaling process. This was considered appropriate for a number of reasons. First, this 
framework understands technology diffusion as a non-linear process, which involves a 
multitude of interactive feedback mechanisms along the innovation–diffusion trajectory 
(Geels, 2002). This means that technology supply- and demand-side aspects are addressed 
simultaneously, although with a particular focus on technology adopters and user practices, 
which, according to Geels (2004, 2011), are often neglected in other related frameworks, 
such as the innovation system literature. Secondly, this framework also focuses on the 
broader institutional conditions for technology diffusion, including policies, regulations, 
culture and norms, social practices, industrial structures and supporting infrastructures, and 
markets dynamics. This multidimensionality involves consideration of a range of actors and 
processes at the landscape, regime and niche levels that indirectly and directly influence the 
diffusion process, which is contrasted with more technology-centric frameworks focusing 
exclusively on technology management in individual firms. Thirdly, following Markard and 
Truffer (2008), a main strength associated with conceptualising technology diffusion as a 
niche development process lies in the explanatory power of analysing the relative stability 
of an emerging niche relative to an existing regime. In this regard, according to Raven 
(2006), the greatest prospect for niche up-scaling may arise in situations with relative 
stability at the niche level in combination with a situation of relative regime instability.  
 Despite these merits, a number of drawbacks also pertain to this framework, which 
has been discussed in the literature (see e.g. Genus and Coles, 2008; Smith et al., 2010). As 
noted in Geels (2011), the MLP framework is a heuristic device that guides the analysis 
towards relevant questions and issues, and applications of the framework therefore require 
both substantive knowledge of the empirical domain and theoretical sensitivity (and 
interpretive creativity) to identify interesting patterns and mechanisms. Although the 
framework thus allows for interpretative flexibility, as a so-called middle-range theory 
(Geels, 2007) the lack of theoretical and conceptual rigidity is a main challenge in 
operationalisation and analysis. In addition, the MLP has been critisised for its inability to 
conceptualise the international dimension of niche development and transition studies, 
which have mainly been lumped together in the all-encompassing notion of the landscape 
concept (Geels, 2011). The framework has mostly been applied nationally, as the main 
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empirical boundary and studies have examined technology diffusion locally or nationally on 
that basis (Raven et al., 2012). This renders the framework less suited to addressing 
transnational linkages and the international dimension of niche development and transition 
process, which requires complimentary analytical perspectives to explore these issues.  
 
2.3. Conceptual communalities 
 
 The MLP and technological capability literatures both have their basic origins in 
evolutionary theories of technical change, which since the 1980s have focused on the role of 
innovation in firm and industry-level competition (Nelson and Winther, 1982). Although 
these two literatures both have their foundational theoretical basis in evolutionary 
economics, they have moved in entirely different directions. The following will describe 
some of the shared conceptual communalities in these two bodies of literature.   
In the literature on technological capability formation in developing country firms, 
the basic starting point is that firms cannot be assumed to be operating on a common 
production function since technological knowledge is not shared equally among them, nor is 
it easily imitated by or transferred across firms. Therefore, on the basis of differences in 
prior accumulated skills and various sources of knowledge inputs, firms in a given industry 
are likely to develop different levels of technological capabilities, which in turn translates 
into "]..different efficiencies in the innovative search processes]" (Dosi, 1988; 1156). This 
heterogeneity in technological capability accumulation, understood as the ability to 
implement technical change, is considered a main factor in explaining (intra-industry) 
variability in the competitiveness of firms (Lall, 1992). Firms in a particular industry do, 
however, share general routines, such as common cognitive search heuristics or engineering 
approaches, which reflect their bounded rationalities (Nelson and Winther, 1982). This 
influences learning and innovation in individual firms by structuring their technical search 
spaces in directions that are close to existing routines and competencies. This structuring 
comprises a technological regime, which according to Genus and Coles (2008; 1437) denotes 
"]..the beliefs and prevailing successful designs that predispose innovators in firms towards 
development of certain apparently marketable or feasible options and away from other less 
attractive options]".   
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In the MLP, the technological regime is conceptualised as playing an important role 
in hindering niche-level innovations from emerging due to lock-in and path dependence, as 
well as orientation towards incremental innovation along predictable trajectories. The 
understanding of technological regimes was developed further in the MLP from the original 
conceptualisation in Nelson and Winther (1982), which according to Geels (2004) over-
emphasized technology design heuristics and cognitive rules within firms without giving due 
consideration to understanding technology and society as interrelated, co-evolutionary 
processes. This is reflected in Rip and Kemp (1998; 338), who suggest that a technological 
regime comprises "].. the rule-set or grammar embedded in a complex of engineering 
practices, production process technologies, product characteristics, skills and procedures, 
ways of handling relevant artifacts and persons, ways of defining problems – all of them 
embedded in institutions and infrastructures]".  
Beside the technological regime concept, another conceptual communality in the 
MLP and the technological capability literatures is the importance of learning as a main 
condition for niche development and technological capability-building. Learning about 
technological aspects in niche development processes may, for example, take place as part 
of competition between private firms, labor turnover in a local industry, inter-firm 
technology cooperation or platforms for knowledge sharing. Similarly, such localised 
learning mechanisms may be equally important channels for individual developing country 
firms to acquire technological capability. As described above, the technological capability 
literature emphasizes the importance of access to technological knowledge from foreign, 
more advanced technology suppliers, and such external linkages may also play a role in 
niche development. For example, as part of learning from technology transfer in individual 
firms, potentially this may create broader learning opportunities in the maturation of 
technologies from experimentation activities in an evolving niche. This may take place 
through local knowledge spill-over from imitation and copying, although such issues have 
not been addressed to any great extent in the literature on niche development. Caniëls and 
Romijn (2008) do, however, note that the technological capability literature on learning 
mechanisms is similar to the conceptualisation of experimentation activities described in the 
sustainable transition literature on niche development.  
16
While this brief discussion does not provide a full picture of the relationship between 
the MLP and the technological capability literatures, the two examples do illustrate that the 
analytical frameworks adopted in this thesis are not mutually incompatible or in conflict.  
 
3. Research methodology  
  
The following sub-section 3.1. describes the empirical context for the research 
conducted in this thesis. The second sub-section 3.2. describes the research method 
adopted to address the research questions put forward initially.   
 
3.1. The empirical context  
 
Malaysia has experienced remarkable economic growth in recent decades, which has 
lead to a concomitant increase in fossil fuel-based energy usage and greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. Indeed, annual GHG emissions in Malaysia increased by around 8% in the period 
1990-2006 and are expected to rise by 74% by 2020 from the 2005 level, which is mainly 
attributed to the continuing reliance on fossil fuels (NRE, 2011). Although still a small 
contributor to total emissions relative to, for example, China or the United States, this gives 
Malaysia one of the highest expected growth rates in emissions in the world.  
However, with increasing environmental pressure, diminishing domestic fossil fuel 
resources, rapidly growing energy demand and a general increase in fossil fuel prices, 
renewable biomass energy has come to be seen as central to diversifying the energy system 
and reducing GHG emissions in Malaysia. This has led to the adoption of a number of energy 
policies in Malaysia, which, together with succeeding donor programs, have aimed at 
promoting renewable energy. These national energy policies and donor programs have 
particularly focused on the utilisation of palm oil biomass waste due to its availability in 
Malaysia (Shuit et al., 2009). However, limited studies have addressed the results of these 
policies and donor programs, as well as other factors influencing biomass technology 
development in Malaysia, although this may provide important insights with broader 
relevance for understanding the critical factors for low-carbon transitions in developing 
countries.     
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Moreover, since the 1990s different factors have contributed to creating conducive 
conditions for investments in palm oil biomass waste-to-energy plants in Malaysia. This 
attracted a number of Malaysian boiler companies to become engaged as technology 
suppliers to these power plants. In fact, most palm oil biomass waste-to-energy plants 
constructed in Malaysia were supplied by local boiler manufacturers. However, before their 
involvement in these plants, these local firms mainly supplied small-scale, inefficient 
industrial boilers to various industries and therefore had very limited experience in 
engineering or in the construction of large-scale, efficient biomass-fired power plants. They 
were therefore forced to engage in concerted learning and technological capability-building 
efforts in order to take advantage of these new market opportunities, which required new 
technological innovation compared to their existing boiler technologies. Some of these local 
boiler suppliers had established relationships with foreign technology developers, which 
provide a suitable context in which to examine the accumulation of technological capability 
and the role of technology transfer compared to other forms of learning.        
 
3.2. Data collection methods and analysis  
  
The research conducted for the four papers comprising this thesis draws on data 
collected during three successive periods of fieldwork undertaken in Malaysia in 2008, 2010 
and 2011. The data collected during these extended periods of fieldwork mainly consisted of 
interviews, various sources of written material and observations at plant sites. The main 
research question addressed in the four papers concerns the main factors influencing the 
transfer and diffusion of biomass power plant technologies in Malaysia. The research 
methods adopted in order to examine this question in the individual papers will be 
described in the following.  
Paper 1 investigated the importance of CDM projects in establishing new sources of 
technology and knowledge in Malaysia, while Paper 2 developed this analysis further by 
conducting a detailed study of the learning mechanisms underlying technological capability 
formation in the Malaysian biomass boiler and power plant supplier industry. These firms 
were identified on the basis of their involvement in palm oil biomass waste-to-energy plants 
in Malaysia. The data collected for these two papers primarily consisted of interviews with 
employees of firms in this industry and secondarily on written material. A key part of the 
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data collection process consisted of formulating interview questions in order to 
operationalise the key analytical concepts into data collection procedures (in interview 
guide questions). As Adcock and Collier (2001) describe, enhancing construct validity in this 
process of concept operationalisation essentially requires ensuring that observations 
meaningfully capture the fundamental ideas contained in the concepts. This was achieved 
by ensuring logical consistency between the conceptual constructs and the detailed 
interview questions, the aim being to obtain data about the key concepts of interest 
(Krefting, 1991). In order to operationalise the key concepts of learning mechanisms and 
technological capability formation, the interviewees were asked to describe the relative 
importance of various learning mechanisms with regard to the accumulation of 
technological capabilities throughout the firms' involvement in specific palm oil biomass 
waste-to-energy plants. The interview questions addressing the level of technological 
capability achieved by the individual firms drew mainly on a range of indicators from the 
literature. All interviews were digitally recorded and subsequently transcribed.    
In order to increase the internal validity of Papers 1 and 2 concerning the role of 
CDM in technology transfer and the use of different learning mechanisms in technological 
capability building, two types of triangulation method were used to cross-examine and 
synthesise the data (Meijer et al., 2002). First, the triangulation of data consisted of 
interviews with current and former employees across different administrative levels and 
functions in the individual boiler supplier firms, and with local engineering consultants (with 
substantial industry experience), investors and plant operators. Moreover, since the data 
were collected over an extended fieldwork period of around three years, this allowed for 
some temporal spread in the data. Secondly, the application of triangulation by method 
involved the use of multiple sources of qualitative data in the form of interviews, different 
sources of written material and observations at plant sites. As suggested in Miles and 
Huberman (1994), the data analysis used the matrices method for data coding and 
interpretation procedures in order to identify regularities in the data. The analysis relied on 
pre-established coding categories based on the analytical framework adopted in the papers.  
Paper 3 investigated the critical factors for the development of a palm oil biomass 
waste-to-energy niche in Malaysia. Building on this, Paper 4 focused on analysing the role of 
donor interventions in niche development, both of which were based in the MLP literature. 
Both papers used qualitative data, primarily in the form of interviews, and secondarily by 
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using different sources of written material, which included a comprehensive review of the 
academic and grey literature on the palm oil biomass waste-to-energy sector in Malaysia. A 
main objective of the data collection process conducted for the two papers was to 
illuminate previous and ongoing processes at the landscape, regime and niche levels. The 
interviews conducted with niche-level actors, such as boiler and power plant suppliers, 
engineering consultants, plant-level operators and investors, addressed the concepts 
related to niche development processes on the basis of semi-structured interview guides. 
Interview questions were therefore formulated to enable respondents to elaborate about 
different forms of learning processes, network formation and changes in levels of 
expectations. Interviews with regime-level actors were conducted with energy-related 
planners from governmental agencies, ministries and utility companies and donor program 
managers, as well as representatives of trade and industry associations and R&D 
organisations associated with the palm oil industry in Malaysia. Interviewees in the energy 
and palm oil regime were asked to elaborate about the existence of stabilizing factors at the 
regime level that were hindering niche development, such as the existence of infrastructural 
constraints, regulations and standards, sunken investments and vested interests, as well as 
destabilizing factors conducive for niche development, such as external pressures at the 
landscape level. The interview questions addressing the key concepts related to niche 
development and regime level dynamics were aligned in a logically consistent manner to 
ensure construct validity. All interviews were digitally recorded and subsequently 
transcribed.  
In order to enhance the internal validity of Papers 3 and 4 with regard to the 
identification of critical factors for niche development and the role of donor programs, two 
triangulation methods were used to cross-examine the data. First, triangulation of data 
involved interviewing individuals from different firms and organizations that represented a 
variety of understandings and interests. Secondly, the application of triangulation by 
method involved the use of multiple sources of qualitative data in the form of interviews, 
different sources of written material and observations at plants sites. Data analysis followed 
the procedures described for Papers 1 and 2.    
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4. Paper summaries  
 
The following section will provide a short summary of the four papers presented in 
this thesis, which will present the main findings and the contribution of the papers to the 
existing literature. Table 1 (in section 1.2) provides an overview of the four papers.   
Paper 1 address the contribution of the CDM to the promotion of technology 
transfer to developing countries, a topic that has attracted increasing interest from scholars 
addressing the development impacts of CDM projects in host countries. Paper 1 contributes 
to this literature by analysing the role of CDM projects in stimulating the transfer of new 
technology and knowledge to Malaysia. Most studies within this field rely on project 
developers' own statements concerning technology transfer presented in official project 
documents. The extended fieldwork approach adopted in Paper 1 provides a more 
multifaceted picture going behind the ‘official statements’ found in project documents. 
Contrary to the general claims of project developers, the paper concludes that the CDM 
played a limited role in stimulating technology and knowledge transfer. On the other hand, 
CDM contributed to incentivizing the diffusion of existing technologies by reducing the 
payback period and improving the internal rate of return of projects. 
Building on the analysis undertaken in Paper 1, Paper 2 addresses the topic of low-
carbon technology transfer and technological capability formation in developing country 
firms. The existing literature on this topic has been dominated by industry-level studies and 
a conceptualisation of technology transfer as mainly encompassing physical equipment and 
patents. Previous studies have therefore neglected to examine the firm-level specifics of 
technological capability-building and overlooked the centrality of knowledge embodied in 
technology transfer. This paper contributes to addressing these gaps by utilising firm-level 
data to analyse the extent to which the use of different learning mechanisms can explain 
differences in the accumulation of technological capabilities. This is explored via an 
examination of eight firms in the biomass boiler and power plant supplier industry in 
Malaysia during the period 1970-2011. The paper concludes that differences in the level of 
technological capability achieved by individual firms were influenced by i) the specific 
combination of learning mechanisms employed by the firms; and ii) differences in the 
relative levels of resources dedicated to exploiting these learning mechanisms. It is found 
that firms relying on a combination of learning from foreign technology partners and 
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internal learning by planned experimentation make most progress in building technological 
capability.  
Paper 3 addresses the issue of how transitions towards more sustainable 
development pathways may be achieved in Southeast Asia, a topic that has drawn 
increasing interest from a number of scholars within the socio-technical transition tradition. 
The paper contributes to this literature by examining the conducive and limiting factors for 
the development and proliferation of a palm oil biomass waste-to-energy niche in Malaysia 
during the period 1990-2011. The paper concludes that the niche development process has 
made only slow progress, despite a brief and momentary period of niche development 
during 2002-2006. The paper identifies reluctance in implementing energy policy, rises in 
biomass resource prices, limited network formation and negative results at the niche level 
as the main factors hindering niche development. The paper provide an empirical 
contribution to an understanding of the critical factors that may influence the development 
of niches from a single or a few isolated experiments to larger up-scaling in a developing 
country context.   
The analysis undertaken in Paper 3 provides a basis for Paper 4, which explores the 
role of international donor interventions in the development of a palm oil biomass waste-to-
energy niche in Malaysia. This paper responds to recent calls in the literature on socio-
technical transitions for improving the conceptualisation and empirical assessment of 
transnational linkages in niche development and transition processes. It proposes adding a 
novel conceptual framework to the existing literature by drawing on the ‘planned 
intervention’ tradition to analyse the role of donor interventions as one form of 
transnational linkage in niche development. According to this framework, attention should 
be given to a focus on the analysis of interests, as donor interventions most likely open up 
new arenas of struggle over resources, interests and influence between various actors, 
rather than the execution of a specific plan of action. With regard to its empirical 
contribution, the paper concludes that the limited effect of twenty years of donor 
interventions on niche development was influenced by the following three factors: i) that 
advice and knowledge dissemination on energy policy had a limited impact, mainly due to 
strong opposing interests in maintaining the existing situation; ii) that creating the necessary 
conditions for transferring a private-sector model of electricity production to the Malaysia 
remained a challenge; and iii) that the short duration of each intervention and the 
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unpredictability of interventions generally can be seen as important impediments for 
programs to reach their objectives.   
Beside these papers, four additional publications have been prepared in parallel with 
the preparation of this thesis. Although these four additional papers are not to be included 
as part of the assessment of the thesis, they are mentioned below in order to emphasise the 
relevance of the thesis with regard to the ongoing, practically oriented work in the UNEP 
Risø Centre on the transfer and diffusion of low-carbon technologies in developing 
countries.     
 
1) Beniof, R., Coninck, H., Dhar, S., Hansen, U.E., McLaren, J., Painuly, J., 2010, Strengthening 
Clean Energy Technology Cooperation under the UNFCCC: Steps toward Implementation, 
Joint report by National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Energy Research Centre of 
the Netherlands (ECN), and UNEP Risø Centre.  
 
2) Boldt, J., Nygaard, I., Hansen, U.E., Trærup, S., 2012, Overcoming Barriers to the Transfer 
and Diffusion of Climate Technologies, UNEP Risø Centre and Global Environment Facility 
(GEF).  
 
3) Hansen, U.E, Olhof, A., 2009, Climate Change: The Current State of Knowledge, Part I in: 
Trade and Climate Change WTI-UNEP Report, World Trade Organisation (WTO) and United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).  
 
4) Haselip, J., Nygaard, I., Hansen, U., Ackom, E., 2011, Diffusion of Renewable Energy 
Technologies: Case Studies of Enabling Frameworks in Developing Countries, Technology 
Transfer Perspectives Series, UNEP Risø Centre.  
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5. Conclusion  
 
5.1. Main findings  
 
 This thesis set out to explore the main influential factors for the transfer and 
diffusion of biomass power plant technologies in Malaysia. The following presentation of 
the main findings is organised around two overarching themes: i) slow niche development 
process compared to anticipations; and ii) firm-level learning and technological capability 
formation. These will be elaborated further below. Subsequently, areas of further research 
will be identified.     
 
5.1.1. Slow niche development process compared to anticipations  
 
 The formation and up-scaling of niches typically takes place on a temporal scale of 
around 10-15 years, and studies generally find that niche up-scaling is a long-term, 
cumbersome and highly complex process (Hoogma et al., 2002; Raven 2005). Many studies 
also show that in many cases niche development does not even reach beyond the 
completion of a few isolated niche-level experiments (see e.g. Hoogma, 2000). Moreover, it 
is also uncertain whether the formation of a viable niche will eventually diffuse on a wider 
scale and create a transition at the regime level, which takes place on an even longer 
timescale. In correspondence with this understanding in the existing literature, this thesis 
found that the development of a palm oil biomass waste-to-energy niche in Malaysia only 
made limited progress despite a prolonged period of twenty years of niche formation.  
The thesis identified reluctance in implementing an efficient (or necessary) energy 
policy as the main limiting factor for niche development in this case. Although a number of 
donor programs providing policy advice and knowledge dissemination advocated the 
adoption of a stronger enabling framework to support niche development, this only had a 
limited effect on policy development. When the government finally decided to improve the 
incentive structures through a reduction in fossil fuel subsidies and by introducing a feed-in-
tariff system, these measures were only implemented about ten years after they had 
initially been suggested by donor programs. In addition, these measures were introduced at 
a time when the investment interest in palm oil biomass waste-to-energy plants in Malaysia 
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had slowed down significantly and therefore appeared to be having less effect on niche 
development than if they had been implemented earlier. The thesis finds that the limited 
impact of donor programs on policy development was mainly attributed to the strong 
opposing interests of key actors in maintaining the existing situation. Of particular 
importance was the limited support from the national electricity utility company in 
Malaysia, which over an extended period deliberately obstructed niche development 
because it was against its economic interests. Moreover, due to their short-term duration 
and instability of support, donor programs did not provide a sufficient level of continuity 
necessary to attract investors to engage in large-scale power plant projects.  
The CDM played some role in supporting niche development by providing a financial 
incentive that improved the returns on project investments for project developers. 
However, many planned plants were never put into operation, and those that were 
constructed were substantially delayed and generally only had poor levels of performance. 
This may be acknowledged when considering the limited number of biomass CDM projects 
registered in Malaysia that have materialized into operational plants and issuing of carbon 
credits (UNEP Risø, 2013). The largely negative results from niche-level experimentation 
activities came to play an important factor limiting niche development since it significantly 
reduced the investment interest from palm oil companies, which increasingly considered 
palm oil biomass waste-to-energy plants a risky business venture compared to the 
continuation of their core business activities.  
At the same time, a number of alternative usages of biomass waste attracted 
increasing commercial interest in the Malaysian palm oil industry, such as biofuel, pulp and 
paper and cardboards, which were considered more profitable compared to energy 
generation. Therefore, in combination with the generally high risk assessment of plant 
investments, palm oil companies became reluctant to invest in palm oil biomass waste-to-
energy plants. This was at odds with the continued push from donor programs aiming to 
encourage palm oil companies to become power producers as part of promoting a private-
sector model of electricity production in Malaysia. The growing interest in alternative 
biomass waste usages in the palm oil industry led to a substantial price increase for palm oil 
biomass waste. The perception of biomass in the palm oil industry therefore gradually 
changed from being considered an unproductive waste product to being an economically 
valuable resource. This meant that it became difficult to engage palm oil companies in long-
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term biomass fuel contracts, which were needed for power plants investors relying on 
external biomass resources. This turned out be an important factor hindering niche 
development.  
Finally, the thesis finds that, during the entire niche development process, a broader 
network linking actors together across the individual plants remained weak. The lack of 
inter-company coordination of activities and interaction in general was mainly attributed to 
longstanding rivalry among local boiler suppliers and a deliberate strategy of investors to 
prevent plant-specific knowledge from being disseminated. Formalised and coordinated 
knowledge sharing among these actors was therefore limited despite donor programs' 
efforts to establish a platform for exchanging experiences. The lack of knowledge sharing 
comprises another key factor limiting niche development. Yet, learning did take place in the 
niche development process, mainly in the form of unintended knowledge spill-over, such as 
imitation and copying, as well as in the individual projects.  
 
5.1.2. Firm-level learning and technological capability formation 
  
 The transfer of technology is understood in this thesis as the exchange of knowledge 
through international inter-firm linkages, which contribute to enhancing the technological 
capability of the recipient firms, thus enabling them to engage in innovation. This 
understanding focuses on the importance of knowledge, including the elements that are 
tacit in nature, which is contrasted to the prevailing understanding in the existing literature 
that focuses on the transfer of physical equipment and patents. The learning and 
innovation-based perspective adopted in this thesis has provided a basis for analysing 
technology transfer and the formation of technological capabilities in the Malaysian biomass 
boiler and power plant equipment industry. 
The thesis finds that firms that dedicate significant resources to a specific 
combination of learning from foreign partners and planned learning from their own 
experimentation made most progress in terms of technological capability. Firms using a 
combination of learning from imitating national competitor firms (which learned from 
interactions with foreign partners) and internal trial and error also made advances in 
technological capability although to a comparably lesser extent. The thesis also found that 
firms that rely on learning by imitating local competitors failed to take advantage of the 
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potential opportunities to learn from commercial interactions with overseas technology 
partners. This implies that a lack of technological capability-building through learning from 
foreign partners may be due to a lack of efforts devoted to exploiting such opportunities 
rather than a lack of an opportunity to do so. The implications of these findings suggest that 
a combination of specific learning mechanisms plays a significant role in technological 
capability formation in developing country firms.    
 The thesis also finds that CDM projects implemented in Malaysia played a limited 
role in stimulating the introduction of new technology and knowledge to Malaysian biomass 
boiler and power plant equipment supplier firms. Involvement in CDM projects did not add 
anything above and beyond what was already included in the existing relationships between 
the firms in question. The high level of optimism to be found in the international policy 
arena concerning the role of CDM in stimulating the transfer of low-carbon technologies to 
developing countries (see e.g. Grubb et al., 1999; UNFCCC, 2001) therefore did not 
materialize in the case of biomass power plant technology in Malaysia. These findings are 
interesting, as they challenge the over-optimistic view of the contribution of CDM to 
technology transfer in existing research and policy debates. This is particularly relevant as 
most of the project documents emphasized their influence on technology transfer, as did 
the institutional approval system in Malaysia. Yet, the limited role of CDM projects in 
technology transfer may not be that surprising given its main role as a financial mechanism.  
 
5.2. Further research  
 
 Since research on the transfer and diffusion of technologies in developing countries 
in the context of climate change is very much in its infancy, four promising future research 
agendas could profit from the work undertaken in this thesis.     
 First, future studies are needed to explore further the topic of transnational linkages 
and the international dimension of niche development and transition processes. Previous 
studies in developing Asia have only described sustainable transitions in broad terms as part 
of ongoing globalisation processes (see e.g. Rock et al., 2009), but such analyses should 
become much more detailed regarding how global processes materialise in specific 
localities.  
27
The work undertaken in Wieczorek et al. (2012) on the multilayerdnes of 
experiments and in Binz et al. (2012) on spatially coupled innovation systems are 
complementary to the work undertaken in this thesis, and could be further explored.  
 Secondly, and related to the above, technical change in developing countries is often 
driven by the acquisition, assimilation and further development of technologies obtained 
from foreign sources. As the literature on technological capability formation in developing 
country firms is particularly concerned with the importance of such external linkages with 
regard to learning and innovation, future research may tie this literature closer together 
with the socio-technical transition framework when applied in the context of developing 
countries (see e.g. Byrne et al., 2011). Particularly, additional studies could address the role 
of external firm-level linkages with regard to the maturation of technologies in an evolving 
niche, including their influence on learning and experimentation activities, actor-network 
formation and expectations for the niche. This is in line with the suggestion in Berkhout et 
al. (2011) to combine an analysis of global flows of knowledge and technology on localised 
niche development processes.  
Thirdly, more research is needed to explore the role of firm-level technological 
capability formation in niche development processes. Since many developing country firms 
may only have developed limited technological capabilities, their ability to manage and 
generate technical change may be restricted, which may influence the niche development 
process. Although the technological capabilities of firms are considered an important part of 
the functioning of innovation systems, this issue has not been taken up in a developing 
country context to any great extent.      
Fourthly, future research could address in greater detail the relative importance of 
different internal, local and foreign sources of learning, and their specific combinations, for 
the development of technological capability in developing country firms. This is not only 
relevant for studies examining low carbon technologies, but could also be explored in other 
industrial contexts. Important is however that the systematic collection and analysis of firm-
level data should be an essential element of such research efforts. A topic of increasing 
importance in this regard concerns the recent growth of outward foreign direct investment 
from developing country firms in the form of mergers and acquisitions of firms in developed 
countries (UNCTAD, 2011). Since these outward investments are mainly motivated by the 
attempts of developing country firms to appropriate new technological know-how and 
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innovative competences, future research could address whether such sources of learning 
constitute a promising new avenue for technological capability building compared to other 
sources (Pradhan, 2010).  
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1 Introduction 
The transfer of low carbon emitting technologies is an essential prerequisite in order to 
achieve significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions in developing countries. 
Given the rapid growth of emissions in these countries, technology transfer is needed to 
promote a more climate-friendly trajectory for economic development. The urgency of 
the matter can be affirmed when considering that the total projected level of GHG 
emissions for developing countries is expected to account for two-thirds to three-fourths 
of the global increase in emissions by 2030 (IPCC, 2007). Technology transfer from 
developed to developing countries has consequently and increasingly entered the top of 
the political agenda, especially concerning a post 2012 climate change regime following 
the first Kyoto Protocol (KP) period. The ongoing political negotiation process under  
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), respectively 
under the Ad hoc Working Group of the Convention (AWG-LCA) and the KP  
(AWG-KP) have confirmed that technology transfer will constitute a cornerstone in a 
future climate change agreement. In this context, the KP’s clean development mechanism 
(CDM) has played and continues to play a central role in these deliberations concerning 
effective mechanisms that can facilitate and promote the transfer of GHG mitigation 
technologies to developing countries (UNFCCC, 2009). 
In spite of the above, a limited number of studies have undertaken empirical analysis 
of technology transfer occurring through the CDM (see Haites et al., 2006; de Coninck  
et al., 2007; Seres, 2007; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008; Hoffmann et al., 2008). These 
studies, which apply similar methodological and analytical approaches, focus primarily 
on the arguments put forward concerning technology transfer in the CDM project design 
documents (PDDs), required for the process of project approval. A mainly descriptive 
approach has been adopted in these studies, although predominantly through regression 
analysis, they have also assessed whether technology transfer takes place and whether 
specific factors, e.g., project type or project size influence this. Notwithstanding the 
usefulness of these studies, they provide merely an overall picture or first layer of 
analysis on the issue at hand. An underlying weakness regarding the reliability of the 
results of these studies concerns their source of information, i.e., the PDDs, since the 
information herein is not evaluated or verified independently. The studies moreover focus 
narrowly on the origin of the technology, which may overlook the underlying 
arrangements and circumstances under which the technology has been supplied and 
implemented. Furthermore, owing to their research design, the studies do not further the 
understanding of the factors involved in the micro-level processes regarding technology 
transfer. These factors concern the nature of the relationship and interaction between  
the transferee and transferor parties in the projects (the receivers and providers of 
technology) and their respective strategic interests. In relation to this, the previous studies 
concentrate only to a limited extent on the nature of knowledge transfer-related activities, 
and thereby, contribute less to clarify the substance of this in the CDM. In contrast, the 
objective of this study is to assess what role CDM projects play in relation to the transfer 
of GHG mitigation technologies from developed countries (Annex 1 countries) to 
developing countries (non-Annex 1 countries) by focusing on the factors not addressed to 
any great extent in these studies. This study applies a different analytical approach and 
research design than the above-mentioned studies. This involves focusing more on the 
concrete actors, at the firm-level, involved in the technological aspects of specific CDM 
projects. As private companies predominantly have the ownership and legal rights over 
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various technologies and the diffusion of these occurs through markets, in which 
companies are key actors, this makes it relevant to focus on the company-level in the 
analysis. Hence, in order to conduct a more intensive and in-depth study of technology 
transfer at the micro-level and in a local context, a case study design was considered 
appropriate for this study. The study was performed as a multiple case study of 13 
registered CDM projects implemented in Malaysia. Underpinning the selection of 
Malaysia was both a wish to reduce the interest sphere of the study and to address the 
issue in a country, which under its institutional CDM approval system has formulated 
detailed conditions concerning technology transfer. It could therefore be expected that 
this element would be an important part of the implemented projects, which render 
Malaysia suitable as a case for studying the associated processes. In relation hereto, the 
study also takes into consideration the country specific CDM-related institutional and 
regulatory arrangement. Furthermore, in Malaysia and in the Southeast Asian region, the 
number of CDM projects has been increasing and are expected to continue to increase 
(UNEP, 2008). Therefore, insights obtained from this study can provide valuable input 
into arrangements and configurations of similar projects in the future. It may also 
contribute to broader discussions on technology transfer provisions in the CDM or other 
initiatives involving GHG mitigation actions in developing countries. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After the introduction, Section 2 
will present the key concepts and notions that constitute the central elements of the 
analytical framework applied in the analytic process of this study. In Section 3, the 
methodological approach is described and Section 4 reports the results. This is followed 
in Section 5 by a general discussion of the findings. In Section 6, the conclusions drawn 
will be presented. 
2 Key concepts and analytical framework 
2.1 Conceptualisation of technology transfer 
Most often, the transfer of GHG mitigation technologies denote the relocation of 
technology embodied in physical goods, instalations, industrial machinery and 
equipment, components, etc., which ultimately causes a net reduction in GHGs  
(IPCC, 2000). However, the concept of ‘technology’ has been defined in numerous ways 
and little consensus seems to have emerged concerning the meaning and content of the 
concept (Martinot et al., 1997; Müller, 2003). The various conventional definitions of 
technology can be categorised as representing three types of perspectives: 
1 the technology as transformer perspective 
2 the technology as tool perspective 
3 the technology as knowledge perspective (Ramanathan, 1994). 
The first perspective reflects the traditional understanding of technology as  
encompassing only the material side of production, i.e., the machines and equipment 
necessary to transform raw materials into finished products (Levin, 1997; Chandra and 
Zulkieflimansyah, 2003). The focus on tangible objects and artefacts also corresponds  
to the perception of technology as a ‘black box’ (Rosenberg, 1982). The technology as  
a tool perspective expands the concept to include man-machine interrelations by 
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emphasising the associated intangible factors, for example, the skills, methods and 
heuristic knowledge of humans. The third perspective opens up the technology black box 
further by understanding technology as a specialised body of knowledge which can take 
certain forms, e.g., tools, processes, techniques, machines, materials or procedures. This 
reflects the cognitive aspects of technology and encompasses both accumulated technical 
experiences, tacit knowledge and know-how, and the more complex scientific theoretical 
insights and expertise, involving more codified/formalised knowledge such as blueprints, 
patents and technical specifications (Jacot, 1997; Lorentzen, 1998). Ramanathan (1994) 
suggests a fourth eclectic form of technology understanding, which attempts to 
incorporate the different perspectives into an integrative technology concept. In 
accordance with this approach, technology is in this study understood broadly, 
encompassing both the tangible and intangible dimensions, which can be said to 
constitute or characterise a given technology (Sharif, 1994; Müller, 2003). 
Table 1 The analytical assessment framework to assess the role of the CDM in relation to 
technology transfer 
Factors taken into account Sub-issues related to these factors 
• Identification of the technology-related transferee and transferor 
companies involvement of these companies in the projects 
• Characterisation of the CDM project-related internal 
arrangements relevant to the projects, which involve 
identification of the channels that facilitate transfer of 
technology and knowledge and the nature of the relations 
between the transferee and transferor companies 
• The previous CDM-related activities of the identified transferee 
companies in Malaysia 
Transfer from Annex 1 
countries to Malaysia in 
(and through) concrete 
CDM projects 
• The transfer of main or core technological hardware components 
• Technological learning process facilitated through interaction 
between the relevant companies involved in the CDM projects, 
including training activities, exchange of knowledge, e.g., 
through cooperation regarding implementation of the technology 
• Identification of the effects on the capability of the Malaysian 
companies (as a whole) to undertake new activities and/or to 
generate changes in the technology 
• The strategic interests of the relevant companies involved in and 
aspects relating to technology and knowledge transfer 
Accumulation of  
firm-level technological 
capabilities in the 
Malaysian companies 
through CDM project 
involvement 
• The process whereby adaptation, modification, reconfiguration, 
redesign, development, etc., of the technological system 
pertinent to the CDM projects has taken place in order to 
overcome specific challenges, obstacles or barriers 
• Historic assessment of the identified Malaysian (transferee) 
company, including the general company profile, its core 
business activities and project activities also before its CDM 
project involvement 
CDM as an initiator –  
the historic account and 
background information 
on the activities of the 
Malaysian companies • The history and development of the relationship and 
interrelations between the Malaysian (transferee) company  
and the affiliated Annex 1 country (transferor) company 
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2.2 Analytical framework 
An analytical framework was specifically developed for this study with the purpose to 
provide a thorough qualitative characterisation and assessment of technology transfer in 
the CDM. In Table 1, the framework is presented which comprise the three primary 
factors or criteria taken into consideration in the analysis of the specific CDM projects 
examined. These factors and related sub-issues will in turn be addressed in the following. 
2.2.1 Transfer from Annex 1 countries to Malaysia through CDM projects 
The transfer notion inevitably implies that at least two entities can be identified between 
which the transfer can occur. In this study, the relevant transferee and transferor agents  
of technology transfer are generally understood as the companies, with respective head 
offices located in Malaysia and Annex 1 countries which reasonably clearly can be 
identified as directly involved in the implementation of the technological systems in the 
CDM projects. In the Malaysian context, the transferees include the companies hosting 
the CDM projects, manufacturers, technology providers, consultant companies, licensees 
of Annex 1 country companies, joint venture companies and subsidiaries. These 
companies are included since they can directly influence and be influenced by technology 
transfer in the CDM projects. The technology transferor parties are understood as the 
Annex 1 country-based licensees, parent companies, joint venture companies and others, 
which provide, facilitate access to or enable the transferee companies to supply or 
implement technologies in the projects. 
Different modes and mechanisms may facilitate technology and knowledge transfer. 
These includes FDI, joint ventures, licensing, fee and royalty agreements, turnkey 
projects, purchase of capital goods, technical agreements and various forms of 
cooperation arrangements (Bell, 1997; IPCC, 2000). At the company-level, these 
pathways appear to be especially relevant since they concern the commercial and 
technology-related relationships and ownership structures between the companies 
(Forsyth, 2005). The varying modes of transfer related to the CDM projects pertinent to 
this study are included as a central element of what is referred to as the project-related 
internal arrangements. These arrangements denote the internal structure of relations, 
interactions and ties between companies through which flows of technology and 
knowledge can be channelled. Therefore, this assessment factor also involves an 
identification of the CDM-related activities of the transferee company in order to address 
the existence or creation of these channels. Table 2 presents an analytic categorisation of 
the types of internal arrangements relevant for the specific projects and companies in this 
study. As appears, Table 2 establishes technology developer, technology producer  
and technology user companies as operational analytical entities according to their 
technology transfer-related characteristics. The developer companies encompass the 
relevant transferor companies in the Annex 1 countries, which develop and possibly 
produce core components of the technological systems implemented in the specific 
projects. The producer companies denote the non-Annex 1 country companies that owing 
to the relations with the former are able to manufacture and/or possibly implement the 
technology in question. The user parties are understood as the companies hosting the 
CDM projects, which in concrete terms utilise and operate the specific technologies. 
Figure 1 presents Table 2 visually, where the dotted line symbolises the boundary 
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between the Annex 1 country transferor sphere (above) and the non-Annex 1 country 
transferee sphere (below). 
Table 2 Analytic categories of the CDM project-related internal arrangements 
Modes and mechanisms of transfer Characteristics of the transferor and  transferee companies 
1 Technology provider 
partnership arrangements 
Transfer of technology and knowledge facilitated  
through joint venture companies or other partnership 
arrangements between an Annex 1 country technology 
developer company and non-Annex 1 country company 
manufacturer or other type of company that perform 
implementation of the technology, entailing also channels 
to the end-users of the technology 
2 Technology implementation by 
Annex 1 country company 
subsidiary 
The implementations of the technology or the 
technological system is handled, controlled and 
undertaken by an Annex 1 country company operating 
through its subsidiary company, which is based in the 
non-Annex 1 country. This implies channels to transfer of 
technology and knowledge from an Annex 1 country to a 
non-Annex 1 country albeit within the company and to 
the technology end-user companies of the technology. 
3 Non-Annex 1 country company 
manufacturing technology 
under a license, royalty or fee 
agreement 
Manufacture of technology by a non-Annex 1 country 
through a license, royalty or fee agreement with an  
Annex 1 country technology developer company, which 
thereby facilitate channels of technology and knowledge 
to the non-Annex 1 company and to the end-user 
companies of the technology 
Source: Compiled from Kumar et al. (1999) and IPCC (2000) 
Figure 1 Visual representation of project-related internal arrangements 
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Furthermore, as appears in Table 1, this assessment factor also takes into account the 
transfer of main or core technological hardware components. Yet, this aspect is primarily 
considered relevant insofar as the transfer process facilitates a possibility for the 
identified Malaysian companies to access valuable knowledge and obtain substantial 
insights into the hardware in question. 
2.2.2 Accumulation of firm-level technological capabilities 
Technology transfer can facilitate a possibility of tapping into the knowledge base of  
the external organisation and can thereby contribute to increase the human skills and 
organisational capital of the receiving company (Wei, 1995). A central element of  
the analytical frame, therefore, concerns an assessment of the technological learning 
processes and its effects on technological capability building of the Malaysian 
companies, resulting from its interactions with Annex 1 country companies involved in 
the CDM projects. The notion of firm-level technological capabilities is therefore  
used to characterise, conceptualise and qualify the knowledge dimension and the  
inter-organisational learning process of technology transfer (Levin, 1997). It should be 
remembered, however, that technology transfer also may have detrimental implications 
for the transferee parties, including reproduction of technology dependency, consolidate 
asymmetrical power structures and have socially damaging effects. 
The concept of technological capabilities has since the 1980s become central to 
theories on engines of economic growth in developing countries (Lorentzen, 1998; 
Chandra and Zulkieflimansyah, 2003). The focus on technology transfer in this context 
has been to address the factors that lead to, stimulate and set into motion a continuing 
learning process in the receiving companies entailing, inter alia, further change and 
development of the initially acquired technology and existing technologies (Bell, 1997). 
The transfer of technology can, through facilitating a dynamic assimilation and learning 
process, contribute to develop the dynamic and innovative technological capabilities of 
the companies (Bell and Pavitt, 1993). Firm-level technological capabilities, thus, denote 
a company’s ability as a whole to utilise technological knowledge efficiently to acquire, 
assimilate, use, replicate and generate changes in existent technologies and the ability to 
develop new technologies, products and processes. As organisations, firms can learn and 
accumulate knowledge over time, e.g., through technology transfer, which enables these 
to undertake new and progressively more demanding innovative activities. This process 
can be understood as gradual and evolutionary, and therefore, path dependent, in which 
sequential levels of capability accumulation can be identified (Müller, 2003; Dutrénit, 
2004). In this study, the central aspect is that the identification of these capability levels 
can provide an understanding of the companies’ competences regarding the specific 
CDM project-related technologies. 
The characterisation and properties of the technological and organisational learning 
processes, relevant to technology transfer initiatives, have been considered in various 
ways in the literature on firm-level technological capabilities (Dutrénit, 2004). Common 
to these approaches are that the process of transferring knowledge which is accumulated 
in the transferor company that necessitates close interaction with the transferee company  
in order to facilitate access and insights into operation, maintenance, manufacture, 
implementation, design and development of the technologies in question (Lall, 2002; 
Müller, 2003). This technological knowledge, either tacit or codified in nature and 
possibly embodied in firm-specific routines and structures, may entail various forms of 
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interaction, including collaboration, instruction, supervision, training activities and  
more, to induce accumulation of technological capabilities in the transferee company. 
Different detailed taxonomic models to characterise and analytically operationalise  
the development and achievement of different capability levels have previously been 
advanced (Lall, 1992; Bell, 2007). Here, a simple model is adopted, and although 
inspired by the above-mentioned approaches, it will not contain as comprehensive 
information, especially regarding the company-related functions, as the above. Therefore, 
in this study, firm-level technological capabilities denotes the knowledge, including  
the coordinative, managerial and organisational capacity of the company as a whole, 
necessary to undertake certain activities regarding the technology in question. In Table 3, 
the model is presented, which features three levels of capabilities and the properties that 
characterise these levels. The model serves to provide an analytical basis for a qualitative 
assessment of the capability level of the Malaysian companies, both prior and subsequent 
to their involvement in CDM projects. 
Table 3 The levels and properties of firm-level technological capabilities 
Levels of capabilities Properties related to the levels of technological capabilities 
• Capabilities to use, operate and maintain the technological 
equipment, devises, machinery, etc., subsequent to implementation 
of technology, including undertaking replacement and repair of 
minor components 
Basic 
(know-how) 
• The capability, primarily concerning the respective operators, to 
secure and maintain an efficient level of productivity (at best at its 
design levels of performance) 
• Capability to replicate and/or independently undertake complete 
implementation, including possible fabrication of technological 
components, technological subsystems or complete systems 
Intermediate 
(know-what) 
• The capability to independently undertake incrementally minor 
adjustments, modifications, improvements, optimisation, etc., in 
relation to specific application requirements and contexts 
• Capability to generate and manage more substantial changes and 
developments in the technological component, technological 
subsystem or complete system in question 
Advance or innovative 
(know-why) 
• The capability to undertake reconfiguration and redesign of the basic 
technology outlay, develop new designs or elements of the system or 
of the complete system including possibly to continuously optimise 
the system performance through engineering R&D-related activities 
Source: Müller (2003) and Bell (1997, 2007) 
This assessment factor also addresses the respective strategic interests of the companies 
involved in the process of, and aspects relating to, technology and knowledge transfer.  
In this regard, companies that develop technologies generally seek in different ways to 
retain strategic control over the core areas of their technology and tacit knowledge, 
through intellectual property rights (IPRs), patents and more, to hinder an uncontrolled 
dissemination of these aspects (Dicken, 2003). The ownership structure between 
companies, pertinent also to the rights of the technology, may constitute one opportunity 
for the technology developer companies to control their valuable assets in relation to 
activities and operations in other countries (Bell, 1997; Kumar et al., 1999; Forsyth, 
2005). It has been suggested that a more integrated, binding and shared nature of 
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technology-related ownership relations between the companies involved imply increased 
incentives to exchange valuable knowledge (Hagedoorn, 1990). Relating hereto, the 
factors influencing the respective interests of the transferee and transferor agents, most 
important for the progress and outcome of technology transfer initiatives, have been 
summarised as capacity, opportunity and willingness (Kua and Ashford, 2004). For 
example, the needs and aspirations of the transferee company determine the envisaged 
opportunities and consequent willingness to actively engage in the process. The  
progress and outcome are, however, also contingent on the capacity of the transferee,  
the willingness to exchange valuable knowledge and the opportunities foreseen by the 
transferor. 
Technology and knowledge transfer processes often involve an adaptation phase. This 
especially concerns the introduction of new technology in a company or country, since a 
different application context may imply challenges to the optimal performance of the 
technology. The technological system may therefore undergo changes to overcome the 
obstacles and different requirements (Lorentzen, 1998; Müller, 2003). If relevant, these 
adjustment processes to handle technological challenges or barriers will be taken into 
account. 
2.2.3 The CDM as initiator of technology and knowledge transfer activities 
This aspect of the analytical assessment framework concerns a historic assessment of  
the identified Malaysian transferee companies and focuses on the development, the 
company’s core business activities and the general profile of the company. In this regard, 
the intention is also to address these companies’ various project activities prior to  
the possibility of participating in CDM projects. This element, therefore, addresses the 
novelty of the specific technological systems implemented in the CDM projects, seen in 
relation to prior applications in Malaysia of the companies’ technologies. Furthermore, 
the history and development of the transferee companies’ affiliation with the identified 
Annex 1 country companies will also be taken into consideration. This assessment will 
address the nature of the relationship and interaction between these companies that has 
been evident prior to the CDM. Thereby, the analysis attempts to include the pre-existing 
engagements which may still be evident that facilitate transfer of technology and 
knowledge, in order to place the CDM within a historic context. The intention is thus to 
understand and assess whether the CDM initiates changes in the nature of the internal 
relationship and interaction patterns between the companies. Moreover, this also provides 
a possibility to understand whether the CDM essentially implies a continuation of  
the standard activities of the transferee company which implicitly have implications 
concerning the technological additionality of the projects. 
3 Methodological approach 
3.1 Projects and companies taken into consideration 
As an initial data collection strategy, it was considered relevant only to include CDM 
projects registered by the clean development mechanism executive board (CDM EB), and 
published on the UNFCCC website, before the 1st of November 2007. The intention  
was thereby to focus on projects either implemented or currently in a final stage of 
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implementation. Among the 18 projects identified, 13 were chosen for further analysis 
since it was possible to obtain additional and sufficient information besides the official 
project documents concerning these projects and to establish contact to the relevant 
companies involved. Twelve of these projects involve the implementation of boiler 
technologies, which utilise biomass residues, inter alia from the Malaysian palm oil 
industry primarily empty fruit bunches (EFBs), to generate energy. One project concerns 
a landfill gas extraction and utilisation project. The project titles, project host companies 
and project numbers relevant to these 13 projects are presented in Table 4. The relevant 
companies referred to in the official PDDs and validation reports associated with these 
projects were consulted in order to identify additional technology supplier and facilitator 
companies. Each project, therefore, involves the participation of both Annex 1 country 
companies and companies based in Malaysia. The study is hence structured as a multiple 
case study, where each identified case describes the constellation of companies involved 
in the specific CDM projects. All projects taken into consideration claim to facilitate and 
result in technology transfer from an Annex 1 country to Malaysia in their PDDs and/or 
validation reports. 
Table 4 CDM projects taken into consideration 
CDM project title CDM project host company 
CDM 
project 
no. 
Biomass Energy Lumut PGEO Edible Oils Sdn. Bhd. #249 
Kina Biopower 11.5 MW EFB Power Plant Kina Biopower Sdn. Bhd. #385 
Seguntor Bioenergy 11.5 MW Power Plant Seguntor Bioenergy Sdn. Bhd. #386 
LDEO Biomass Steam and Power Plant in 
Malaysia 
LDEO Energy Sdn. Bhd. #395 
SEO Biomass Steam and Power Plant in 
Malaysia 
Sandakan Edible Oils Sdn. Bhd. #402 
Bentong Biomass Energy Plant in Malaysia Pascorp Paper Industries Berhad #501 
ENCO Biomass Energy Plant in Malaysia Kulim Industrial Estate #502 
Johor Bundled Biomass Steam Plant in 
Malaysia 
WT Speciality Ingredients Sdn. Bhd. #503 
Jenderata Steam and Power Plant United Plantations Bhd. #558 
Landfill Gas Utilisation at Seelong Sanitary 
Landfill Project 
Seelong Sanitary Landfill #927 
Bandar Baru Serting Biomass Project MHES Asia Sdn. Bhd. #1091 
Biomass Thermal Energy Plant – Hartalega 
Sdn. Bhd. 
Hartalega Sdn. Bhd. #1186 
Mensilin Holdings Biomass Energy Plant 
Project 
Mensilin Holdings Sdn. Bhd. #1214 
Note: See the http://www.unfccc.int web page for further information regarding these 
projects. 
Source: UNEP (2008) 
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3.2 Sources of data and key informants 
This study relies on multiple sources of qualitative data, primary relevance of the PDDs 
and to a lesser extent to the validation reports of the specific projects. The passages 
regarding technology transfer in these documents were assessed with the purpose to 
triangulate the information contained herein with other sources of data. Other documents 
obtained from company and project visits in Malaysia received by post from the 
companies and from the internet provides a further basis for understanding the  
activities of the companies involved. This includes company presentation papers, project 
descriptions, contractual agreements, technical documents and more. Moreover, a number 
of in-depth interviews with employees from the Annex 1 country and Malaysian-based 
companies involved in the identified projects constitute a central element of the data 
material of this study. The intention was to interview company representatives from  
both sides of the PDD’s proclaimed technology transfer process, in order to reach a 
comprehensive understanding of their individual companies’ history and development, 
internal relationship and concrete interaction throughout their CDM project involvement. 
The key informants identified have thus primarily been in higher and longer standing 
management positions within the various companies which enable these to provide such 
information. Interviews with key informants were of a semi-structured nature and were 
conducted both as telephone interviews and during personal meetings at the respective 
companies’ head offices in Malaysia. Interviews were also conducted with official staff 
members of the Malaysian CDM-related regulatory system. Among the 16 interviews 
undertaken in total, two were performed with representatives of the institutional 
Malaysian CDM approval system and 14 with company representatives. All interviews in 
Malaysia were performed during a two-month visit in the spring of 2008. The interview 
discussions were structured on the basis of previously prepared categories of questions 
addressing each of the factors and sub-issues presented in the analytical framework 
(shown in Table 1). 
Figure 2 The companies and projects constituting the five identified cases 
 
Notes: *Kyoto Energy Pte. Ltd. was involved in CDM project no. 1186 as a carbon assest 
manager consultant for the project host company. 
**Mensilin Holdings Sdn. Bhd. was both the project owner and technology  
end-user company in CDM project no. 1214. 
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Table 5 The summarised key findings regarding the analytical sub-issues addressed 
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4 Results 
4.1 Case studies 
The study identified five cases in total, which each comprise the relevant companies and 
CDM projects constituting the case in question. The cases are presented in Figure 2, 
where the arrows represent linkages between relevant companies and thereby channels 
for technology transfer. 
Furthermore, in Table 5, the sub-issues related to the factors taken into consideration 
in the analytical framework (see Table 1) have been addressed and the key findings 
regarding these elements pertinent to each of the five cases identified are summarised. 
These findings will be examined in more details in the following. 
As appears in the first column in Table 5, different project-related internal 
arrangements, viz. the underlying formal organisational structures between the involved 
companies are evident in the five cases. The first case falls under the category of a 
subsidiary company facilitating technology implementation, whereas cases two and four 
are characterised by the manufacture of boiler technologies under a license and royalty 
arrangement. In cases three and five, the companies involved are engaged in joint venture 
partnership agreements. 
Regarding case one, the Belgium company Vyncke Energietechniek N.V. has 
operated in Malaysia through its Malaysian-based subsidiary company Vyncke East Asia 
Sdn. Bhd. since the late 1980s. As a company, Vyncke specialises in the implementation 
of tailor-made boiler system solutions according to varying application contexts and can 
undertake all activities related to design, engineering, production, instalation and 
commissioning to training and after sale service. The activities of Vyncke in Malaysia 
and the Southeast Asian region have included numerous boiler system applications in 
different industries utilising various biomass materials. In case two, the Malaysian 
company ENCO Systems Sdn. Bhd. has manufactured and implemented boiler 
technologies in Malaysia respectively under a license and royalty agreement with the 
Danish-based companies Danstoker A/S since 1993 and Babcock & Wilcox Volund A/S 
since 1997. ENCO has implemented the companies’ biomass utilising boilers in 
numerous cases in Malaysia. In the third case, the joint venture company Meridian 
Utilities Sdn. Bhd. was established in 2004 between the Canadian companies Heuristic 
Engineering Inc. and Northern Steel Ltd. and the Malaysian company MHES Asia Sdn. 
Bhd. As a company, Heuristic Engineering Inc. specialises in the development and 
application of biomass-fuelled combustion system technologies and has a license 
agreement with Northern Steel Ltd. to manufacture these technologies. Through the joint 
venture company, the purpose was to jointly undertake promotion, marketing, 
manufacture and distribution of Heuristic Engineering Inc.’s patented combustion 
technology (the so-called envirocycler) in Malaysia and the Southeast Asian region. 
Since the early 1990s, the Malaysian company Jebsen & Jessen Technology Sdn. Bhd. 
has under a partnership agreement undertaken sale, instalation and service of varying 
turbine systems in Malaysia for the Brazilian turbine manufacturer company NG 
Metalúrgica Ltda. Although Brazil is a non-Annex 1 country, the activities and 
relationship between these companies were taken into consideration in order to account 
for the implementation pathway of the turbine technology pertinent to CDM project  
no. 1091. Concerning case four, the Malaysian company Vickers Hoskins Sdn. Bhd. has 
since 1980, under a license agreement with the UK-based company Doosan Babcock 
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Energy Ltd., manufactured and implemented boiler systems in Malaysia. These boilers 
utilise various biomass materials as fuel source and they have been deployed extensively 
in Malaysia. In summary, as is evident from the above, the CDM did not establish new 
channels for technology transfer to other companies besides the technology end-user 
companies in the previously examined cases. In the fifth case, however, the initiation of a 
joint venture partnership between the Danish company GasCon Aps. (through its 
Malaysian-based company Q2 Engineering Sdn. Bhd.) and the Malaysian company 
Southern Waste Management (SWM) Sdn. Bhd. was primarily motivated by the 
possibility to venture together into CDM projects in Malaysia. Therefore, the activities of 
GasCon Aps. in Malaysia relating to landfill gas recovery and utilisation projects can be 
regarded as a direct consequence of or directly influenced by the CDM. The partnership 
also involved the completion of a small-scale demonstration project, co-funded by a 
Danish development fund, to explore the technical and financial viability of the ensuing 
large-scale CDM project at the Seelong Sanitary landfill (CDM project no. 927). 
As can be seen in Table 5, the CDM projects in cases three and four did not involve 
the transfer of main technological hardware components from Annex 1 countries. In case 
one, the core components, i.e., the step grate combustion system, the heat exchanger 
system, the control and regulation system, etc., have in concrete terms been manufactured 
in Belgium and the Czech Republic (and in China) and transferred to Malaysia. However, 
Vyncke exercises a clear protective strategy to avoid an uncontrolled dissemination of 
information and knowledge concerning these systems in the Malaysian context. This has 
effectively hindered the end-user companies and other companies from gaining 
substantial insights into the various aspects of these systems. Regarding case two, the key 
hardware components, including the biomass shredding systems, ventilators, chippers, 
screening machines, separation systems and steam turbines, have been transferred to 
Malaysia from Annex 1 countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Germany, USA and others. 
As in the first case, ENCO strives to prevent other companies from gaining insights into 
the functionality, composition, outlay, arrangement and purpose of this hardware. In case 
five, a gas flaring system, gas analyser and automatic control system – constituting the 
main technological hardware components in CDM project no. 927 – were transferred 
from Germany, England and India. More importantly, GasCon Aps. allowed employees 
of the Malaysian company SWM to gain considerable and detailed insights into these 
systems during the transfer process. 
As laid out in the fourth column of Table 5, Vyncke essentially continues its previous 
activities in Malaysia by implementing tailor-made boiler systems. For example, in CDM 
project no. 1186, Vyncke has supplied a boiler, which utilises EFBs, to generate energy. 
The company has independently handled the challenges or technological barriers 
associated with the combustion of this biomass material in their boiler system. The CDM 
has thereby increased the application volume of the Vyncke boiler system in Malaysia. A 
key factor to achieve this concerns the CDM-related revenue stream, obtained from the 
sale of certified emission reductions (CERs), which contribute to enhance the financial 
viability of such projects. Similarly, in case two, ENCO has through the CDM increased 
its boiler system application volume in Malaysia and has in this regard independently 
handled the appertaining challenges to an optimal operation. As it is the standard 
procedure of the company to manufacture and implement boiler systems utilising 
biomass materials, ENCO also continues its previous activities. Again, the CER revenue 
is a central factor for an increase in the volume of activities. Concerning case three, 
evidence seems to suggest that MHES Asia Sdn. Bhd. successfully has implemented the 
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envirocycler technology of Heuristic Engineering Inc. in CDM project no. 1091. 
Evidently, the company has not been in contact with its two Canadian partners since the 
commencement of the joint venture partnership and has therefore independently 
implemented the technology. In this regard, MHES Asia Sdn. Bhd. has utilised its 
previous extensive experiences in implementation and management of small power 
plants, as is the case in this CDM project, and has thereby continued and expanded its 
prior activities. The continuance of previous company activities also applies to the fourth 
case, where Vickers Hoskins Sdn. Bhd. has manufactured and implemented a boiler 
system utilising EFBs. However, a closer process of collaboration has been evident 
throughout the license partnership with Doosan Babcock Energy Ltd., which has 
involved assistance in solving various technical challenges in specific projects. This is 
also the case in CDM project no. 558, where the boiler system underwent reconfiguration 
to overcome the associated biomass-related challenges. Again, CERs have played a 
central role to further the volume of the company’s boiler systems in Malaysia. In case 
five, SWM has not, prior to its involvement in CDM project no. 927 and concomitant 
partnership with GasCon Aps., been involved in undertaking landfill gas recovery and 
utilisation systems. The CDM project involvement has thereby stimulated SWM, as a 
concessionaire of a large number of landfill sites in Malaysia, to develop landfill gas 
projects through the joint venture company and/or independently. 
In four out of five cases, the accumulation of firm-level technological capabilities has 
been limited to enable the relevant end use operators to carry out efficient operation and 
maintenance of the technologies in question. This has mostly been achieved through short 
training courses. Referring to Section 2.2.2, this corresponds to the lowest level of 
technological capabilities, which therefore suggest that the transfer of knowledge through 
the CDM has been limited. The Malaysian companies have therefore not undergone a 
process, through their CDM project involvement, which enable them to undertake other 
and more demanding activities. Yet, in the fifth case, the CDM project involvement has 
resulted in a substantial learning process for SWM employees throughout a close  
and mutually benefiting process between the involved companies. It appears that the 
CDM-related transfer of knowledge has significantly increased the technological 
capabilities of SWM to implement and handle gas recovery and utilisation systems. 
During all phases of the project, including the demonstration and feasibility study 
process, the companies collaborated closely and on a day-to-day basis. While working on 
site, GasCon Aps. utilised the company’s comprehensive accumulated and tacit expertise 
in overcoming the instalation challenges. SWM, thereby, acquired familiarity with the 
methods and procedures of performing continuous system optimisation necessary to 
handle the implementation, and possibly further technology development, independently. 
The development of such capabilities, through the interaction process, has been 
strategically interesting for SWM, envisaged as involving future market opportunities, 
which has increased the willingness of the company to engage actively in the 
implementation process. GasCon Aps. has been willing to and interested in developing 
the competences of SWM in order to reach an equal project involvement and to 
streamline the process of jointly implementing highly efficient landfill gas recovery 
systems. However, GasCon Aps., also considers it necessary to retain some of the most 
essential information of the technology. This may point towards a possible underlying 
conflict of interest in relation to initiatives involving technology transfer. The cooperative 
and accommodating approach by GasCon Aps. may have been influenced by 
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requirements associated with the initially acquired Danish funds to engage in a long-term 
relationship augmenting the technological capacities of the local partner. 
4.2 The Malaysian institutional CDM approval system 
A CDM project host country needs to have a designated national authority (DNA) in 
place to be eligible to participate in CDM projects. In Malaysia, the DNA is located 
within the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. The role of the DNA is to 
ensure and approve that CDM project activities assists in achieving sustainable 
development for the projects to be registered by the CDM EB. A national committee on 
the clean development mechanism (NCCDM) and the Malaysian Energy Centre together 
with the DNA constitute the regulatory approval framework for CDM projects in 
Malaysia. It is the prerogative of the non-Annex 1 country in question to formulate and 
define the sustainable development criteria used to assess the CDM projects in the 
approval process. In this regard, Malaysia has included technology transfer as a key 
element of these criteria in its formal acceptance and approval modalities. In Table 6, 
these provisions are presented. 
Table 6 The CDM-related technology transfer requirements in the Malaysian sustainable 
development criteria 
Criterion 3 – projects must provide technology transfer benefits  
and/or improvement in technology 
3.3.1 Interpretation 
• Technology transfer and/or improvement in technology include both soft and hard elements of 
technology. 
• CDM projects should lead to the transfer of environmentally sound technologies and  
know-how. 
• Improvement in technology implies that the project applies a technology that is more efficient 
and less carbon intensive. 
• Technology transfer and/or improvement in technology should support the sustainable 
development objectives of Malaysia. 
• Technology transfer and/or improvement in technology should enhance the indigenous 
capacity of Malaysians to apply, develop and implement environmentally sound technologies. 
3.3.2 Indicators – the relevant indicators should measure the following: 
• Impact of the project on the indigenous capacity to apply, develop and implement 
environmentally sound technologies 
• Impact on increased use of renewable energy resources and/or increased energy efficient 
and/or reduction of GHG emissions 
• Demonstrations and replication potential of the technology 
• Impact on domestic energy-related industries and services (increased local content of skills 
and equipment in energy projects) 
Source: Malaysia Energy Centre (2006) 
It appears from Table 6 that technology transfer requirements in the CDM have been a 
central priority for Malaysia. In practice, however, the actual approval and assessment 
procedure adopted by the regulatory system under the DNA has been more 
straightforward and pragmatic. Indeed, technology transfer has in concrete terms been 
54
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    An empirical case study of the transfer of GHG mitigation technologies 17    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
interpreted to require only that the original technology design of the main components in 
a given implemented technological system must originate from an Annex 1 country 
company. Malaysian companies involved in CDM projects engaged in (previous) license, 
royalty and other agreements with Annex 1 country companies, therefore, per se involve 
technology transfer. Efforts have not been devoted to assess, in further detail, the 
concrete technology-related processes and interaction between the involved companies 
during the implementation of the CDM projects. The main reason for this approach is 
attributable to a wish to avoid upholding unnecessary barriers for CDM project 
developers to develop and implement projects in Malaysia. This may therefore suggest 
that more strictly enforced technology transfer requirements may constitute an obstacle to 
further the implementation of CDM projects. 
5 Discussion 
The CDM project assessment approach adopted by the Malaysian CDM approval system 
relates to a general discussion concerning how to conceptualise and operationalise 
technology transfer requirements. This concerns the different ways to formulate, assess, 
enforce, verify and implement technology transfer provisions and to integrate these 
aspects in an institutional and regulatory system. Recent discussions regarding 
technology support for nationally appropriate mitigation actions in developing countries 
and development of technology transfer indicator framework undertaken by the 
UNFCCC’s Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) engages intensively with 
these elements. In relation to a follow-up period to the KP, it seems plausible that the 
CDM will continue to exist although most likely in a modified version. As mentioned, the 
subject of technology transfer from Annex 1 countries to non-Annex 1 countries has 
increasingly entered the top of the political agenda concerning a post 2012 climate 
change regime. Therefore, current debates in the negotiation process concern a possible 
integration of technology transfer requirements (for project registration and approval) in a 
reformed CDM or in other initiatives involving GHG emission reduction activities in 
developing countries. If technology transfer is to be a key priority, also taking the 
findings of this study into consideration, the provisions may require comprehensive 
assessments and accordingly allocation of resources to undertake the procedural activities 
associated herewith. However, a further complication of the CDM project cycle 
procedure may in this regard not be considered desirable for the CDM. Alternatively, the 
requirements may continue to exist as more non-binding and optional provisions, as this 
presently is the case under the regulatory system of the CDM EB. In continuation hereof, 
one possible politically acceptable approach may therefore involve adopting best 
available technology (BAT) requirements. In this regard, technology transfer as one 
objective ultimately needs to be balanced with other aims, including the aspiration to 
increase the volume of GHG mitigation activities, especially if technology transfer 
requirements potentially constitute an obstruction to further these activities. To agree 
upon relevant and verifiable technology transfer-related provisions which satisfy all 
relevant parties’ demands may furthermore constitute a challenging or unfeasible task. A 
question also concerns which regulatory institutional body(ies), e.g., the CDM EB (or 
appurtenant panels), DNAs, designated operational entities (DOEs), etc., should be 
responsible for evaluating prospective technology transfer requirements. In addition, as 
55
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   18 U.E. Hansen    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
the CDM fundamentally is a market-based mechanism, it may not be considered 
politically appropriate to adopt too many restrictions which distort its functioning. 
6 Conclusions 
Although a formal priority of the Malaysian DNA, the study concludes that the CDM 
only plays a role in relation to the transfer of technology from Annex 1 countries to 
Malaysia in one registered and implemented CDM project in Malaysia – the Seelong 
Sanitary Landfill project. Among the 13 projects examined, this project stands out, as the 
CDM is the primary reason for an Annex 1 country company’s engagement in a  
long-term, close and binding partnership with a Malaysian company, which facilitates 
substantial transfer of technology and knowledge. Through this project, the Malaysian 
transferee company gains access to comprehensive insights into fundamental aspects and 
principles of the technological system along with the methods and procedures for its 
continuous optimisation. The company, thereby, accumulates technological capabilities 
necessary to handle implementation, and possibly further development, of the landfill gas 
recovery and utilisation technology. 
While transfer of technological hardware does take place in most projects, the transfer 
of knowledge through the CDM is considered limited. In fact, the process that takes place 
in the (12) remaining examined projects can essentially be characterised as the local 
diffusion of existing technologies. The Malaysian transferee companies’ relationships 
with Annex 1 countries has existed before the companies’ CDM project involvement and 
the capability to handle technology manufacture and/or implementation, including 
overcoming the specific instalation challenges, is already present. Therefore, the CDM 
does not, to any great extent, contribute to develop technological capabilities of these 
companies enabling them to take future responsibility for implementing or developing 
technological GHG mitigation solutions. Moreover, the activities of Annex 1 country 
companies in Malaysia may more appropriately be understood as an element of a general 
internationalisation of their economic activities, involving that these establish 
subsidiaries, joint ventures and license agreements, and more, in Malaysia. On this basis, 
the CDM have led to limited additional technology transfer, above and beyond what 
would have taken place as a consequence of other ongoing processes under the broad 
heading of globalisation. The CDM does, however, play a role as a financial mechanism 
to facilitate wider adoption and usage of the pre-existing technologies by making the 
project activities more financially viable. 
Finally, companies do not engage in technology transfer activities as such, but instead 
in technology procurement, contracts, license, royalty and fee agreements, joint ventures 
and other company-related linkages. The extent to which these linkages, between the 
companies in question, are close and binding in nature seem to encourage the parties to 
exchange valuable technological knowledge. The character of the relationship, thereby, 
seems to play a role for the substance and quality of the technology and knowledge 
transfer process. It is suggested that the transferor companies may not necessarily have 
incentives to transfer substantial technological knowledge necessary to perform 
implementation and/or development of the technology in question. This may therefore 
constitute a potentially underlying limitation to the development of firm-level 
technological capabilities through technology transfer initiatives. Political deliberations 
addressing technology transfer and the CDM, including adopting relevant provisions post 
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2012, may therefore benefit from considering the various pathways or channels for 
technology transfer. 
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Abstract  
 
Low carbon technology transfer is fundamental to supporting lower carbon development 
trajectories in developing countries. But to have a long term impact technology transfer 
needs to support broader processes of learning and technological capability formation. 
Previous studies that look at this in the context of cleantech industries in emerging 
economies tend to overlook intra-industry differences and firm-level specifics. This paper 
contributes to filling this gap by utilising in-depth, qualitative firm-level data to analyse the 
extent to which the use of different learning mechanisms can explain differences in the 
accumulation of technological capabilities. This is explored via an examination of eight firms 
in the biomass power equipment industry in Malaysia during the period 1970-2011. The 
paper finds that firms relying on a combination of learning from foreign technology partners 
and internal learning by planned experimentation make most progress in terms of 
technological capability. Nevertheless, local spill-over effects were found to be important 
for some firms who learned principally from imitation of local competitors, although, 
significantly, firms learning from local spillovers failed to advance beyond extra basic 
operating technological capabilities. Those firms who proactively pursued learning from 
foreign partners, on the other hand, advanced further, reaching basic innovative levels of 
technological capabilities.  
 
Keywords: Technology transfer; technological capabilities; indigenous innovation; climate 
change; biomass; renewable energy; palm oil; Malaysia 
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1. Introduction  
 
There is often a tendency to think of sustainable development separately from 
processes of technological capability development in developing countries via the 
transfer/import of foreign technologies. For example, recent special issues of the 
development studies journal World Development dealt separately with the topics of 
“Sustainable Development, Energy and Climate Change” (Halsnæs et al., 2011) and “Foreign 
Technology and Indigenous Innovation in the Emerging Economies” (Fu et al., 2011). An 
emerging literature, however, is beginning to highlight how these issues are in fact 
inextricably linked and how an understanding of the latter might make a critical contribution 
to realising the former, i.e. sustainable development pathways that incorporate lower 
carbon energy technologies, contributing to climate change mitigation whilst simultaneously 
meeting critical development priorities (Mathews, 2007; Altenburg, 2008; Walz, 2010; 
Ockwell et al, 2010; Berkhout, 2012). But simply transferring lessons from research on 
conventional technology imports and indigenous innovation is not enough. Climate change 
and technologies for its mitigation or adaptation poses a range of unique challenges and 
considerations which are currently under researched and under theorised (Ockwell and 
Mallett, 2012). These include temporal concerns relating to the urgency of climate change 
mitigation (i.e. achieving extensive low carbon technology transfer as quickly as possible), 
the global good nature of the benefits of low carbon technologies which are not captured in 
the market (Mowery et al., 2010), ignored needs of the poorest people where market 
incentives are also lacking (Sagar, 2009), and the early stage of commercial development 
and adoption of many low carbon technologies, raising multiple risks to their commercial 
use and barriers to investment. However, despite the lack of an empirical or conceptual 
base upon which to build, in many development organisations, including donors, NGOs, and 
international development banks, the use of phrases such as “low carbon development”, 
“climate compatible development” and “green growth” have become increasingly 
widespread and are shaping funding agendas. There is therefore an urgent need for 
empirically grounded research which explores theories of foreign technology and indigenous 
innovation explicitly within the context of low carbon energy technologies, and the contexts 
of climate change and development policy more broadly. It is within this context that this 
paper seeks to contribute.  
A number of studies have recently begun to analyse how low carbon energy 
technology industries in emerging economies have evolved and proliferated in parallel with 
rapidly expanding renewable energy markets and overseas investments. A key question 
addressed in these studies is the extent to which foreign investment has increased 
indigenous capabilities in developing countries to engage in advanced product development 
(Brewer 2008; Altenburg, 2008; Lema and Lema, 2012). Existing work pays particular 
attention to the role of national political and institutional conditions for industry 
development (see e.g. Huang and Wu, 2007; Mathews et al., 2011; Pueyo et al., 2011; Walz 
and Delgado, 2012). A number of other studies use aggregate R&D and patent statistics 
both to assess the underlying processes of learning and whether innovative capabilities have 
developed at the industry level (see e.g. Walz et al., 2008; Tan, 2010; Walz and Weidemann, 
2011; Dutch and Sharma, 2012; Wu and Mathews, 2012). This work therefore often misses 
potential intra-industry differences and firm-level specifics. Moreover, the economic 
indicators used only indirectly assess learning as an output of technological efforts. With 
notable exceptions, e.g. Lewis (2007, 2011), Mizuno (2007), Marigo (2009), Marigo et al. 
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(2010), few empirical studies based on firm-level data have undertaken in-depth, 
longitudinal studies of learning and accumulation of innovation capabilities in individual 
firms.  
One important question concerns the critical factors that underlie differences in the 
accumulation of innovation capabilities at the firm level. This has critical implications for 
understanding how foreign technology imports, and interactions between indigenous firms 
and international technology owning firms, might contribute more broadly to building low 
carbon innovation capabilities in developing countries and thus how policy and practice 
might target such capability building. One potential factor that might underlie inter-firm 
variance in capability building is the nature of the learning mechanisms individual firms 
employ to develop their in-house technological capabilities. This paper therefore sets out to 
explore the extent to which the use of different learning mechanisms can explain inter-firm 
differences in the accumulation of technological capabilities. This question will be explored 
by examining the dynamics of firm-level learning in relation to boiler manufacturing in the 
biomass power equipment industry in Malaysia from 1970-2011. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops the conceptual framework. 
Section 3 sets out the methodology; Section 4 introduces the empirical context before the 
main findings are presented in Section 5. The paper concludes in Sections 5 and 6 with a 
discussion of the results and drawing some conclusions.  
 
2. Conceptual framework  
 
This paper draws on two key theoretical distinctions made within the innovation 
studies literature to guide its empirical analysis. The first theorises a continuum of 
technological capabilities in developing country firms, from productive through to 
innovative. The second theorises a twofold categorisation of different learning mechanisms 
that firms might adopt and which might explain the accumulation of technological 
capabilities. The latter also facilitates elaboration of the theoretical underpinnings of 
assessing the role different learning mechanisms play in technological capability formation.  
 
2.1. Accumulation of technological capabilities in latecomer firms 
 
This paper builds on the literature on technological learning and accumulation of 
technological capabilities in firms in developing economies – known as latecomer firms (see 
e.g. Amsden, 1989; Lall, 1992; Dutrénit, 2004; Bell, 2006). In this literature, firm-level 
“technological capabilities” are broadly defined as the resources needed to generate and 
manage technological change, including skills, knowledge, experience and organisational 
systems (Kim, 1997; Figueiredo, 2001). The accumulation of capabilities is thus 
conceptualised as a process whereby firms accumulate knowledge and skills over time that 
improve their ability to implement and handle technical change. Following Bell and Pavitt 
(1993), this paper makes a distinction between "innovation" capabilities and "production" 
capabilities. Production capabilities refer to the basic and routine-based capabilities 
necessary to produce industrial goods at different levels of efficiency, given various input 
combinations such as equipment, labour skills, product and input specifications, and the 
organisational methods and systems used. Essentially, such production capabilities 
represent the firms’ ability to use, operate, and make small productive efficiency 
improvements in existing technologies and production systems. Innovation capabilities, on 
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the other hand, denote the resources that firms need to create new, or to implement more 
substantial changes in products and product process organisation (Lall, 1992).  
Production and innovation capabilities may according to Bell and Pavitt (1993; 1995) 
be considered to be at opposite ends of a continuum of sophistication of firms’ innovative 
technological activities. Various studies have elaborated taxonomies to identify different 
degrees or levels of innovation capabilities of latecomer firms (see e.g. Katz, 1987; Lall, 
1992; Ariffin, 2000; Dutrénit, 2000; Marcelle, 2004; Tacla and Figueiredo, 2006). These levels 
typically range from the basic operational production capability, at the lower end, towards 
more complex and advanced engineering and R&D-based activities, at the higher end, 
across various technical functions in the firm. As Bell (2007) and Plechero (2012) 
conceptualise, with an increase in innovative capability, firms are capable of mastering the 
generation of innovations with increasing degrees of novelty and complexity. At the lower 
end of the spectrum, innovations may be "new to the firm" and with increasing innovative 
capability, firms may generate innovations that are "new to the local industry" (or local 
market) and "new to the world" market (Fagerberg, 2005; OECD, 2005). It should be noted 
that in this context “innovation” can be taken to refer to both incremental and adaptive 
innovation, as opposed to simply radical (new to the world) type innovation. These former 
types of innovation, which may involve adapting technologies (including designs and 
organisational practices) to local contexts or incrementally improving technologies to move 
towards the technological frontier, are often of far more relevance in a developing country 
context (Mani and Romijn, 2004).  
Building on this distinction between productive and innovative capabilities, a 
typology for assessing technological capability accumulation is presented in Table 1. It 
should be noted, however, that, as Bell and Figueiredo (2012) argue, the boundary between 
production and innovation capabilities is often fuzzy and not straightforward. Whereas 
other taxonomies, such as those elaborated in Ariffin (2000) and Figueiredo (2001), 
comprise indicators to assess the level of technological capability across a number of 
technical functions in the firm (such as process, product, equipment, or investment-related), 
this paper focuses exclusively on the product side. In the context of the case study of boiler 
manufacturing, this conceptualisation encompasses vital boiler and power plant 
components such as the grate, super-heater, economiser, fuel pre-treatment and fuel 
feeding system, as well as the complete power plant design and related engineering.  
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Table 1. Typology of levels of technological capabilities in boiler supplier firms. 
Levels of technological capability Product-related indicators 
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(6) 
Advanced innovative 
capability 
 
 
-World leading in new boiler engineering and innovation based on cutting-edge 
research  
-Substantial number of highly specialised and internationally recognised R&D personnel  
-Systematic and continuous patenting of boiler design innovations that are "new to the 
world market" 
(5) 
High intermediate 
 
-Own development of computer modelling and automation systems in project design 
engineering systems  
-Ongoing substantial independent R&D and engineering on new world class boiler 
system designs (close to the international innovation frontier)  
-Engaging in joint ventures and strategic alliances with leading foreign international 
firms and universities 
(4) 
Intermediate 
innovative capability 
 
-Establishment of design engineering departments to undertake product-related R&D 
or substantial expansion of existing engineering staff  
-Product development certification (e.g. ISO 9001) or similar formalised qualifications  
-Continuous development of new product designs based on own research for local or 
regional markets  
-Establishment of collaborations with domestic research institutions and universities on 
basic R&D in new products  
(3) 
Basic innovative 
capability 
 
-Systematic and planned routines to enhance boiler plant performance (improved 
project engineering design) with existing engineering staff   
-Acquiring designs that are new to the domestic market and using this to develop new 
products (e.g. from licensing new technology)   
-Significant modifications to existing designs and/or engaging in products that are 
completely "new to the local market and economy"   
-Generation of significant price-performance optimisation improvements compared to 
local/domestic competitors  
 
Boundary between production and innovation capabilities  
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(2) 
Extra basic operating 
capability 
 
-Outsourcing production of key components and the integration of these in the overall 
boiler plant design outlay  
-Minor adaptation in existing design specifications and small incremental improvement 
in boiler performance  
-Modifications of existing designs to generate products that are "new to the firm"  
 
(1) 
Basic operating 
capability 
-Manufacture of standardised boilers and small-scale power plants according to fixed 
design specifications  
-Routine quality and control to maintain existing standards (ongoing and final 
inspection)  
-Own production of vital boiler pressure part components (e.g. pre-heaters, 
economisers, grates, furnaces, tubes, etc.) 
-Awarded international certification (e.g. ISO 9002, ASME codes, LRQA, BS2790) 
Source: Adapted from Lall (1992), Ariffin (2000, 2010), Dutrénit (2000), Figueiredo (2001), Viotti 
(2002), Ariffin and Figueiredo (2004), Tacla and Figueiredo (2006), Bell (2007).   
 
2.2. Learning mechanisms 
 
Bell (1984) distinguishes between two types of learning in relation to developing 
innovative capability in latecomer firms. The first type concerns doing-based learning that 
automatically and costlessly accrues from the continuation of well-established production 
activities, which through the implementation of minor changes may incrementally enhance 
the productive efficiency of a firm over time. Such efficiency improvements arise as passive 
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by-products over time from the execution of standardised production tasks (Malerba, 1992). 
According to Bell and Pavitt (1993), this mainly experience-based learning may enhance the 
firm's production capabilities, but provide limited stimulus to increase the innovation 
capabilities of the firm to manage technology and implement technical change. In contrast, 
the second type of learning is conceptualised as involving more active and purposive 
investments in learning activities that improve the ability of firms to carry out in-house 
changes in production process organisation and products (Scott-Kemmis and Chitravas, 
2007). Learning in the second sense thus requires conscious, costly, and concerted efforts 
through the allocation of necessary financial and human resources with the explicit purpose 
of building innovative capabilities. Following Bell and Figueiredo (2012), this paper focuses 
on learning understood  in the latter sense - as deliberate processes by which additional 
technical skills and knowledge are acquired by individuals, and through them by 
organisations, potentially varying according to how explicitly deliberate these processes are 
and how much time and money is invested in them.  
Within this definition of learning, this paper makes use of the framework developed 
in Figueiredo (2001, 2003) to conceptualise different mechanisms through which such 
learning might be pursued, and to assess the role of these mechanisms in firms’ 
accumulation of technological capabilities. While the sources firms actively utilise to acquire 
and generate new knowledge may take various forms, this paper conceptualises learning as 
the acquisition of knowledge from two distinct learning processes: intra-firm learning and 
externally-mediated learning.  
Intra-firm learning processes involve the acquisition of new knowledge from various 
sources within the firm. These internal learning processes comprise formalised and 
purposive activities that take place by engaging in systematic and continuous improvements 
of production organisation, products, and equipment. For example, involvement in planned 
experimentation in new investment projects may give rise to "learning by changing" through 
the modification of equipment and machinery, particularly if this builds consecutively on 
accumulated experience obtained in different projects. Achieving the most effective 
learning outcomes in such new investment projects may, according to Kim (1997), be more 
likely if the learning process is proactively approached by conscious efforts to plan and 
manage how knowledge will be obtained and integrated into the organisation. Another 
example of intra-firm learning takes place in practical problem solving efforts in specific 
projects in the form of "trial and error learning". Different types of formal in-house training 
programmes, both course-based and on-the-job training of workers, supervisors, and 
managers (e.g. in product design routines) may also provide "learning by training" 
possibilities for employees. The generation of new knowledge may also derive from 
"learning by searching" activities through in-house technical efforts in firm laboratories, 
formal R&D divisions, design and engineering departments, and quality and control units 
(Jonker et al., 2006).  
 Externally mediated learning, on the other hand, involves a number of ways whereby 
knowledge is acquired and internalised into the organisation from sources outside the firm 
(Bell and Figueiredo, 2012). In this paper, particular attention is paid to learning processes 
facilitated through dyadic relationships between firms, as opposed to other types of 
external influences, such as linkages with local universities or recruitment of employees 
from sources outside the firm. These dyadic relationships may be through linkages with 
foreign firms in the form of licensing agreements, joint ventures, technology cooperation, 
technical assistance, strategic alliances, and other forms of commercial inter-firm 
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relationships that transcend the local economy. By facilitating the acquisition, assimilation, 
and possible improvement of foreign technologies, such transnational inter-firm linkages 
may comprise important sources of "learning by interacting" with foreign, more 
technologically advanced partners (Amsden, 1989; Hobday, 1995; Mathews, 2006). Another 
source of externally mediated inter-firm learning may take place when firms interact with 
local competitors either through formalised ventures, such as project partnering, or from 
non-formal channels such as "learning by imitation and copying" and local labour turnover. 
Such knowledge spillovers across firms in a local industry or economy may constitute a key 
(external) learning source for latecomer firms (Kesidou and Romijn, 2008).  
 This paper focuses on the extent to which firms make use of the different learning 
mechanisms introduced above in order to build innovative capabilities. Following Figueiredo 
(2001), attention is also paid to the intensity of management effort and financial 
commitment devoted to utilise a given source of learning, which Kim (1997) and Mathews 
(2006) also stress as an important determinant of technological capability building. These 
key characteristics of learning mechanisms, as operationalised in this paper, are illustrated 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Typology for assessing learning mechanisms utilized by firms in developing 
technological capabilities. 
 Type of learning mechanism 
 
Intra-firm 
 
Externally mediated 
Different learning mechanisms 
used by firms: 
 
Presence or absence of 
processes for acquiring 
knowledge through 
internal activities 
 
 
Presence or absence of 
processes for acquiring 
knowledge locally and/or 
abroad 
Intensity of efforts devoted to 
utilise a given learning 
mechanism: 
Level of persistence and human 
and financial resources devoted 
to leverage learning from  in-
house efforts 
Level of persistence and human 
and financial resources devoted 
to leverage learning from 
external sources 
Source: Adapted from Figueiredo (2001; 2003).   
 
2.3. The importance of different learning mechanisms  
 
Based on the conceptualisation above, one may distinguish between learning 
mechanisms that are either internal or external (local or foreign) to the firm (Bell and 
Figueiredo, 2012). Viotti (2002) stresses that technological learning in latecomer firms is 
largely confined to the absorption of existing technologies acquired from foreign, more 
technologically advanced firms. This recognition of the importance of external, foreign 
sources of knowledge is encompassed in various conceptual frameworks addressing the 
dynamics of technical change in developing countries. In the literature on capital 
investments by multinational firms in developing countries, for example, much effort has 
been devoted to analysing the knowledge spill-over effects of foreign investments in local 
industries (see e.g. Blomström et al., 2000; Saggi, 2002). In a related body of literature, the 
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dissemination of knowledge from multinationals to local producers inserted in global 
production networks has been extensively examined (Ernst and Kim, 2002). Similarly, the 
global value chain perspective has placed equal emphasis on foreign sources of learning, 
and devoted particular attention to understanding how lead firms govern the flow of 
knowledge and thereby the prospects for industrial upgrading amongst local suppliers 
(Gereffi, 1999).  
With regard to local sources of learning, other analytical frameworks have 
accentuated the importance of local knowledge systems in latecomer firms' technological 
capability building (Bell and Albu, 1999). A lot of the literature on industrial clusters in 
developing countries, for example, addresses knowledge flows occurring, inter alia, through 
interactions among local competitors, user-producer relations, industry-university linkages, 
new firm creation, and labor mobility (Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999). In another body of the 
literature on innovation systems in developing countries, the main research interest 
concerns the institutional structures that enable knowledge flows among various actors at 
the national, sectoral, or regional level (Malerba and Mani, 2009; Lundvall et al., 2009).  
Other frameworks have emphasised the important role of firms' internal strategic 
intent to invest in activities aimed at generating new knowledge from intra-firm sources (Xie 
and White; Scott-Kemmis and Chitravas, 2007). In the international business literature, for 
example, scholars adopting a resource-based view of the firm have focused on the essential 
role of increasing the internal human capital in latecomer firms as a central element of 
technological capability building (Mathews 2002). In a related literature addressing the 
development of absorptive capacity in latecomer firms, the key role of internal R&D 
investments and the cumulative nature of technological capability formation has been 
emphasised (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
While this short discussion by no means provides an exhaustive review of the 
treatment of the role of internal, local, and foreign sources of learning in various bodies of 
literature, it illustrates that these learning mechanisms are often treated separately. 
However, since it may be useful to consider these, at least potentially, as complementary 
(rather than alternative) sources of technological capability building, some recent studies 
have highlighted the importance of assessing how firms use different combinations of such 
learning mechanisms (see e.g. Giuliani et al., 2005; Kesidou and Romijn, 2008; Fu and Gong, 
2011; Fu and Zhang 2011; and Li, 2011). Building on these studies, this paper examines 
which specific combinations of learning mechanisms firms utilise as complementary 
composites or bundles of learning mechanisms, thus providing a basis for examining the 
consequences of these firm-specific patterns for the levels of technological capability 
achieved. 
 
3. Empirical context  
 
Together with Indonesia, Malaysia is the largest producer and exporter of crude 
palm oil and derived products in the world. Since the 1970's, Malaysia’s production output 
and area under palm oil cultivation increased exponentially, leading to a concomitant 
increase in palm oil biomass waste. Compared to other residual biomass resources in 
Malaysia, such as rice husk or sugarcane bagasse, the electricity potential from utilising 
palm oil biomass waste is by far the largest - around 2700 MW in 2007 (Chua et al., 2011). 
Among these biomass waste by-products, empty fruit bunches (EFB) are the most 
abundantly available and lowest cost. At least until the beginning of the 1990's, this 
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resource was left largely unutilised in the palm oil industry except for mulching purposes. 
Owing to the anaerobic decay of EFB and palm oil mill effluent (POME), palm oil mills 
generate substantial methane gas emissions which have 20 times the warming potential of 
carbon dioxide as a greenhouse gas.   
In palm oil mills, the usual waste management practice involved the utilisation of 
palm kernel shells (PKS) and mesocarp fibres in cogeneration plants to meet the internal 
process steam requirements owing to a higher calorific value compared to EFB. These 
conventional captive power plants were deliberately designed inefficiently in order to burn 
as much biomass waste as possible since the potential energy from utilising PKS, mesocarp 
fibres, and EFB was much larger than required by mills. Besides mulching, EFB was mainly 
left to decay in open landfills and stockpiles since it was difficult to utilise EFB directly in 
boilers owing to a high moisture, chlorine, and alkali (silica) content. Consequently, limited 
experience was generally accumulated in the local boiler industry with regard to utilising 
EFB efficiently for energy generation, particularly for modern, large-scale, and high-efficient 
combined steam and electricity power plants.  
However, since the 1990's a number of factors contributed to conducive conditions 
for investments in renewable energy in general and EFB-fired power plants in particular 
(Hashim and Ho 2011). This created demand for EFB-fired power plants in Malaysia, opening 
new market opportunities for local boiler supplier firms. This market demanded 
fundamentally different products in terms of scale and efficiency than normally required in 
the conventional inefficient and small-scale cogeneration plants in palm oil mills. In contrast 
to the old, typically low pressure and low temperature palm oil mill boilers, the new market 
increasingly demanded efficient, high pressure and high temperature boilers in large-scale 
power plants. In order to compete in this market and meet this demand, Malaysian boiler 
supplier firms were, due to a lack of previous experience, forced to engage in concerted 
learning efforts and accumulate technological capabilities to improve their ability to 
implement technological changes. This dynamic setting thus provides a suitable context to 
examine the extent to which individual firms used different learning mechanisms and 
whether this influenced technological capability formation. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
This paper uses qualitative data from in-depth, semi-structured interviews with key 
employees in the eight Malaysian boiler and power equipment supplier firms which had 
achieved the strongest positions in the emerging market for palm oil biomass waste-to-
energy power plants in Malaysia. Data was collected during successive field studies in 2007, 
2010 and 2011 and supplemented with documentary material (such as archival firm 
statistics, firm websites, and industry reports). The eight firms were identified by consulting 
industry experts in Malaysia, and using a snowballing method to consult with competitors 
and customers, to ascertain which firms had supplied boilers to the majority of EFB-fired 
power plants constructed in Malaysia between 1990-2011. Key characteristics of these 
firms, which have been anonymised in this paper owing to confidentiality concerns, are 
presented in Table 3. Interviews were undertaken with lower and higher ranking employees 
with shorter and longer-lasting positions in each firm, including former employees. In total, 
thirty in-depth interviews were conducted and digitally recorded, transcribed and analysed. 
In advance of the data collection process, an identical interview questions protocol was 
prepared, which was used across the interviews conducted. 
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          Table 3. Key figures on the firms analysed. 
Firm 
Production 
personnel  
Engineering and 
Administration 
personnel 
Year 
established 
 
Ownership 
Alpha  15 20 1975  
Malaysian 
owned  
Beta 0 30 1985 
Foreign 
subsidiary  
 
Gamma  40                            50 2005  
Malaysian 
owned 
Delta 70 58 2005  Malaysian 
Epsilon   40 20 1978  
owned 
Malaysian 
owned  
Zeta  80 15 1972  
Malaysian  
owned  
Eta  40 32 1993 
Malaysian 
owned  
Theta   12 25 1974 
Malaysian 
owned 
 
 
4.1. Concept operationalisation and data acquisition  
 
4.1.1. Variety and intensity of learning mechanisms used by firms   
 
To gain insights into the variety of learning mechanisms used by individual firms in 
their technological capability building efforts, interviews were conducted using the following 
guidance: 
1. Interviewees were introduced to the conceptual distinction between external 
and internal types of learning mechanisms and given examples of these.  
2. Interviewees were asked to use this categorisation throughout the interviews to 
elaborate which learning mechanisms, and specific combinations of them, they 
predominantly utilised during their involvement in EFB-fired power plants.  
3. To guide their evaluation of learning mechanisms, interviewees were asked 
which learning mechanisms they considered most important in increasing their 
firms' ability to handle the engineering-related activities in the design and 
construction of EFB-fired power plants.  
4. Interviewees were requested to substantiate the nature of identified learning 
mechanisms in further detail, including follow-up questions on what and how 
specific employees learned from different sources and how this learning process 
became manifested in concrete terms in the plants constructed.  
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This information fed into a subsequent round of interview questions that addressed 
the intensity of efforts devoted to utilise specific learning mechanisms using the following 
guidance:  
1. Interviewees were asked to describe to which extent, and at which level of 
persistency, the management allocated financial and human resources to extract 
knowledge from a given source.  
2. In interviews with firm managers, they were asked specifically about the level of 
attention and priority given to acquire new knowledge.  
3. Additional probing questions were use to elicit detailed information, including 
the number of man-hours spent on intra-firm trial and error efforts (e.g. from on-
site problem solving), internal R&D investments, and the level of continuity of 
resources devoted to searching for and leveraging knowledge from foreign 
technology suppliers and/or local competitors.    
 
4.1.2. Levels of technological capabilities achieved by firms 
 
Before conducting interviews in Malaysia, the levels and related indicators on 
technological capabilities detailed in Table 1 were first validated with firms in Denmark to 
see if they made sense to people working in the biomass boiler industry. Validation was 
based on consultations with five recognised Danish leaders in biomass boiler technology, 
Babcock & Wilcox Volund, Danstoker, Aalborg Boilers, SEM A/S and B&W Energy. This 
confirmed that the indicators in Table 1 made sense to people working in the industry and 
was therefore deemed appropriate for application in the fieldwork in Malaysia. 
 Interviews with the Malaysian boiler manufacturing firms applied the following 
guidelines to assess relative levels of technological capabilities: 
1. Interviewees were first asked to elaborate on the technological milestones they 
considered most important during their firms' involvement in EFB-fired power 
plants.  
2. To facilitate discussion interviewees were provided with examples that might 
have been associated with such milestones, such as the achievement of 
significant plant performance improvements, major design modifications, or 
specific landmark projects.  
3. Interviewees were explicitly informed that these milestones should reflect a 
manifestation of their firms' increased level of skills to handle and improve their 
EFB-fired power plant technology.  
4. Interviewees were subsequently shown an overview of the indicators described 
in the second column of Table 1 and asked a series of questions addressing the 
indicators in ascending order.  
5. Using technological originality as a main indicator of the level of technological 
capability achieved by the firms, the interviewees were asked to describe which 
kinds of technical changes that they implemented during their involvement in 
EFB-fired plants, explicitly distinguishing between "no changes" from those that 
were "new to the firm", "new to local market", and "new to the world market". 
To obtain this information, interviewees were asked about the type of boiler 
technologies supplied by the firms, including when and if they introduced new 
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designs or products, and whether these were distinctly different from the 
existing ones in the local market.  
6. As a secondary indicator, additional questions addressed whether the technical 
changes implemented by the firms were associated with relatively minor or more 
significant price/performance ratio improvements compared to similar plants 
constructed in Malaysia.  
7. As a third indicator, interviewees were asked about product quality certifications 
acquired relating both to design and product standards.  
8. To triangulate data on technological originality gathered from individual 
interviews, data were compared across interviewees and with other sources of 
data, such as firms’ archival records and industry reports.  
 
4.2. Categorisation of the firms 
 
Data collected from the interviews were analysed in relation to two key issues 
identified in the literature reviewed in Section 2 above: I. Variety of learning mechanisms 
employed by the firms and the intensity of efforts devoted to leverage knowledge from 
these; II. Levels of technological capability achieved.  
 
4.2.1. Variety and intensity of learning mechanisms used by firms 
 
Learning mechanisms employed by the firms were categorised according to the 
importance ascribed to particular learning mechanisms by the interviewees in relation to 
their firms' technological capability building efforts. Explanations given by interviewees of 
the sources relied on to gain new technical insights and overcome concrete problems during 
involvement in successive projects provided evidence on the nature of intra-firm and 
externally mediated learning mechanisms employed. A given learning mechanism was 
interpreted as present if it was emphasised as having played an important role by the 
interviewees and was interpreted as absent if they did not ascribe importance to a 
particular learning mechanism.  
The intensity of efforts devoted to different learning mechanisms were categorised 
based on interviewees’ responses according to a continuum from short-term (one-off) 
efforts and the allocation of limited resources to utilise different learning mechanisms, to 
more persistent (longer-term) efforts with higher levels of devoted resources.      
 
4.2.2. Levels of technological capabilities achieved by firms 
 
Classification of technological capability used an analytical coding of interviewees' 
responses to questions on types of technical changes implemented during firms’ 
involvement in EFB-fired power plants. Key indicators included level of originality (or 
novelty) of technological changes, which ranged from minor adjustments of existing boiler 
sub-components (possibly as part of repair and maintenance activities) towards more 
profound, and possibly entirely new, reconfigurations of the entire power plant design 
arrangement (involving new products and engineering solutions) (see also Plechero, 2012). 
A secondary indicator of changes in technological capability focused on price/performance 
improvements achieved. The coding process also applied the other indicators in Table 1. 
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Firms did not have to comply with all of the indicators to be placed within a given category 
level.  
To illustrate the application of the coding process in practice, if interviewees stressed 
that they more or less continued to use their pre-existing boiler design drawings and 
standardised products without introducing any changes or achieving performance 
improvements, they were classified at the lowest level of technological capability, the "Basic 
operating capability" level in Table 1. Firms that had undertaken minor and incremental 
modifications to existing designs that were "new to the firm", including small improvements 
in plant price/performance ratios, were classified as having reached the "Extra basic 
operating capability" level. The "new to the firm" classification was interpreted as evident in 
cases where a firm introduced a new product or design that was already available from 
competitors in the local market. Firms that had introduced technical changes that were 
"new to the local market", including alternatives that were markedly different from existing 
designs used by their local competitors, were categorised as having reached the "Basic 
innovative capability" level. Another indicator used to determine whether firms achieved 
this level, involved assessing whether such changes encompassed significant plant 
price/performance ratio improvements compared to the plants constructed by their 
competitors.  
 
4.3. Identification of patterns across firms 
 
Following the analytical coding procedures related to the individual firms described 
above, subsequent analysis focused on identifying similar patterns across the firms in the 
variety and intensity of learning mechanisms used and the level of technological capability 
achieved. This employed cross-sectional analysis focused on identifying similarities in 
interviewees' responses within each of these themes using the tabular coding method 
suggested in Miles and Huberman (1994). 
 
5. Results  
  
The analysis led to the classification of the eight firms into the three main groups 
detailed in Table 4. Each group shared common features in terms of the learning 
mechanisms employed, the level and intensity of efforts devoted to leverage knowledge 
from these, and the levels of technological capability achieved. To provide a more detailed 
overview of the characteristics shared across these groups, a detailed description of one 
firm illustrative of each group is provided below – Alpha for Group 1, Epsilon for Group 2, 
and Zeta for Group 3. 
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Table 4. Key findings on learning patterns and levels of technological capability achieved. 
 
Intra-firm learning  Externally-mediated learning  
 
Level of 
technological 
capability 
achieved 
 Presence / absence Level of 
intensity  
Presence / absence Level of 
intensity  
 
Group 1 
(Alpha, 
Beta, 
Gamma) 
"Learning through 
planned 
experimentation"  
Significant  
 
"Learning from 
interacting with 
foreign technology 
partners"  
Significant 
"Basic innovative 
capability" 
Group 2 
(Delta, 
Epsilon) 
 
"Learning from trial 
and error efforts" 
Low 
"Learning from 
imitation of local 
competitors"  
Significant 
"Extra basic 
operating 
capability" 
Group 3 
(Zeta, Eta, 
Theta) 
"Learning from trial 
and error efforts" 
Low  Absent   Absent 
"Basic operating 
capability" 
 
 
5.1. Three illustrative firm representations 
 
5.1.1. Representative illustration of firms in Group 1 
 
Since its initiation in 1975, Alpha primarily installed and undertook service on 
imported industrial boilers and since 1992 manufactured and installed small-scale wood-
fired and industrial gas/oil-fired boilers under a license agreement with the Danish company 
Danstoker A/S (Hansen, 2011). However, in 1998, Alpha decided to focus entirely on the 
emerging market for EFB-fired power plants. According to interviews with firm managers, 
one of the ambitious aims of Alpha was to become an energy service company (ESCO) 
supplying steam and/or electricity to industrial users from EFB-fired power plants. As the 
main investor and risk taker, Alpha had a strong strategic interest in continuously optimising 
their plants, which pushed the firm to devote sustained financial and human resources to 
their ongoing learning efforts.  
Alpha proactively recognised a need early on to acquire new knowledge from 
different sources and paid particular attention to establishing relations with foreign 
technology partners. It engaged in a license contract in 1997 with the parent company of 
Danstoker at that time, Volund A/S, to manufacture and install a large-scale and high-
efficiency biomass plant designed to utilise EFB and other fuels with high moisture content. 
According to interviewees, Alpha initially aspired to acquire access to the basic boiler design 
through the license agreement with Volund, which firm managers considered would address 
their limited technological expertise. As a main learning strategy, Alpha’s management 
wanted to learn as much as possible from the relationship with Volund and accumulate 
knowledge over time through planned experimentation in successive plants on a project-by-
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project basis. After engaging in its first EFB-fired power plant in 2000, in 2004 Alpha 
introduced a new vibrating and water-cooled (inclining) membrane grate system in an EFB-
fired and grid-connected power plant in Malaysia under the license agreement with Volund. 
This type of system, which included fully automatic feeding, had not previously been 
constructed in Malaysia. Subsequently, Alpha sold around seventeen of these boiler units to 
customers in the palm oil industry in Malaysia and Thailand.  
According to longstanding managers in Alpha, the license partnership with Volund 
enabled employees from Alpha to access a highly skilled pool of expertise and learn about 
critical elements of advanced boiler designs, including vital calculation methods. This 
externally mediated learning by interacting process occurred during on-site plant visits, 
overseas training, and through technical assistance. This learning process was particularly 
intensive in the period after the second plant was constructed in 2004 when the 
management in Alpha was committed to persistently devoting efforts and resources to 
leverage learning through regular interaction and communication between employees in 
the respective firms. Through this interactive relationship with Volund, Alpha's employees 
reached a sufficient level of knowledge to enable Alpha to subsequently manufacture, 
install, and further develop similar plants independently.  
Regarding intra-firm learning, Alpha recognised a need for pre-treatment of EFB to 
reduce moisture content and fibre length, which were found to be critical determinants of 
boiler performance. To overcome this challenge, Alpha’s learning strategy was to gradually 
develop a new EFB pre-treatment system through planned experimentation and learning by 
changing in successive plants. Alpha employees approached this learning process by 
continuously optimising plants by adding and replacing equipment (such as shredding and 
drying machinery) and subsequently integrating discovered solutions in new plants. This 
systematic experimentation process involved the introduction of a new automatic fuel 
feeding system, which was better suited to EFB than the original Volund design. Volund’s 
design was evidently modified by Alpha in their efforts to utilise EFB, including introduction 
of a new furnace de-ashing system and a reconfiguration of the primary and secondary fans 
outlay. This pre-treatment system had not previously been used in Malaysia and was 
therefore new to the boiler industry and local market.  
Owing to the low ash melting point of EFB, another persistent problem concerned 
formation of clinkers on heat surfaces in the boiler, a significant technical challenge which 
increased with utilisation of a higher percentage of EFB in the boiler. Attempts to 
circumvent clinker formation focussed on efforts to optimise the integrated furnace water 
cooling system. In addition, learning efforts were devoted to optimising the boiler control 
system by continuously adjusting critical parameters in plant performance, such as those 
related to air inlet velocity and fuel feeding operations. Throughout their engagement in 
EFB-fired power plants, Alpha persistently devoted significant financial and human 
resources to internal learning efforts in order to solve the multitude of challenges 
experienced. Thus, it appears that Alpha utilised a unique combination of (externally 
mediated) learning from interacting with a foreign technology partner and (intra-firm) 
learning by planned experimentation, both of which were characterised by a high level of 
intensity of efforts. The case of Alpha thus illustrates the complementarity between the use 
of specific types of external and internal learning mechanisms.  
The interviews suggested the ability of Alpha to implement and handle technical 
change in EFB-fired power plants was significantly improved during their involvement with 
different plants. This resulted in substantial plant price/performance ratio improvements 
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over time compared to Alpha’s domestic competitors. In addition, Alpha's employees were 
independently able to design a fuel pre-treatment system that was new to the local industry 
and domestic market. With the introduction of a new automatic fuel feeding and optimised 
design outlay in this fuel pre-treatment system, Alpha was able to achieve a higher overall 
plant performance than by using the design initially acquired from Volund. This indicates 
that Alpha made some progress in moving from the basic level of routine-based production 
capabilities into more advanced stages of innovative technological capability. Based on the 
originality of the technical changes implemented by Alpha and the significance of the 
price/performance improvements made, Alpha could be considered to have progressed to 
the "Basic innovative capability" level in Table 1.  
 
5.1.2. Representative illustration of firms in Group 2 
 
Since its establishment in the late 1970's, Epsilon mainly supplied boilers to the palm 
oil milling industry and to a lesser extent small-scale packaged gas and oil-fired boilers to 
various industries. Over a period of more than thirty years, the firm was, according to the 
interviews, able to achieve a large share in the market for palm oil mill boilers in Malaysia 
(around 30% in 2011). Managers at Epsilon suggested this was an outcome of the primary 
and longstanding strategy of the firm, which was to secure and enlarge its market position. 
In 2002, however, Epsilon’s management decided to diversify activities and engaged in their 
first EFB-fired power plant at an existing palm oil mill in Malaysia. Subsequently, Epsilon was 
involved in the construction of five additional EFB-fired power plants.  
At the outset of their engagement with EFB-fired power plants Epsilon apparently 
demonstrated limited recognition of a need to acquire new knowledge from different 
sources. During construction of the first plants, Epsilon’s managers considered the existing 
boiler technology design, which inter alia comprised a conventional step grate and water-
tube system, to be sufficient for utilising EFB. This design had previously been used in 
Epsilon’s construction of boilers supplied for the palm oil milling industry, acquired initially 
in 1980 through a license agreement with a UK-based company. According to managers at 
Epsilon, the percentage of EFB utilised and the customer's required performance levels in 
the first EFB-fired power plants were both relatively low. Consequently, Epsilon only 
experienced minor operational problems in these plants. Later, Epsilon’s management 
found additional changes to the existing boiler design were necessary to utilise a higher 
percentage of EFB at higher efficiency and performance levels in order to compete in this 
market. This led Epsilon to search for new sources of learning during subsequent projects. In 
contrast to Alpha and the firms in Group 1, Epsilon did not actively promote EFB-fired power 
plants to new potential customers. The engagement in these plants was, according to the 
interviews, mainly driven by direct demand from specific customers and was therefore not, 
as in the case of Alpha, an outcome of a deliberate strategy to learn through planned 
experimentation in successive plants.  
The main learning strategy pursued by Epsilon was to rely primarily on learning from 
their local competitors though non-formal channels and internal efforts by modification of 
their pre-existing boiler designs. To learn from competitors, Epsilon's employees devoted 
significant time and resources to searching for information about the technological solutions 
that led to performance improvements, mainly in the plants constructed by Alpha and the 
other firms in Group 1. This was achieved through plant site visits, communication with 
industry contacts (including former employees), relations with customers, and hear-say. 
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Apparently both plant owners and boiler technology suppliers attempted to prevent this 
information from being openly disseminated, for example by enforcing strict plant visiting 
regulations. According to interviews with firm employees, Epsilon’s management came to 
the conclusion that EFB fuel pre-treatment systems, and, even more so, boiler water-cooling 
systems had contributed significantly to solving the clinker formation problem in other 
plants. Accordingly, employees from the engineering department in Epsilon concentrated 
efforts on developing a similar water-cooled grate system in an attempt to circumvent this 
generic problem. These internal efforts resulted in some learning through imitation, 
contributing to Epsilon subsequently developing a water-cooled grate design that was new 
to the firm. However, according to an interview with a representative of Epsilon’s license 
partner, the design was relatively simple and did not work well. Epsilon’s management also 
found that the design was not able to resolve the problems experienced and soon 
abandoned further development of this grate system. These relatively short-term internal 
efforts in Epsilon’s engineering department were therefore undertaken with limited 
persistence.  
Management subsequently decided to import a water-cooled vibrating grate from an 
internationally renowned supplier of biomass combustion technology (from the US) and to 
implement this system in later plants. Epsilon did not devote efforts to leverage learning 
through the establishment of a longer-term partnership or through closer interaction with 
this grate supplier company. Moreover, according to interviews with managers, Epsilon did 
not actively seek to utilise the relationship with its existing license partner in its learning 
efforts. Since it proved problematic for Epsilon to incorporate the vibrating grate in the 
firm’s existing power plant design, some internal trial and error learning efforts were 
employed. These problem solving efforts concerned a number of issues related to 
malfunctioning of the draught fan systems and water feeding pumps. These challenges were 
more profound than initially foreseen and resulted in financial losses, so Epsilon was 
hesitant to engage in further EFB-fired power plants.  
The case of Epsilon depicts a particular combination of the use of (externally 
mediated) learning by imitation and (intra-firm) trial and error efforts to develop and 
integrate a new grate system into their existing designs. This unique combination was 
different from the specific composition of internal and external learning mechanisms used 
by firms in Group 1. From interviews with Epsilon’s managers, it appears that many 
problems remained unresolved during their involvement in EFB-fired power plants and 
Epsilon only recently made progress in overcoming some of these challenges. Epsilon was 
only able to achieve small price/performance ratio improvements through minor, 
incremental modifications to existing design specifications. Epsilon also managed to develop 
a water-cooled grate design that was new to the firm by imitating its domestic competitors, 
although this system did not perform well and further development was quickly abandoned. 
Thus, the ability of the firm to implement and handle technical change was only advanced to 
a limited extent commensurate with the second level of production capabilities (the "Extra 
basic operating capability" level in Table 1), but not to have progressed further into 
developing innovative capability.  
 
5.1.3. Representative illustration of firms in Group 3 
 
Zeta was established in 1972 and initially involved mainly in installation and servicing 
of imported boilers. From the late 1970's, Zeta began fabricating packaged fire-tube boilers 
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under a license agreement with a UK-based company and later in 1982 began producing 
water-tube (fixed grates) boilers for the palm oil industry under another license agreement. 
This mainly followed the general development of the Malaysian boiler industry. When 
demand for larger capacity boilers with higher levels of automation increased during the 
1990's, Zeta developed a moving grate system to meet these requirements on the basis of 
their pre-existing boiler designs. Notwithstanding these minor incremental modifications, 
the basic boiler design in Zeta has remained largely unaltered over the last 15 years.   
Zeta and the two other firms in Group 3 focused mainly on the market for 
conventional packaged gas and oil-fired boilers to various industries. However, according to 
interviews with managers in Zeta, management increasingly recognised a need to diversify 
activities to avoid becoming overly dependent on this market. This led to Zeta engaging in 
their first EFB-fired cogeneration plant in 2002 at an existing palm oil mill. The plant utilised 
a relatively low percentage of EFB in the fuel mix (around 30%) and the customer required a 
low performance level. The second cogeneration plant Zeta constructed was similar to the 
first, although it utilised a higher percentage of EFB in the fuel mix. In both plants, a boiler 
was used which had previously been supplied to customers in the palm oil milling industry. 
According to interviews with engineering employees at Zeta, these plants only gave rise to 
minor difficulties, which required some problem solving efforts at the plant sites. They 
attempted to circumvent these problems mainly through further modification of the moving 
(step) grate system via relatively short-term internal trial and error based learning efforts.  
Zeta’s main learning strategy during involvement in these plants was to utilise their 
pre-existing boiler designs, which were considered suitable for a larger fraction of EFB than 
normally required in palm oil mills. Since the plants constructed by Zeta and the firms in 
Group 3 generally utilised a relatively low percentage of EFB in the fuel mix, typically around 
30-40%, they were able to use the pre-existing conventional boiler designs without many 
problems and without much technical effort. In contrast to the plants constructed by firms 
in the other two groups, Zeta also only retrofitted existing steam generation plants in palm 
oil mills, not in plants primarily designed for electricity generation, which would have 
required additional design changes. Thus, Zeta did not recognise a need for new sources of 
learning in their efforts to overcome the minor challenges experienced. As an example, 
although an external engineering consultant provided some technical assistance to 
engineers in these projects, Zeta did not purposely seek to leverage learning from this 
source to any great extent. Zeta’s management also did not attempt to establish new 
relationships with external technology partners in their learning efforts.   
Although Zeta experienced some minor problems during involvement in EFB-fired 
cogeneration plants, the challenges experienced were largely overcome by relying on their 
existing technology. The necessity of acquiring new knowledge and engaging in concerted 
efforts to overcome these problems were consequently limited, which resulted in the 
allocation of only a very limited amount of time and financial resources to problem solving. 
Essentially, therefore, Zeta continued to carry out their previous, routine-based production 
activities without many changes or additional learning efforts. Accordingly, Zeta did not 
achieve any price/performance ratio improvement. The manufacture of boilers and 
construction of power plants was undertaken according to pre-existing and standardised 
design specifications. Zeta can therefore be considered to have remained at the lowest level 
of technological capabilities, the "Basic operating capability" level in Table 1.  
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6. Discussion  
 
6.1. Learning and technological capability formation 
 
Existing studies of learning and technological capability formation in cleantech 
industries in emerging economies pay little attention to micro-level dynamics, despite the 
highly firm-specific nature of such processes (Lall, 1992).  The analysis in this paper suggests 
that learning mechanisms employed by individual firms plays a critical role in the level of 
technological capability achieved. As illustrated through the case of Alpha, technological 
capability building was most pronounced where firms dedicated significant, sustained 
resources to a specific combination of learning from interacting with foreign technology 
partners and intra-firm planned experimentation activities. 
 These findings are consistent with previous studies on development of wind and 
solar industries in China and India, where foreign connections were also found to constitute 
important sources of learning (see e.g. Lewis 2007, 2011; Mizuno, 2007; Marigo et al., 
2010). At a more general level, this supports the argument put forward in Kim (1997), 
Mathews (2002), and Bell and Figueiredo (2012) that significant advances in technological 
capability formation in latecomer firms is often related to learning through networks of 
foreign and more advanced technology partners. However, following Fu and Gong (2011), 
this also speaks to a broader discussion about internal (or indigenous) learning and 
innovation, on the one hand, versus foreign technology, on the other hand, as the main 
sources of technological capability formation in latecomer firms (see also Fu and Zhang, 
2011). In this paper, Alpha and the firms in Group 1 were required to engage in concerted 
internal efforts to adapt and modify acquired foreign technology to improve its 
performance. Alpha, for example, not only devoted substantial resources to leverage 
learning from its foreign license partner, but also to its own efforts to engage creatively with 
the original design. Therefore, as Li (2011) argues, foreign sources of advanced technology 
will only enhance latecomer firms’ levels of technological capability to the extent that 
simultaneous concerted investments are made in internal learning efforts. Thus, as the case 
of Alpha illustrates, and in line with Fu et al. (2011), rather than understanding technological 
capability formation as driven either by foreign or internal sources, these may more 
appropriately be considered as complementary drivers.  
The more limited progress made by firms in Group 2 in building technological 
capabilities through a combination of imitating local competitors and internal (engineering) 
trial and error  focused on modification of existing grate designs suggests at least three 
further insights. First, as Kesidou and Romijn (2008) note, learning opportunities available 
from local knowledge systems may provide an important stimulus for technological 
capability building in latecomer firms (see also Bell and Albu, 1999). Among such learning 
sources, Chen (2009) particularly stresses the role of inter-firm interactions in the form of 
informal knowledge spill-over among local competitors. As Mathews (2006) argues, 
however, since latecomer firms typically operate in isolation from world centres of science 
and innovation and sophisticated technology markets, the reliance on local learning sources 
may comprise a key barrier to technological capability building. This argument is further 
devolved in Plechero (2012), who emphasises that knowledge spill-over among local 
competitors may only enable firms to progress production capabilities - in order to reach 
more advanced levels of innovation capability, additional, complementary sources of 
learning may be required. As illustrated by Epsilon, the empirical findings of this paper 
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appear to corroborate this proposition since the firms in the Group 2 were not able to 
advance beyond the level of production capability. Notwithstanding this, owing to 
substantial resources devoted to imitating local competitors, the use of this learning 
mechanism did constitute an important stimulus for the technological capability 
improvement that did occur in the two firms in Group 2.  However, the lack of resources 
devoted to engaging (concomitantly) in internal learning efforts may also have hindered the 
attainment of higher levels of technological capability. 
Second, and relatedly, since the learning efforts of the two firms in Group 2 focused 
on imitation of plants constructed by firms in Group 1, this speaks to a broader discussion 
on local spill-over effects of technologies acquired from foreign sources (Fu et al., 2011). In 
the literature on inward foreign direct investments in emerging economies, the extent local 
firms benefit from knowledge spill-over effects is often discussed (Blomström et al., 2000). 
Benefits might be in the form of learning opportunities provided by exposure to new, more 
advanced technology and local diffusion of technological knowledge. As Saggi (2002) 
emphasises, technology owners often try to mitigate against unintended local spill-over of 
proprietary technological assets, which tends to reduce local knowledge diffusion. This 
paper corroborates this finding as firms in Group 1 strove to hinder knowledge from being 
openly disseminated, e.g. by enforcing strict visiting rules and regulations at plant sites. The 
diverging interest between technology owners and imitators may therefore comprise a 
central limitation in learning by imitation as opposed to learning through more formalised 
partnerships with foreign technology partners. It should, however, be noted that learning by 
imitation might be critical in the infant stages of technological capability building, but 
becomes less important as firms progress towards higher levels of innovative capability 
(Kim, 1997; Chen, 2009; Lema and Lema, 2012).   
 A third interesting finding concerns the nature of firms in Group 2’s learning through 
relationships with foreign technology partners. As illustrated by Epsilon, although 
relationships were established with more advanced technology suppliers, limited efforts 
were devoted to leveraging learning from these sources. Epsilon could, for example, have 
achieved this by establishing a longer-term relationship with its water-cooled grate supplier 
and/or by extracting new knowledge from its established license partnership. As 
emphasised by Figueiredo (2001, 2003) and Mathews (2006), the extent to which such 
external linkages with foreign firms facilitate learning and technological capability building is 
strongly related to the persistence and resources (the intensity of efforts) devoted to 
utilising such learning opportunities. This paper seems to corroborate this argument.  
The firms in Group 3 relied exclusively on internal sources in their learning efforts 
and, during their involvement with EFB-fired power plants, did not progress beyond the 
basic and lowest level of technological capability in Table 1. According to Edquist (1997), 
learning and innovation in firms rarely take place in isolation, but occurs through complex 
and varied interactions with the different actors and organisations in their external 
environment. Thus, as Bell (1984) argue, latecomer firms relying exclusively on their own 
resources and internal learning efforts are likely to have a hard time building technological 
capability. This is attributed, among other things, to the widespread absence, under-
prioritisation, and/or understaffing of in-house R&D resources in many latecomer firms, 
especially small and medium-sized enterprises (Mani and Romijn, 2004). The case of Zeta 
seems to illustrate these limitations of relying exclusively on internal learning efforts in 
technological capability formation. However, Figueiredo (2001) emphasises the need not to 
underemphasise the importance of building a minimum level of technological capabilities 
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through internal efforts in latecomer firms. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) attribute this 
importance to the cumulative nature of technological capability building, which involves 
gradual increases in the efficiency of internal learning and associated increases in 
technological capabilities. Since the firms in Group 3 devoted very limited resources in their 
internal learning efforts, their ability and efficiency to appropriate additional learning 
remained limited (see Xie and White, 2004; Scott-Kemmis and Chitravas, 2007).  
  
6.2. Reflections on technological capability building and low carbon development 
 
As flagged in the introduction, an emerging body of literature seeks to develop 
theoretical contributions of past work on technological capability building in the context of 
specific challenges relating to low carbon technology transfer to developing countries to 
mitigate future development-related carbon emissions (e.g. Mathews, 2007; Altenburg, 
2008; Walz, 2010; Ockwell et al., 2008, 2010; Berkhout, 2012). Research in this area is, 
however, very much in its infancy – there is a lack of empirical evidence and a distinct lack of 
any comprehensive attempt at theorising technology transfer and indigenous innovation as 
part of broader low carbon development pathways (Ockwell and Mallett 2012). There are a 
number of areas where this paper’s findings on the role of learning mechanisms and 
technological capability building in a specific cleantech industry in Malaysia suggests 
broader implications for both theory building and future empirical research. 
An initial focus for future research is to explore the applicability of the specific 
combinations and intensities of learning mechanisms identified by this and other papers 
within the context of other technologies, industries and countries. Low carbon energy 
technologies need to be researched across a spectrum of supply, network/infrastructure 
and end use technologies. But it is also important to explore them along the continuum of 
the innovation chain, from R&D, through demonstration, to widespread commercial 
availability. Specific risks and challenges apply at these different stages of maturity and their 
implications for learning and development need to be better understood (Ockwell et al., 
2008). There is also a particular need to understand the role of learning mechanisms and 
technological capability development in lower and lower-middle income countries where 
existing levels of technological capabilities are likely to be low even for dealing with 
conventional energy technologies, let alone, newer, more efficient, low carbon 
technologies. This raises important questions as to what combinations of learning 
mechanisms are most appropriate in these contexts, and what firm based or public policy 
driven strategies are needed to encourage such learning and related capability building.  
The internal efforts that firms employ to develop technological capabilities are 
currently understudied in existing studies on the evolution of cleantech industries in 
emerging economies (Mizuno 2007; Marigo, 2009). With notable exceptions (e.g. Lema and 
Lema, 2013), policy-oriented studies which have attended to the importance of 
technological capability building through low carbon technology transfer have also, to date, 
largely failed to analyse individual firm-level learning mechanisms, often relying on relatively 
crude typologies of technology transfer applied to large datasets of project proposals 
(Haites et al., 2006; Das, 2011). The historical, in-depth analysis applied in the current paper 
suggests one way of overcoming the methodological limitations of these other efforts. 
However, it raises difficult tensions with the urgency of providing sound empirical bases for 
designing climate and development policy.  
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Another weakness of the literature and policy thinking in this area is a tendency to 
conceive of technology transfer as constituting individual events, supporting the assumption 
that these events might somehow be scaled up to achieve more rapid diffusion of low 
carbon innovations in developing countries (Ockwell et al., 2010). This overlooks two 
important issues. Firstly, it fails to recognise the widespread adoption of low carbon 
technologies as the result of a process over time, involving both individual events of 
technology transfer and related processes of learning and capability building. As this paper 
demonstrates, this can involve both intra- and inter-firm learning and learning between 
foreign as well as national firms, with important implications for resulting levels of capability 
building. Secondly, a misleading distinction is implied between technology innovation and 
diffusion, viewing them as two separate activities and hence overlooking the additional 
creative engagement, improvement, and diversification of technologies acquired from 
foreign sources by latecomer firms. Creative learning and innovation efforts often continue 
during the diffusion process, which involves more than the simple and passive acquisition of 
imported machinery or product designs, and the assimilation of related operating skills (Bell 
and Pavitt 1993). In the current paper, for example, firms in Group 1 devoted substantial 
internal efforts to engage creatively with a technology design originally acquired from a 
foreign license partner, which contributed significantly to technological capability building. 
Subsequently, the firms in Group 2 combined internal efforts with imitative learning from 
their competitors in Group 1 and the import of foreign technology thereby became part of 
ongoing learning activities in the local economy. This implies a need for further research 
exploring the additional learning activities associated with technology diffusion and how this 
relates to technological capability building in cleantech industries.  
An additional area to which this paper speaks and which warrants further attention 
is the widespread assumption that lower carbon development trajectories somehow 
necessitate the rapid introduction of "radical", or "disruptive", new-to-the world types of 
innovations. Such radical innovations are commonly identified as the main basis of 
correspondingly radical shifts towards more sustainable economic development. This 
understanding reduces the importance of incremental innovations which involve longer-
term and gradual learning and experimentation efforts. Since such innovations are typically 
at the lower end of the spectrum of innovative novelty, such as being new-to-the firm or 
local market, they are often considered less important in the extant innovation literature 
(Fagerberg, 2005). These types of innovations may, however, be of equal, if not more 
importance in achieving low carbon development, not least because it is often incremental 
innovation that characterise the gradual development of technological capabilities in 
developing country firms (Bell, 2009; Ockwell  and Mallett, 2012). In this paper, for example, 
incremental learning efforts were observed to enable some firms to gradually overcome 
technical challenges, which resulted in improvements in both performance and 
technological capabilities. There would therefore be value in additional research that 
explores in more detail the relationships between longer-term, incremental firm-level 
learning efforts and the development of relevant capabilities in relation to low carbon 
technologies at a regional or national scale. Indeed, the issue of scale is one which, to date, 
is surprisingly absent in existing studies and an area where engagement from the fields of 
economic and development geography could make important contributions to advancing 
the theoretical treatment of technology transfer and low carbon development more 
broadly. 
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Finally, most research in this field focuses on technology transfer and innovation in 
the context of potential or existing commercial markets in developing countries. As Sagar 
(2009) emphasises, there is also a need for research in the context of the development 
needs of poor people in the absence of commercial markets for relevant technologies or 
innovation efforts. This might also apply to examples where these market opportunities are 
nascent but could potentially be harnessed through new approaches to energy service 
delivery, such as emerging ideas around solar lighting provision via communal charging 
stations and mobile phone based hire-purchase agreements. This also alludes to a further 
emerging research area addressing the needs of marginalised groups and the radically 
different distributional implications of alternative low carbon development pathways (see 
e.g. Leach et al., 2010).  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
 This paper’s detailed, firm level analysis of the Malaysian biomass power equipment 
industry illustrates a range of inter-firm differences in the combination of learning 
mechanisms employed in making technological advances, as well as important differences in 
the relative levels of resources dedicated to exploiting these learning mechanisms. This 
suggests some important relationships between patterns and intensities of learning 
mechanisms and the level of technological capability building achieved by firms. In 
particular, firms that dedicated significant resources to a combination of learning from 
foreign partners and planned learning from their own experimentation were observed to 
have achieved most progress in terms of technological capability building. Nevertheless, 
important (albeit not as significant) advances in technological capability building were also 
made by firms who learned from imitating national competitor firms, the latter having 
learned from interactions with foreign partners. This suggests the role of local knowledge 
spillovers ought not be underestimated, although, significantly, firms learning from such 
local spillovers failed to advance beyond extra basic operating technological capabilities, as 
compared to those firms who proactively pursued learning from foreign partners who 
advanced to basic innovative levels of technological capabilities. Importantly, however, this 
paper found cases of firms who had tended to learn by imitating local competitors, but who 
had failed to take advantage of potential opportunities to learn from commercial 
interactions with overseas technology partners. This implies that in some cases a lack of 
technological capability building through learning from foreign partners is due more to a 
lack of intra-firm strategic decisions to dedicate resources to such learning than a lack of an 
opportunity to do so. Significant work remains to be done, both in terms of empirical 
research across different contexts and in terms of theory building, to make sense of these 
and other relevant insights on the role of learning and technological capability building in 
the broader context of sustained, low carbon development and technological change. 
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Abstract  
 
The economic development in emerging economies in Southeast Asia has significantly 
increased the use of fossil fuel based energy. This has severe implications for global climate 
change, and against this background, scholars within the sustainable transition tradition 
have taken an interest in addressing how transitions towards more sustainable 
development pathways in this region may be achieved. This paper contributes to the 
abovementioned literature by examining the conducive and limiting factors for 
development and proliferation of a palm oil biomass waste-to-energy niche in Malaysia 
during the period 1990-2011. Rising oil prices, strong pressure on the palm oil industry from 
environmental groups, and a persisting palm oil biomass waste disposal problem in Malaysia 
appear to have been conducive to niche proliferation, and on top of this national renewable 
energy policies and large-scale donor programmes have specifically supported the utilisation 
of palm oil biomass waste for energy. However, in spite of this, the niche development 
process has only made slow progress. The paper identifies reluctant implementation of 
energy policy, rise in biomass resource prices, limited network formation and negative 
results at the niche level, as the main factors hindering niche development.  
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1. Introduction 
  
 A number of countries in Southeast Asia have undergone an unprecedented rapid 
economic development and industrialisation process during past decades. This has 
increased the demand for energy, and other resources, to stimulate their economic growth 
process. With the increase in energy consumption and strong reliance on fossil fuels, the 
contribution of Southeast Asian countries to climate change has increased significantly 
(Rock and Angel, 2005).  
Against this background, a number of scholars within the socio-technical transition 
research tradition have recently taken an interest in addressing the question of how 
sustainable energy transitions take place, or may take place, in rapidly growing emerging 
economies in Southeast Asia (see e.g. Bai et al., 2009; Berkhout et al., 2009a,b; Rock et al., 
2009; Berkhout et al., 2010; Patankar et al., 2010; Verbong et al., 2010; Romijn et al., 2010; 
Berkhout et al., 2011). A main topic of interest has been the role of emerging niches, 
comprising of alternative innovations (niche-level experiments) that lead to more 
sustainable trajectories for economic development.  
Notwithstanding prior empirical studies conducted in Southeast Asia adopting the 
transition perspective, many aspects of niche development and transition processes in this 
region remain unexplored. As stressed in Bai et al. (2009), Raven et al. (2011), and Jolly et al. 
(2012),  more knowledge of the conditions under which local niche-level experiments may 
evolve from a single or a few isolated instances to larger up-scaling and system-wide 
transitions is needed. The present paper contributes to this understanding by examining the 
development of a palm oil biomass waste-to-energy niche in Malaysia during the period 
1990-2011. More specifically, the paper examines the extent to which a viable niche around 
palm oil biomass waste-to-energy has emerged in Malaysia; and identifies the conducive 
and limiting factors underlying the niche formation process.  
 During the last two decades, the palm oil industry in Malaysia has experienced a 
tremendous growth, which has led to an almost exponential increase in the biomass waste 
residues generated, and thereby created a substantial waste disposal problem for the palm 
oil industry. Concurrently, various overlapping national policies and international donor 
programme interventions have been implemented to enhance the utilisation of biomass 
waste for energy generation. Increasing oil prices and a growing pressure to reduce the 
environmental impact of the electricity generation system in Malaysia have, in combination 
with the waste disposal problem, contributed to creating conducive conditions for the 
formation and up-scaling of a palm oil biomass waste-to-energy niche in Malaysia. 
 So far, limited research has addressed the development of a palm oil biomass waste-
to-energy niche in Malaysia. The few existing studies mainly rely on official records and 
typically highlight the general barriers for renewable energy in Malaysia (see e.g. Oh et al., 
2011; Mekhilef et al., 2011). In contrast, this paper explores the niche development process 
through an empirically founded analysis of the progression of individual niche-level 
experiments and thereby fulfils the need for empirically based research in this area.  
 The paper is structured as follows. The second section presents the analytical 
framework adopted and the third section describes the research methodology - both of 
which are used to analyse the case study presented in section four. Finally, the conclusions 
are drawn in section five.  
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2. Analytical framework 
 
 This paper adopts the multilevel perspective (MLP) on systems innovations, which 
conceptualises how niche proliferation is influenced by interacting processes at the socio-
technical landscape-level, the regime-level, and the niche-level (Kemp et al., 1998; Geels, 
2002).  
At the macro-level, the socio-technical landscape denotes the large-scale and 
exogenous structural context that influences dynamics at the regime and niche-level. 
Examples include global macro-economic conditions, international geopolitics, overarching 
global political discourses, demography, resource scarcities, and changes in cultural and 
normative values.  
At the meso-level, socio-technical regimes comprise relatively stable configurations 
of institutions, techniques and artefacts, as well as rules, practices and actor networks that 
determine the ‘normal’ development and use of technologies. As a result of stabilising 
mechanisms, regimes are characterised by path-dependency, structural lock-in, and 
resistance to change, which effectively hinder alternative sustainable technological 
trajectories from emerging (Unruh, 2000). In the energy sector, this could involve a situation 
where the continuation of an incumbent fossil fuel-based energy system is stabilised by 
regulations, sunk investments in the infrastructure, subsidies, or vested interests of 
incumbent actors such as utilities (Verbong and Geels, 2007, 2010; Rohacher, 2008). Niche 
proliferation is therefore seen to be contingent upon destabilising tensions that open 
‘windows of opportunity’ at the regime level (Verbong et al., 2008; De Haan and Rotmans, 
2011).  
At the micro-level, socio-technical niches constitute local platforms, or incubation 
rooms, from where new and alternative socio-technical trajectories may emerge to the 
dominating way of fulfilling functions within existing regimes. The MLP conceptualises 
niches as comprising distinct application domains that provide a time-restricted and 
protected space in which new practices and technological innovations can incubate and 
become viable through experimentation. The temporary protection of niches from the 
mainstream selection pressures in regimes is needed since new niche-level innovations may 
be unable to compete on purely commercial terms, due to initial low price/performance 
ratios (Smith and Raven, 2012). According to Schot and Geels (2008), the viability of niches 
is influenced by three internal niche-level processes, which consist of: 1) The shaping and 
alignment of expectations; 2) the formation of a social actor network; and 3) learning 
processes.   
Increasing alignment of expectations involves that niche-level actors increasingly 
share similar visions, beliefs, strategies, agendas and interests. This is due to the important 
role of converging expectations in guiding individual actors towards a common direction. 
Following Hoogma (2000) and Geels and Raven (2006), a high level of aligned expectations is 
generally conducive for niche development although envisioned opportunities need to 
become more specific and rely on positive, tangible results.  
The second niche level process concerns the formation of a constituency behind a 
new or alternative socio-technical trajectory consisting of a network of engaged actors. It is 
generally assumed in the MLP that the formation of close social ties and regular interaction 
among actors stimulates niche development. Furthermore, the composition of the actor 
network plays a central role and the involvement of a broader and more varied actor 
network also promotes niche development (Van der Laak et al., 2007). In addition to 
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technology actors, a broad network includes regulators, policy makers, scientists, societal 
groups, and others depending on the specific context (Coenen et al., 2010). Particularly with 
regards to the proliferation of renewable energy technology niches, the involvement of 
powerful actors in the established regime such as energy utilities is crucial (Smith et al., 
2010).  
Lastly, learning processes involve learning about technological aspects of various 
niche-level experiments, including technical design, functionality, and performance. 
Although the MLP accentuates the role of learning through techno-economic optimisation 
efforts, broader learning processes pertaining to the social embeddedness of these play an 
equally important role. The latter requires that various actors, and society at large, learn 
about many aspects of the technology, including regulatory conditions, user preferences, 
institutional, economic (e.g. business models, profitability, and financing sources), 
infrastructure, socio-cultural, and environmental aspects.   
  
3. Data collection methodology   
 
 The present paper is informed by three successive empirical field studies undertaken 
in Malaysia during the period of 2008 to 2011 (see also Hansen, 2011). A main objective of 
the data collection process was to illuminate previous and ongoing processes at the 
landscape, regime, and niche level. The data collected identified all relevant palm oil 
biomass waste-to-energy plants implemented in Malaysia during 1990-2011 and their 
operational status. Although more was planned during this period, 39 plants had reached 
some level of progression from the initial planning stage towards full operation. All of these 
plants have been implemented as part of national and/or international programmes and 
thus within a protected space around the development of a palm oil biomass waste-to-
energy niche in Malaysia. A sample of 12 of these plants were analysed in detail, which 
included plants that had been in operation for long and short-term periods, plants under 
construction, and abandoned plants. The analysed plants are located in Peninsular Malaysia 
and Sabah, respectively in west and east Malaysia, and include combined heat and power 
(CHP) plants, standalone grid-connected power plants, and off-grid steam generating plants 
for various industrial users (see a complete list of these plants in the Appendix). 
 Data collection mainly consisted of conducting interviews, gathering documentary 
material such as reports and statistical information, and observations at plant sites. In total, 
40 formally planned and digitally recorded interviews were conducted during the field study 
period and around 10 additional non-formal discussions also pertained to the field work. 
Interviews were undertaken with representatives of private companies involved in specific 
niche-level experiments, which include boiler technology suppliers, investors, users, palm oil 
biomass waste suppliers, and consultancy companies. In addition, other people 
knowledgeable about specific plants but not directly involved in them, or with experience in 
the area of palm oil biomass energy generation in Malaysia, were interviewed. They include 
academics, private entrepreneurs, NGO representatives, private consultants, and others.  
 With respect to processes at the regime level, the study covered both the energy 
and the palm oil regime in Malaysia. Consequently, various representatives of institutions 
and organisations pertaining to both the energy and the palm oil sector were interviewed. 
This includes energy-related planners from governmental agencies, ministries, and utility 
companies, donor programme managers, as well as representatives of trade and industry 
associations and R&D organisations associated with the palm oil industry in Malaysia.  
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4. Development of a palm oil biomass waste-to-energy niche in Malaysia during 1990-
2011 
 
 The  main findings is presented as a historical narrative organised into three sections 
based on the three main time periods identified in the paper: The ‘slow introduction’ (1990-
2001), the ‘growth’ (2002-2006), and the ‘fragmentation’ (2007-2011) phases. Within each 
time period the dynamics at the landscape, regime and niche level will be explored. A 
summary of the findings is presented in Table 1 in the concluding section five. It should be 
noted that it was not possible to identify any influential landscape factors of significance for 
regime and niche-level processes developed during the first phase.   
 
4.1. The ‘slow introduction’ phase 1990-2001  
 
4.1.1. Regime conditions 
 
 During the 1990’s, the energy demand increased at around 8-10% annually and the 
key objectives of national energy policies focused on the provision of a sufficient and 
affordable supply of energy (see Fig. 1). To achieve these objectives, the government heavily 
subsidised the energy sector and focussed on utilising the indigenous oil, gas, coal, and 
hydro resources. The four fuel diversification policy, adopted in 1981, therefore aimed at 
reducing the reliance on a single source of energy, which proved to have negative impacts 
on the Malaysian economy during the global energy crisis in the late 1970's (Thaddeus, 
2002). To increase the security of supply in the energy system, the four fuel policy continued 
to provide a dominating guiding principle for energy generation expansion plans throughout 
the 1990's.  
 Rapid depletion of indigenous oil reserves, frequent power outages - most notably in 
two substantial one-off blackout events in 1992 and 1996 - and the discovery of large 
natural gas resources in the early 1990’s, entailed that the expansion of generation capacity 
was largely met by domestic natural gas (see Fig. 2). Consequently, the subsidies and 
priority given to natural gas provided the basis for continuing the fossil fuel-based energy 
regime. A formal renewable energy policy was also absent during this period. The energy 
sector was dominated by the state-owned utility company Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) 
and the nationalised Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), which were vested with the 
entire oil and gas resources in Malaysia. Since 2005, TNB has owned around 60% of the 
generation capacity in the Peninsula and 55% in total in Malaysia. Electricity generation was 
liberalised during the 1990’s, and this led to the inclusion of a few large-scale independent 
power producers (IPP).  TNB has, nevertheless, remained by far the largest utility company 
with a monopoly on electricity transmission and distribution. TNB is also the major 
shareholder in the two main electricity utility companies Sabah Electricity Sdn Bhd (SESB) 
and Sarawak Energy Berhad (SEB) respectively in Sabah and Sarawak in east Malaysia.    
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  Fig. 1. Energy demand in Malaysia 1999-2010. Source: EIA (2012).     
 
 
Fig. 2. Energy generation mix in Malaysia 1978-2013. Source: Oh et al. (2011).  
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  Concerning the palm oil regime in the 1990's, the management of biomass waste in 
the upstream fuel supply chain was characterised by the longstanding and well-established 
practices in palm oil mills. The palm oil milling process generates three main fractions of 
solid biomass residues from the processing of fresh fruit bunches (FFB): Palm kernel shells 
(PKS), mesocarp fibres, and empty fruit bunches (EFB). The conventional practice in palm oil 
mills was to use PKS and mesocarp fibres, which had a high calorific value, for production of 
process steam and electricity for internal consumption. The energy demand in a standard 
size palm oil mill was, however, significantly lower than the potential energy from these 
waste resources, creating a substantial waste problem in terms of PKS, mesocarp fibres, and 
EFB. The amount of waste increased concurrently with the general rise in the annual 
production of crude palm oil in Malaysia, which increased from approximately 5 to 16 
million tonnes in the period 1990-2001.   
 EFB is a fibrous and bulky material with a high water, chlorine, and soluble alkali 
content, and a low ash melting point. Compared to the other fractions, this rendered EFB 
less suitable as a fuel for energy generation (Menon et al., 2003). Therefore, EFB waste were 
mainly used as mulching and soil conditioner in plantations, dumped in open landfills, 
stockpiled in palm oil mill facilities, and burned in open incinerators - enabling the ash to be 
used as a fertilizer (Yusoff, 2006). In this regard, it should be noted that the anaerobic decay 
of EFB in landfills and stockpiles were associated with substantial emissions of methane, 
which is a highly potential greenhouse gas. Generally, the biomass waste was considered a 
disposal problem for palm oil milling companies due to high removal and transport costs, 
especially for EFB, and an absence of regulatory measures or incentives to circumvent this 
situation, including a lack of opportunities to sell surplus electricity to the grid (Evald, 2006). 
The power plants in palm oil mills were therefore deliberately designed to operate 
inefficiently so as to burn as much biomass residues as possible (Sulaiman et al., 2011). 
Consequently, during this period, the palm oil milling industry did not have incentives to 
invest in high-efficient EFB-fired energy generation plants.  
 A number of development assistance (donor) programmes were implemented in 
Malaysia during the 1990's with the aim to promote renewable energy. Among these, the 
EU–ASEAN COGEN 1 and 2 programme (1991-1994 and 1995-1998) and the Danish 
Cooperation for Environment and Development (DANCED/DANIDA)1 programme (1994-
2006) were particularly influential in creating conducive conditions for niche development 
(DANCED, 1999; Hezri and Hasan, 2006) (see Fig. 3). These programmes both provided 
technical assistance to energy sector and palm oil industry agencies and financial support to 
specific palm oil biomass waste-to-energy projects (Dewulf and Leelakulthanit, 1997; AIT, 
2004). DANCED was also directly involved in the establishment of the Malaysia Energy 
Centre (PTM) in 1998 - an independent national energy research and information centre on 
renewable energy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1The DANCED programme was in 2001 taken over by the Danish International Development Assistance 
(DANIDA). The programme is therefore referenced as the DANCED/DANIDA programme. 
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Program / Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2011 
COGEN (1,2,3)       
DANCED/DANIDA      
BIOGEN    
SREP    
GTFS       
CDM      
FIT      
Fig. 3. Palm oil biomass waste-related national renewable energy policies and external 
support programmes in Malaysia 1990-2011. 
 
4.1.2. Niche processes 
 
 Despite the need for expanding and diversifying the electricity generation capacity 
and in spite of the implementation of two international programmes aiming at promoting 
the utilisation of palm oil biomass waste for energy generation, only one cogeneration plant 
was constructed during this period. The plant was erected at an existing palm oil mill and 
was based on relatively simple and well-known technology using PKS and mesocarp fibres. 
The actor network formation and learning processes were therefore limited and at the end 
of the period the general familiarity with, and interest in, palm oil biomass waste-based 
energy generation was limited - both in the energy and palm oil regime.   
 
4.2. The ‘growth’ phase 2002-2006  
 
4.2.1. Landscape conditions 
 
 In this period, two factors at the landscape level contributed to generating tensions 
in the energy and the palm oil regime, which created opportunities for niche development. 
First, the rapid increase in crude oil prices and derived products such as gasoline, petroleum 
(including fuel oil), and diesel between 2001 to 2007, from around 30 to 70 US$/barrel, 
played an important role (IEA, 2011). This price increase provided an incentive for energy-
intensive industries in Malaysia to utilise alternative and more cost-efficient sources of 
energy, such as palm oil biomass waste, to meet their heat and electricity requirements. As 
a result, palm oil biomass waste was increasingly utilised in the cement and rubber glove 
industry as well as in palm oil refineries and oleo-chemical plants relying on diesel and fuel 
oil-fired generators. Secondly, an increasing international environmental critique of the 
palm oil plantation expansion and production process put pressure on the palm oil industry 
to engage in an ecological modernisation process. In 2004, this led to the establishment of 
the roundtable on sustainable palm oil (RSPO), an international organisation aiming to 
promote and monitor sustainable palm oil production. This incentivised the utilisation of 
palm oil effluent and biomass residues to reduce the environmental impact from the palm 
oil production process.  
 
4.2.2. Regime conditions  
 
  With a continued increase in the energy demand, recurrent power outages, and a 
rapid depletion of domestic natural gas resources, the pressure to expand and diversify the 
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energy supply created tensions in the incumbent energy regime (Shekarchian et al., 2011). 
The situation was especially urgent on the eastern coast of Sabah, which was plagued by 
aging, expensive, and unreliable power plants and transmission lines (Koh and Lim, 2010). 
Therefore, energy planning agencies in Sabah had a particularly strong motivation to 
enhance the reliability and sufficiency of the electricity supply. In response to these 
challenges, and given the low cost of coal, the energy authorities under the auspices of TNB 
continued expanding the generation capacity with mainly coal fired power plants in the first 
part of the period (Thaddeus, 2002) (see Fig. 2). 
 However, at the same time, political pressure to reduce the environmental impact of 
electricity generation in Malaysia, and a wish to diversify energy supply due to security 
reasons, spurred political action in promoting renewable energy. This was initially laid out in 
the Third Outline Perspective Plan (OPP3) in 2001, for the period 2001-2010, which 
specifically emphasised increasing the utilisation of biomass resources from the palm oil 
industry for electricity generation, and later reiterated in the Eight Malaysia Plan (8MP) 
adopted in 2001 (covering the period 2001-2005). 
The 8MP gave renewable energy a strategic priority with the promulgation of the 
fifth fuel diversification policy. More precisely, a target was set by the government to 
achieve 5% of the total energy demand in 2005 to come from renewable energy, equal to 
around 500-600 MW additional generation capacity with a particular focus on palm oil 
biomass waste-based energy generation (EPU, 2001). This target was to be achieved 
through the government programme entitled “Small Renewable Energy Power Programme” 
(SREP), initiated in 2001, which applied various financial incentives to support grid-
connected renewable energy. According to the programme, biomass-based generating 
companies were granted exemption of income tax on 70% of the statutory income for 5 
years, or a tax allowance of 60% of qualifying capital expenditure incurred within 5 years. 
Additionally, import duties and sales tax exemption on energy conservation machinery and 
equipment not produced locally was granted as part of these financial incentives. Most 
significantly was the 21 years license period under a renewable energy power purchase 
agreement (REPPA) set up to provide project developers with long-term planning and 
investment security. These incentives contributed to creating opportunities for niche 
development.  
  Despite this, a number of policy design and regulatory aspects reduced the impetus 
from the SREP for niche development. First, SREP projects should be below a capacity of 10 
MW and be situated within 10 km from the nearest grid-substation. Secondly, the project 
developer should bear the cost of new or reinforced interconnection lines including ancillary 
equipment, which in many cases comprised a substantial part of the total plant investments. 
These constraints made it difficult for developers to reach economies of scale and put 
additional pressure on project investment costs (Hashim and Ho, 2011). Thirdly, the REPPA 
contracts largely followed conventional independent power producer (IPP) contracts, which 
comprised unfavourable conditions for renewable energy, such as specified performance 
provisions and penalties for non-delivery (KETTHA, 2009). Last but not least, the REPPA 
contracts were not a feed-in-tariff with fixed tariffs and an obligation for TNB to purchase 
certain quantities of produced electricity. Rather, project developers and TNB were jointly 
responsible for negotiating a suitable REPPA agreement in the individual projects on a 
‘willing buyer, willing seller’ basis. Due to the monopoly status of TNB, as the only power 
off-taker in Malaysia, this created an unequal bargaining position or power asymmetry in 
REPPA negotiations. The government did however in 2001 set out a negotiating range of the 
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tariff price level to be agreed under REPPA contract negotiations, which is shown in Table 2 
below (Hashim and Ho, 2011).  
The lacking obligation of TNB to buy electricity became especially important as 
subsidies to fossil fuel based electricity was maintained and thus contributing to the result 
that the levelised cost of electricity  from conventional gas and coal-fired IPP plants was 
approximately half compared to that of renewable energy (Sovacool and Drupady, 2011). As 
the regulatory scheme did not allow TNB to transfer extra costs onto consumers, TNB would 
experience a serious loss in buying electricity form biomass waste-to-energy plants 
(Sansubari, 2010). Consequently, TNB only accepted the lowest possible tariff rate in REPPA 
negotiations and deliberately delayed and obstructed the project approval process, as it 
considered the SREP a threat to its revenue and profits (Sovacool and Drupady, 2011). Due 
to these reasons, many project developers found that project preparation and 
implementation were too complicated and time consuming, and that uncertainties and risk 
were too high compared to the potential profits with the envisaged tariffs, and 
consequently they did not proceed with project investments (Shafie et al., 2012).  
 
      Table 2. Changes in tariff price ranges for  
      biomass projects under SREP 2001-2009. 
Year Price 
2001 0.14-0.17 RM/kWh (0.043-0.052 US$/kWh) 
2006 0.17-0.19 RM/kWh (0.052-0.058 US$/kWh) 
2009 0.19-0.21 RM/kWh (0.058-0.064 US$/kWh) 
       Source: Chua et al. (2011).   
 
In the palm oil regime, a ban on open burning of EFB was implemented by the 
government in 2000 owing to concerns about local health problems and complaints of black 
smoke in residential areas located close to palm oil mills. This effectively exacerbated the 
biomass waste disposal problem in the palm oil industry. The total volume of EFB generated 
in Malaysia increased from around 8.5 to 19 million tonnes, during the period 1998-2006 of 
which most was mulched, incinerated, stockpiled, or left to decay in open landfills (Ngadi 
and Mustapha, 2007; Shuit et al., 2009). In palm oil mills without their own plantations to 
dispose EFB, the situation became particularly problematic and the ban thus initiated a 
search for alternative waste management options including the utilisation of EFB for energy 
purposes. It should be noted however, that the regulatory enforcement of the ban was 
relatively weak in distant locations and palm oil mills that were in operation before 2000 
were not obliged to comply with the regulation.  
 A second issue in the palm oil regime concerned dynamics set in motion by a rapid 
increase in the price of PKS, which began to materialise around 2003. This was a result of an 
increase in the demand for PKS, particularly from the cement and rubber glove industry in 
Malaysia, as a substitution for the use of fuel oil and diesel in processing facilities. 
Therefore, from effectively having no economic value at the beginning of the second period, 
the price of PKS increased to approximately 80 RM (26 US$)/tonne in 2006 (Dit, 2007), and 
continued to increase subsequently to reach around 180-200 RM (60-65 US$)/tonne in 
2011. As a result, in fuel substitution and other types of palm oil biomass waste-to-energy 
plants, it became more economically viable to utilise EFB for which a market price did not 
develop (Evald, 2006). Consequently, from 2003 and onwards, the prospects for niche 
development became focused on the utilisation of EFB.  
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 Lastly, two large renewable energy related donor programme interventions and the 
new financing opportunities through the Kyoto Protocols' Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) contributed to creating opportunities for niche development. The donor 
interventions were in the form of the EU-ASEAN COGEN 3 programme (COGEN 3) (2002-
2004) and the Biomass-based Power Generation and Cogeneration programme (BioGen) 
(2002-2010) (from 2005) (see Fig. 3). The COGEN 3 programme continued the previous 
activities under COGEN 1 and 2, particularly the efforts to identify and mature specific 
projects (Lacrosse, 2004; COGEN3, 2012). The BioGen programme was funded by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and, 
among other things, provided direct financial support to specific plants, conducted training 
workshops, and undertook policy analysis on tariff structure revisions and REPPA agreement 
standards (Aldover and Yang, 2010). The financial incentive provided by the CDM, in the 
form of carbon credits, also contributed to creating more favourable investment conditions 
for palm oil biomass waste-to-energy plants in Malaysia (DANIDA, 2004; Hansen, 2011; 
UNEP Risoe, 2012).  
 
4.2.3. Niche processes    
 
 Concerning the shaping and alignment of expectations, the second period from 2002 
to 2006 was especially marked by the launch of the SREP, COGEN 3, BioGen, and the 
financial opportunities arising from the introduction of the CDM in Malaysia. These 
programmes contributed significantly to raise the level of expectations of various niche-level 
actors, such as technology suppliers, palm oil industry companies, investors, and project 
developers. This created a general hype around EFB-based energy generation and the 
interest to engage in niche-level experiments converged. Therefore, of the total 39 plants 
identified, 26 were planned, commissioned, and/or put into operation during this period as 
illustrated in Fig. 4 and the Appendix.  
 
 
Fig. 4: Palm oil biomass waste-to-energy plants in Malaysia at various stages in project 
implementation. Status is based on information from 2011. The years in the table refer 
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to the date of obtainment of the necessary operational licenses of the individual plants 
(see Appendix). Source: Authors own elaboration based on various sources.  
 
This has led some commentators to refer the 2002-2006 period as the ‘bio-energy 
boom’ in Malaysia (Aziz et al., 2011). This is also reflected in the large number of license 
applications submitted under the SREP programme. Apart from 5 plants, which mainly 
utilise PKS, all plants identified involve the utilisation of EFB as the main source of fuel for 
energy generation (see the Appendix). These plants vary in installed capacities from 1.2 MW 
to 23 MW and have primarily been implemented as cogeneration plants in palm oil 
refineries, in other industries, and as green-field grid-connected power plants. An overview 
of the status of the plants according to the categories above is shown in Fig. 5. It should be 
noted though that among the EFB-fired biomass projects that had been put in operation 
under SREP in 2005, only one plant had delivered electricity to the grid by the end of 2005 
(EPU, 2006; Oh et al., 2011).  
 
 
Fig. 5. Number of palm oil biomass waste-to-energy plants in Malaysia in palm oil 
refineries, in other industries, and as green-field grid-connected power plants by 2011. 
Source: Authors own elaboration based on various sources.    
 
As mentioned above, for independent palm oil mill owners without plantations for 
mulching or disposal, the ban on open incineration in 2000 provided a strong incentive to 
consider alternative biomass waste management options, such as combustion of EFB. 
However, in spite of access to land for disposal, the ban on open incineration was also a 
motivating factor to invest in EFB-fired plants for the large-scale palm oil companies with 
upstream plantation and downstream processing facilities, such as palm oil milling and 
refining. According to plant owners, other motivating factors were:  i) threat of increasing 
energy prices, ii) a need of reliable energy supply (especially in Sabah), and iii) an aspiration 
to improve their environmental profile. For some of the large-scale palm oil plantation 
companies, utilising EFB for energy generation was also considered a new potential business 
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area, and in spite of the ban on open incineration, high expectations to a profitable use of 
EFB for energy generation gradually changed the perception of EFB from being a waste 
product to being an economically valuable resource. In the boiler manufacturing industry, 
the expectations to the emerging market were high and a number of boiler supplier 
companies specifically targeted their activities towards the development of EFB-fired power 
plants. The strategy of these companies was to build a platform based on accumulated 
experiences, and from there move towards technological lead and a large market share. 
Despite limited experience with EFB combustion and the associated risks, many of these 
companies proved to be willing to invest both time and resources in aspiration to reap 
future benefits.  
In parallel with the growing number of plants implemented since the first EFB-fired 
plant2 was commissioned in 2001, the actor network gradually expanded during the second 
period. The network mainly included private companies directly involved in the plants either 
as suppliers of boiler technology and related ancillary components, energy consultants, 
investors, users, and suppliers of EFB. The evolving actor network was however 
characterised by a lack of relations linking actors together across the individual plants. The 
majority of the plants were implemented by a small group of local boiler suppliers, which 
were specialised in supplying boilers to the palm oil industry in Malaysia and in the 
Southeast Asian region since the 1970’s, and according to the interviewed actors the high 
level of competition and rivalry among these suppliers was the reason behind very limited 
inter-company coordination of activities, cooperation, and interaction in general. 
Knowledge sharing among these actors was therefore limited. 
Investors in the palm oil industry and other investors also saw a strategic interest in 
protecting plant-related information from being openly disclosed and they hindered third-
hand parties from obtaining access to detailed information about the specific plants, with 
the result that formal sharing of lessons and experiences across industrial actors was largely 
absent. A concrete example of this was the strict visiting rules and regulations enforced at 
palm oil mills and refineries involved in various EFB-fired plants.  In spite of support from the 
donor interventions to facilitate the establishment of an overarching body, which could 
stimulate an information sharing platform between niche-level actors, such efforts never 
materialised (Aldover and Yang, 2010). Consequently, the acquired knowledge remained 
concealed by the actors involved in individual plants.  
Despite the limited interaction between niche-level actors, the network was 
broadened by the participation of a number of influential regime-level actors, most 
noticeably the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB) and the Palm Oil Industrial Cluster (POIC) 
in Sabah. In particular, the MPOB, a powerful state-owned palm oil R&D and innovation 
institution in Malaysia, became engaged in supporting niche development - although 
without actively engaging in specific plants. MPOB had a strong position in the Energy 
Commission that governed the SREP and was therefore able to influence the operational 
modalities of the programme. The POIC was set up in 2005 by the state government in 
Sabah to promote and provide favourable growth conditions for the palm oil industry in 
Sabah. A main purpose of the POIC was to support private investors in developing new palm 
oil biomass waste-based industries such as biofuel production, oleo-chemical, 
phytonutrient, and food industries, as well as palm oil biomass energy generation in Sabah. 
Among other things, MPOB and POIC were highly influential in the government's decision to 
2The term 'EFB-fired plants' denotes biomass power plants that mainly, although to varying degrees, use EFB 
as the primary source of fuel input.    
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increase the negotiable REPPA tariff price range for projects under the SREP in 2006 and 
2007 (see Table 2) (Sovacool and Drupady, 2011). A primary motivation for these palm oil 
industry organisations to push for a tariff increase was to improve the profitability of palm 
biomass-based energy generation to increase the commercial opportunities in utilising 
biomass waste resources in the palm oil industry. Other organisations, including the PTM, 
also encouraged a tariff increase on electricity from renewables (Aldover and Yang, 2010), 
but the achieved tariff rate increase only pertained to SREP projects on biomass and biogas 
and hereby favoured palm oil related energy generation compared to for example solar 
photovoltaic or hydropower. This result indicates the influence of the MPOB and POIC.  
The plants implemented in this period from 2001 to 2005 gave rise to a number of 
important learning experiences at the plant level. First, an incremental and long-term 
techno-economic optimisation process occurred at the plant level throughout the period. 
The boiler suppliers and users were here pursuing a common interest. The users were 
generally interested in achieving the highest possible return on their investments by 
increasing the performance of the plants and the boiler suppliers were interested in 
enhancing the price/performance ratio of the technology to improve their competitiveness 
against competitors in the market. A characteristic feature of the learning and 
experimentation efforts undertaken in the individual plants was the absence of involvement 
from universities, R&D institutions and government-supported laboratories and testing 
facilities.   
Initially, most of the plants used a boiler system similar to the conventional low-
efficiency (and low cost) cogeneration boilers previously used in palm oil mills. As a result of 
the specific chemical and physical properties of EFB, this caused numerous problems in the 
combustion process. Especially the formation of clinker deposits on heat surfaces reduced 
plant performance substantially and required frequent shut downs for manual cleaning. This 
problem was addressed by adjusting and controlling the critical plant efficiency parameters 
such as air inlet levels and hereby achieving better control of temperatures in the boiler and 
by reconfiguration of and experimentation with new boiler designs, such as furnace grate 
systems. The fuel feeding system was not optimised to handle moist and bulky material such 
as EFB and therefore another feature of the learning and experimentation activities 
undertaken concerned the introduction of EFB pre-treatment systems and automatic 
feeding systems. The pre-treatment aimed at reducing the moisture and length of the EFB 
fibres, which was considered a particularly critical parameter regarding plant performance. 
With regard to operation and maintenance, interviewed users and suppliers claimed that 
lack of skilled and trained personnel in rural areas often led to sub-optimal operation and 
maintenance procedures, and limited the potential learning opportunities.  
Another learning experience concerned the dynamics of user preferences and the 
profitability of various business models. During the second period, and subsequently, it 
became clear that the emerging market for EFB-fired energy generation became divided 
into a high-quality and low-quality segment. The users in the high-quality segment mainly 
preferred proven and reliable technology sourced directly from well-renowned international 
boiler supplier companies or indirectly through license agreements from local boiler 
companies. Although the total capital costs of plants in this segment were relatively higher, 
users generally appreciated a higher level of technical certainty and long-term operational 
durability to reduce the investment risks. An example of this involved two green-field grid-
connected power plants erected only for the production of electricity and relying on 
external fuel supply sources. In order to increase the economic viability of such plants, users 
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in this segment valued a higher level of efficiency and plant performance. In the low-quality 
market segment, users tended to opt for larger risk-willingness by investing relatively less 
with the use of local boiler supplier companies working independently. The users in this 
segment focused more on reducing the upfront capital costs rather than securing the long-
term financial viability of the plants, and were therefore more willing to accept a higher 
frequency of plant shutdowns and lower efficiency than the high-quality plant owners.  
 Lastly, critical learning experiences also pertained to fuel handling and management 
issues related to the organisation of integrated logistical systems to supply and utilise large 
amounts of EFB. The typical amount of EFB required to continuously and effectively operate 
a 10 MW power plant is around 150,000 tonnes of EFB/year or approximately 420 tonnes of 
EFB/day. The management of such large volumes of biomass required effective organisation 
for collecting, processing, and ultimately utilising EFB at the plants sites. This involved 
substantial challenges at most plants, but in particular at the large-scale green field plants 
relying predominantly on external fuel supply sources.  
 
4.3. The ‘fragmentation’ phase 2007-2011  
 
4.3.1. Landscape conditions  
 
 At the landscape level, the rise in crude oil prices culminated in a record high of over 
140 US$/barrel in July 2008, and maintained the demand for relatively lower cost palm oil 
biomass waste-based energy generation (see also Romijn and Caniëls, 2011). After the 
global economic recession in 2008 and 2009, the price increased again and reached over 
100 US$/barrel in 2011 (IEA, 2011). This provided a continuous impetus for niche 
development.  
Moreover, climate change mitigation remained a key issue at the international level, 
which particularly attracted political attention in the lead up to, and during, the UN climate 
summit in Copenhagen in 2009. During the summit, the Malaysian government announced a 
commitment to reduce the national greenhouse gas emission intensity by 40% in 2020, 
compared to 2005 levels (Chua et al., 2011). This commitment was incorporated into the 
national energy policy with a focus on palm oil biomass waste-based energy, to help achieve 
this target. Renewable energy remained a key priority in the energy policy, and contributed 
to creating tensions in the energy regime.  
The pressure on the palm oil companies from international environmental NGO’s 
continued and was accelerated by criticism of the increasing biofuel production from the 
palm oil industry in Malaysia. This generated a strong push for reducing the environmental 
impact of palm oil-based biofuel, inter alia, by enhancing the utilisation of palm oil biomass 
waste residues.  
Lastly, during 2006-2011 the crude palm oil price increased from 1,500 to over 2,500 
RM (493-820 US$)/tonne, which made extraction of the residual oil in the milling process 
more profitable (Chandran, 2010). EFB residues thereby became more usable for various 
purposes such as energy generation, which incentivised alternative management practices 
in palm oil mills.     
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4.3.2. Regime conditions 
 
 The incessant power interruptions due to lack of capacity became more widespread 
compared to the second period, particularly along the eastern coast of Sabah, and it became 
clear that the continued increase in energy demand generated an urgent need for 
expanding the generation capacity in Malaysia. Because of the rapid depletion of indigenous 
natural gas reserves, it remained a priority for TNB to increase the security of energy supply 
by diversifying the energy sources (TNB, 2008). This was mainly achieved by constructing 
new capacity based on imported coal and consequently, the reliance of fossil fuels in the 
energy system increased (Shekarchian et al., 2011) (see Fig. 2).  
Previous to the third period, the price of electricity and petroleum products were 
capped and the difference between world market prices and the caps were subsidised by 
the government. When the gap between world market prices and the price caps increased 
in 2008, the energy subsidies increased to around 14 billion US$ or approximately 4% of 
GDP (Aziz et al., 2008; TNB, 2008). The financial burden prompted the Malaysian 
government to review the energy subsidy policies (IEA et al., 2010), with the result that in 
2008 the price of natural gas for power generation was raised by 124% in Peninsular 
Malaysia and the average electricity tariff for all sectors of the economy was increased by 
24%. This reduction in subsidy on fossil fuels and adjustment to market costs contributed to 
creating more conducive conditions for renewable energy generation in Malaysia, which 
created an impetus for niche development.  
 When adopting the Ninth Malaysia Plan (9MP) in 2005, the 500-600 MW target set 
out in the 8MP was far from being reached. In fact only two grid-connected plants, with a 
combined capacity of 12 MW had delivered electricity to the grid in 2005 (EPU, 2006). 
Consequently the 9MP, covering the period 2006-2010, reduced the earlier target to 350 
MW, comprising 300 MW renewable electricity generation capacities in Peninsular Malaysia 
and 50 MW in Sabah. While the SREP thereby continued to encourage niche development 
until its termination in 2010, the program remained in place without any additional 
specified roadmap and incentives, new strategic planning mechanisms and regulations, or 
revitalised institutional structure to achieve the target. Consequently, the problems 
pertaining to the configuration of the SREP explained previously, such as the unequal REPPA 
negotiating situation and unfavourable capacity and localisation constraints, remained 
intact (Sovacool and Drupady, 2011).  
 Other factors were more conducive for niche proliferation during the third period. 
Firstly, as in the previous period, the BioGen programme and the CDM continued to 
promote and incentivise palm oil biomass waste-based energy generation. Secondly, a 1.5 
billion RM (0.48 US$ billion) green technology financing scheme (GTFS) was set up by the 
government in 2009 with the purpose to provide both users and producers of renewable 
and energy efficient technologies with financial support, primarily through soft loans 
(Hashim and Ho, 2011). Thirdly, and most importantly, a new renewable energy feed-in-
tariff (FIT) system became operational in April 2011 following the Malaysian Cabinet's 
approval of a new national renewable energy policy in 2010. The FIT involved an obligation 
for the distribution companies (under the auspices of TNB) to buy specific quantities of 
electricity from biomass power plants at a fixed and significantly increased rate (see Table 2 
and 3 for comparison). The agreement also introduced compensation to the distribution 
companies by allowing a general tariff increase of 1%. This reflected a larger political 
willingness to pass the cost of renewable energy generation onto consumers, and compared 
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to the second period, it reduced the losses for distribution companies in buying electricity 
from renewable energy.   
 
        Table 3. Tariff rates for biomass plants  
        under the FIT system in Malaysia.  
Capacity limit  Fixed tariff price 
<10 MW 0.31 RM/kWh (0.10 US$/kWh) 
>10 MW <20 MW 0.29 RM/kWh (0.09 US$/kWh) 
>20 MW <30 MW 0.27 RM/kWh (0.08 US$/kWh) 
          Source: Hashim and Ho (2011). 
  
In the palm oil regime, one factor was particularly influential regarding the prospects 
for niche development. This concerned the increasing interest in using EFB for various 
commercial purposes other than energy generation. Commercial interests were many. 
Firstly, researchers in various universities and R&D institutions in Malaysia showed interest 
in production of bio-fuel from EFB, and large-scale commercial production of both EFB-
based biodiesel and second-generation bio-ethanol was established by large palm oil 
plantation companies (Shuit et al., 2009; Ng et al., 2012). Secondly, both research in and the 
commercial production of pulp and paper from EFB became a reality, and thirdly, a local 
industry emerged around the production of pellets and briquettes from EFB. Thirdly, EFB 
were increasingly used for a number of other purposes such as input material for wood-
based products especially particle and fibre boards, composite panels, mattresses, animal 
feed, pyrolysis, composting in plantations together with palm oil effluent, and export for co-
firing in power plants (Evald, 2006; Ngadi and Mustapha, 2007). The interest in EFB for 
competing usages increased the price of EFB from about zero at the beginning of the period 
to around 15-20 RM (5.0-6.6 US$)/tonne in 2011, and in some cases even up to 45-50 RM 
(14.8-16.5 US$)/tonne depending on the quality, localisation and site delivery (Chen, 2011). 
This situation opened opportunities for alternative biomass waste management practices in 
palm oil mills beyond the conventional mulching, landfill deposal and open incineration of 
EFB, but reduced the incentives for using EFB for energy generation.  
  
4.3.3. Niche processes   
 
At the niche level, the continuance of the SREP, BioGen and CDM, the introduction of 
the GTFS and the new FIT contributed to sustaining the general interest in palm oil biomass 
waste-based energy generation. Particularly influential was the FIT that introduced three 
new energy policy elements that were conducive for niche development:  i) a raise in the 
tariff rate for biomass plants compared to the SREP (see Tables 2 and 3), ii) an obligation for 
distribution companies to purchase certain quantities of electricity from biomass energy 
plants, and iii) removal of some of the unfavourable capacity and localisation restrictions 
pertaining to REPPA agreements under the SREP (SEDA, 2013).  
The influence of these initiatives on niche development is reflected in the 
continuance of EFB-fired energy plants applying for registration under the SREP, CDM, GTFS, 
and FIT (see the Appendix), and in the fact that a number of suppliers previously engaged in 
EFB-fired plants concentrated their activities around this market. Moreover, the interest 
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from various industrial users in Malaysia in using EFB as a substitution for diesel and fuel oil 
persisted and a number of large-scale foreign industrial investors also became active in the 
market for EFB-fired energy generation. 
However, progress in EFB-fired power plants in the third period ended up being 
much lower than expected. At the end of the 9MP in 2010, only 62 MW of the planned 
additional 350 MW grid-connected renewable energy capacity under SREP was in operation. 
Of the 62 MW, three palm oil biomass waste-to-energy plants were responsible for around 
30 MW in the period (about 30 % of total installed biomass capacity) while the remaining 32 
MW came from mini hydro and biogas plants.  
To through more light on the operational performance, the 17 plants in operation in 
2011 were categorised into 5 levels of performance, defined by the author. The 
categorisation was based on interviews with plant managers, and in 9 cases interviews were 
conducted in a combination with field visits.  Among the plants in operation, only smaller 
plants (total of 5 MW) using PKS and mesocarp fibres as fuel were in the category of high 
performing plants and only two plants (total of 24 MWe) relying exclusively on EFB were in 
the category of medium to high performance. The rest of the EFB-fired plants were 
performing either at the low level or at the low to medium level (see Fig. 6 and the 
Appendix). 
 
 
Fig. 6. Installed capacity of palm oil biomass waste-to-energy plants in operation in 
Malaysia at different performance levels. Source: Based on authors judgement of 
performance following interviews with managers and field visits in 2011. 
This relatively poor performance in most of the plants, was as mentioned above, 
especially the result of problems related to formation of clinker deposits on heat surfaces 
and problems related to the fuel feeding system, which was not optimised to handle moist 
and bulky material such as EFB. Although techno-economic optimisation efforts continued in 
the already implemented plants most new plants were delayed in starting operation and 
performed substantially below design capacity levels. The plants were designed to produce 
process steam and electricity, but due to technical problems, the majority did not manage 
to produce electricity. Moreover, owing to the technical difficulties experienced, most 
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plants were not able to operate exclusively on EFB and were forced to add biomass with a 
higher calorific value such as PKS.  
These operational problems resulted in substantially lower profitability than 
expected and these negative results became widely known (Shafie et al., 2012). According 
to investors, this reduced the general expectations to the commercial viability of using EFB 
for energy generation, with the result that the plants planned in this period were stalled and 
only previously commissioned plants were put into operation. It also became clear that the 
large palm oil plantation companies with own palm oil mills did not consider EFB-based 
energy generation part of their business activities. According to palm oil plantation 
companies, this was due both to the negative performance level of already established 
plants and the increasingly competitive alternative use of EFB. According to the smaller 
palm oil mill companies, most of them did not have an interest or the financial capacity to 
engage in large-scale EFB-fired plants and because of the competing commercial interest in 
EFB, they largely adopted a wait-and-see strategy, which made them hesitant to engage in 
longer-term contracts concerning the sale of EFB. As a result, contrary to converging 
expectations in second period, the niche level actors experienced a diverging interest in the 
third period. 
 The interaction and coordination between actors in the niche and linkages across 
various plants remained limited in the third period. However, in contrast to the second 
period, TNB became actively engaged in the niche as a main investor in two large-scale EFB-
fired power plants (TNB, 2011). As a key regime actor, the direct involvement of TNB in 
niche development marked a new situation since TNB, in contrast to previously, initiated 
concrete actions to promote EFB-fired energy generation in Malaysia and invested in plants. 
Another factor that contributed to broadening the actor network during the third period 
concerned a large NGO coalition organised to campaign against a planned 300 MW coal-
fired plant in Sabah (Green Surf, 2012). The substantial pressure from this campaign was 
highly influential in the decision of SESB in 2011 to withdraw from this coal plant and 
include renewable energy in future capacity expansion plans (McNish et al., 2010; Time, 
2011). The actor network thereby became broadened to include civil society representatives 
in influencing niche development. Lastly, it should be mentioned that although the PTM, 
POIC, and MPOB continued to promote niche development, these actors increasingly 
supported diversifying the use of EFB.  
With regards to the learning process, the techno-economic optimisation efforts 
continued as in the previous period. Although the results of these efforts were generally 
negative, as mentioned above, some price/performance ratio improvements were achieved 
in the individual plants. These performance improvements were mainly associated with 
additional efforts to optimise the EFB pre-treatment systems, which in most plants 
constituted a particularly laborious learning process. A main challenge was to reach a 
consistent size and moisture content of shredded EFB fibres since this was found to 
constitute a critical factor in the fuel feeding and boiler operation process.  
 Another central learning experience was that a reliable and affordable supply of EFB 
increasingly became a critical factor for plant operation and profitability. During the third 
period, EFB was mostly traded directly with palm oil mill owners on a non-contractual basis, 
which implied continuous negotiations regarding delivery, quality, price, and volume. Since 
all plants relied, to various extents, on external sources of EFB, this practice introduced a 
general risk to the profitability of EFB plants, and as palm mill owners were generally 
hesitant to engage in long-term fuel contracts, reliable and long-term EFB supply contracts 
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became a main hindering factor for financial institutions to provide loans to plant investors 
in this period. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This paper set out to explore the extent to which a palm oil biomass waste-to-energy 
niche was developed in Malaysia during the period 1990-2011 and to identify conducive and 
limiting factors underlying the niche formation process.   
Regarding the development of a palm oil biomass waste-to-energy niche, the 
conclusion is that the niche has only made slow progress although some proliferation of the 
niche occurred momentarily in the period 2002-2006.  Except in two cases, the performance 
level for plants using EFB was relatively low, and many planned plants were never put into 
operation and those that were constructed relying mainly on EFB were substantially 
delayed. 
With regard to the conducive and limiting factors for the development and 
proliferation of a palm oil biomass waste-to-energy niche in Malaysia, the paper has 
identified the main influential factors at the landscape, regime, and niche-level involved in 
the niche development process in three distinctive periods. A summary of these factors is 
presented in Table 1 below.   
 In conclusion, rising oil prices, strong pressure on the palm oil industry from 
environmental groups, and a persisting palm oil biomass waste disposal problem in Malaysia 
have been some of the main conducive factors for the creation and proliferation of a niche 
over the three periods. These factors at the landscape level have in all three periods been 
supplemented by supportive regime level factors, such as policy measures in terms of 
national renewable energy policies and large-scale donor programmes interventions aiming 
at the development of the niche for renewable energy technologies in Malaysia. At the 
niche level, the momentary proliferation of the niche during the second period was strongly 
influenced by conducive niche level processes in the form of a high level of alignment of 
expectations and multifaceted learning processes.   
 Explanations as to why the niche did not develop as expected are many, and the 
present analysis is not able to provide any solid causal explanations to this complex 
question.  Based on interviews with plant managers and observers in Malaysia and the 
analyses above, we would nevertheless points towards the following 4 hypothetical limiting 
factors: 
 
5.1. Reluctant implementation of energy policy 
 
As shown above, the policies for niche proliferation have gradually improved over 
time, but have been implemented, when it was too late as compared to the need (Sovacool 
and Drupady, 2011). Most prominently, the REPPA agreement developed under the SREP on 
a 'willing seller, willing buyer' basis, turned out to be costly for TNB, without providing a 
sufficient incentive for investors to engage in waste to energy cogeneration plants. The FIT, 
in contrast, comprising a higher tariff rate for project developers and giving compensation 
to the distribution companies through increased consumer tariffs was only agreed upon in 
2011, when momentum was lost and the trust in high performance of EFB based power 
plants was heavily reduced. Moreover, subsidies on fossil fuel were maintained at a high 
level until 2008. If the fossil fuel subsidy had been reduced at an earlier stage, it would have 
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increased the competiveness for biomass based electricity so, as discussed in Oh et al. 
(2011), also this relevant policy would have benefited the niche development if introduced 
earlier. Both the FIT and the reduction of subsidies were well described incentives in the 
international literature since the late 1990s, see e.g. UNDP (2001), and with the high level of 
technical support in the Ministry of Energy, Green Technology and Water (KETTHA) from 
donor programmes, the late introduction was not due to lack of knowledge, but rather lack 
of political will. 
 
5.2. Rise in biomass resource prices 
 
The cost of the biomass waste increased over the period from being negative to 
reach a level of up to 45-50 RM (14.8-16.5 US$)/tonne for EFB and even higher for PKS and 
mesocarp fibres. This increase in price was due to two reasons: Firstly, increased oil prices 
made PKS and mesocarp fibres a competitive fuel for smaller industries needing process 
heat and was hence not available at a reasonable price for the palm oil industry, and 
secondly, increased palm oil prices changed the process at the palm oil mills, which made 
the EFB more usable for energy purposes but also for various other purposes, such as e.g. 
for biofuel, pulp and paper or cardboards. This reduced the pressure for combustion and 
increased the price of EFB. The rise in prices on EFB had an important side effect, as it raised 
expectations among the EFB producers, which in reality made it impossible to engage in 
long term delivery contracts and hereby hindering investment (see also Raven, 2005).  
 
5.3. Limited network formation 
 
During the entire niche development process, a broader network linking actors 
together across the individual plants remained weak. Apparently, a long standing rivalry 
among local boiler suppliers was the reason behind this very limited inter-company 
coordination of activities, cooperation, and interaction in general. Knowledge sharing 
among these actors was therefore limited. In addition, investors apparently saw a strategic 
interest in protecting plant-related information from being public and they hindered access 
to detailed information about the specific plants, with the result that formal sharing of 
lessons and experiences across industrial actors was very limited. This may also be seen as 
the main reason why involvement from universities, R&D institutions and government-
supported laboratories and testing facilities were almost absent in the technological 
development. In line with Schot and Geels (2008), the findings of this paper points toward 
the lack of niche level network formation as a major reason of the limited learning results 
with respect to handling the challenging EFB fuel.  
 
5.4. Negative results at the niche level  
 
In combination with the factors above, the predominantly negative performances of 
the plants constructed, became the most important factor for the slow progress in niche 
development by 2011, when the research for this paper was concluded (see also Shafie et 
al., 2012). Despite the price/performance improvement achieved in some plants, the 
general picture was one of largely negative results at the niche level, which may be seen as 
a result of insufficient learning and innovation efforts. This may again refer back to limited 
strategic interest from investors and producers of equipment to engage in sufficient 
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investment, which can be the result of insufficient incentives. This paper thereby 
corroborates previous studies in the MLP literature, such as Geels and Raven (2006) and Van 
der Laak et al. (2007) that positive and tangible results from experiments at the niche level 
is an essential element of niche development.  
 Finally, the lack of alignment of the processes at the landscape, regime, and niche-
level provide explanations of the relatively poor results in this case. The general hype and 
interest about biomass generation in the second period, was not aligned with sufficient 
incentives and the needed quality of plants to make them competitive. And when incentive 
structures became more adequate in the third period, the interest in investing had slowed 
significantly down, mainly due to the poor experiences. These findings hence support the 
general claim in the MLP framework that processes at the landscape, regime, and niche-
level need to be aligned in order for a niche to flourish (see e.g. Geels, 2002).  
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Table 1. Summary of the main conducive and limiting factors in the development of a palm 
oil biomass waste-to-energy niche in Malaysia 1990-2011.  
Phase Slow introduction  
1990-2001 
Growth  
2002-2006 
Fragmentation 
2007-2011 
Landscape conditions 
  -Rising oil prices  
-Environmental pressure on the palm 
oil industry 
-Continued rising oil prices 
-Political interest in mitigating climate 
change  
-Sustained criticism of the palm oil 
industry  
-Palm oil price increase led to an 
upgrading of EFB residues 
Regime conditions 
Energy  -Rising energy demand and 
frequent power outages  
-Rapidly depleting oil reserves  
 
-High fossil fuel subsidies  
 
-Four fuel policy (focus on oil, 
gas, coal, and hydro) 
-Energy generation expansion 
largely met by natural gas  
-Lack of a formal renewable 
energy policy  
-Continued rising energy demand and 
recurrent power outages  
-Rapidly depleting natural gas reserves  
 
-Sustained high fossil fuel subsidies 
 
-Fifth fuel policy and the SREP 
programme  
-Energy generation capacity expansion 
increasingly met by coal  
-Disincentive for TNB to engage in 
renewable energy  
-Continued rising energy demand and 
power outages  
-Continued depleting natural gas 
reserves  
-Reduced subsidies on fossil fuels led 
to a general tariff increase   
-Continuation of the SREP. 
-Introduction of the GTFS, and the FIT 
-Continued generation capacity 
expansion mainly met by coal  
-Compensation for TNB to purchase 
renewable energy   
Palm oil  -Stabilised waste handling 
practices in palm oil mills 
-Lack of regulatory measures or 
incentives to utilise waste   
 
-Ban on open incineration of EFB  
-Rapid price increase for PKS 
(incentivises EFB utilisation)  
 
  
-Increasing interest in EFB for 
competing use (EFB became an 
economically valued resource)  
Crosscutting  -International programs (COGEN 
1, 2 and DANCED/DANIDA) 
-International programs 
(DANCED/DANIDA, COGEN 3, BioGen, 
and CDM) 
-International programs (BioGen and 
CDM) 
Niche processes 
Expectations  -Limited interest in palm oil 
biomass waste-based energy 
generation  
-High and converging expectations 
among niche actors  
-Expectations raised due to new 
renewable energy policies  
-Expectations reduced from negative 
results in previous plants  
-Increasingly diverging expectations 
among various niche level actors  
Actor 
network  
-Limited actor network 
formation since only one plant 
was implemented  
-Limited interaction among niche 
actors across experiments 
-Network became broader with the 
active participation of PTM, MPOB, 
and POIC   
-Continued limited interaction among 
niche actors across experiments  
- Network was further broadened with 
the participation of TNB and NGO 
coalition  
Learning  -Limited learning processes  -Techno-economic optimisation efforts 
focusing on plant performance 
-Learning about user preferences and 
various business models  
-Organising the logistical infrastructure 
around large-scale EFB-fired plants   
-Mainly techno-economic optimisation 
efforts in existing plants 
-Difficulties in getting long-term EFB 
supply contracts hinders investment  
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Appendix. List of identified palm oil biomass waste-to-energy plants in Malaysia (1990-2011). 
 
Name Part of program 
License 
date1 
Current 
status 
(2011) 
Operational 
performance Fuel
2 
installed 
capacity ( 
MW) 
Analysed 
in detail 
in this  
study 
Type3 
Kilang Sawit 
United Bell 
Sdn. Bhd. 
COGEN 2 1997 In operation High PKS, MCF 1.2 Yes 
CHP in 
palm oil 
mill 
Kim Loong 
Sdn Bhd - - 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- - 14.0 No 
CHP in 
palm oil 
mill 
Bumi 
Biopower 
COGEN 
3, SREP, 
CDM 
2001 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB, PKS, MCF 6.3 Yes 
Greenfield 
power 
plant 
Kalansa 
Energy 
Corporation 
Sdn Bhd 
SREP, 
CDM 2002 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB 6.5 No 
Greenfield 
power 
plant 
Kogen Sdn 
Bhd SREP 2002 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- - -  - - 
Palm Energy 
Sdn Bhd 
(Kwantas) 
SREP, 
CDM 2002 
In 
operation Low EFB 9.8 No 
CHP in 
palm oil 
refinery 
MHES Asia 
Sdn Bhd 
Biogen, 
SREP, 
CDM 
2002 In operation Low 
EFB 
(gasification) 13.0 Yes 
Greenfield 
power 
plant 
Sunquest 
Biomass 
project 
SREP, 
CDM 2002 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB 6.5 No 
Greenfield 
power 
plant 
Golden Hope 
Plantations 
Bhd 
SREP 2002 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB, PKS, MCF - No - 
IOI Bio-
Energy Sdn 
Bhd project 
SREP, 
CDM 2002 
In 
operation Low/Medium EFB 15.0 Yes 
CHP in 
palm oil 
refinery 
Bell Eco 
Power 
COGEN 
3, SREP, 
CDM 
2002 Under erection - EFB 10.0 Yes 
CHP in 
palm oil 
mill 
Potensi Gaya 
Sdn Bhd SREP 2003 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB 7.0 No 
Greenfield 
power 
plant 
Alaf 
Ekspressi Sdn 
Bhd 
SREP 2003 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB 8.0 Yes 
Greenfield 
power 
plant 
Sungei 
Dingin Palm 
Oil Mill 
project 
COGEN 3 2004 In operation High PKS, MCF 2.0 Yes 
CHP in 
palm oil 
mill 
TSH Bio-
Energy Sdn 
Bhd 
COGEN 
3, SREP, 
CDM 
2004 In operation Medium 
EFB, PKS, 
MCF, 14.0 Yes 
CHP in 
palm oil 
mill 
Biomass 
Energy Plant-
Lumut 
CDM 2004 In operation Medium 
EFB, PKS, 
MCF 2.0 No 
CHP in 
palm oil 
refinery 
Lafarge 
cement 
project 
CDM 2004 In operation High PKS - No 
CHP 
industrial 
user 
(cement) 
Naluri 
Ventures Sdn SREP 2005 
Planned 
not - EFB 12.0 - 
Greenfield 
power 
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Bhd erected plant 
Eko 
Synthesis 
Sdn 
Biogen 2005 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB - No 
CHP in 
palm oil 
mill 
Bentong 
Biomass 
Energy Plant 
CDM 2005 In operation Low/Medium EFB 1.2 Yes 
CHP 
industrial 
user 
(paper 
mill) 
LDEO 
Biomass 
steam 
project 
CDM 2005 In operation Low/Medium EFB 1.2 No 
CHP in 
palm oil 
refinery 
SEO Biomass 
steam 
project 
CDM 2005 In operation Low/Medium EFB 1.2 No 
CHP in 
palm oil 
refinery 
Kina 
Biopower 
Sdn Bhd 
project 
SREP, 
CDM 2005 
In 
operation Medium/High EFB 11.5 Yes 
Greenfield 
power 
plant 
Seguntor 
Bioenergy 
Sdn Bhd 
SREP, 
CDM 2005 
In 
operation Medium/High EFB 11.5 Yes 
Greenfield 
power 
plant 
The Sahabat 
EFB project CDM 2005 
In 
operation Low/Medium EFB 7.2 Yes 
CHP in 
palm oil 
refinery 
ENCO 
biomass 
project 
CDM 2005 In operation Low/Medium EFB - No 
CHP 
industrial 
user 
Johor 
bundled 
project 
CDM 2005 - - EFB 14.0 No 
CHP in 
palm oil 
refinery 
Jendarata 
Steam & 
Power Plant 
CDM 2005 In operation High PKS, MCF 2.0 No 
CHP in 
palm oil 
mill 
Hartalega 
rubber glove 
project 
CDM 2006 In operation Low/Medium EFB 12.0 No 
CHP 
industrial 
user 
(rubber 
glove) 
Bioenergy 
plant – Sawit 
Kinabalu 
CDM 2008 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB 1.2 No 
CHP in 
palm oil 
refinery 
Eco Biomass 
(POIC) 
project 
CDM 2008 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB, PKS 23.0 No 
Greenfield 
power 
plant 
FTJ Biopower - 2008 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB 12.5 No 
Greenfield 
power 
plant 
FELDA and J-
Power 
biomass 
plant 
- 2008 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB 10.0 No 
Greenfield 
power 
plant 
Mini 
renewable 
energy plant 
CDM 2008 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB, MCF, PKS - No 
CHP 
industrial 
user 
(paper 
mill) 
Pengkalan 
Chepa 
biomass 
plant 
CDM 2009 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB, MCF, PKS 1.5 No 
CHP 
industrial 
user 
(rubber 
118
glove) 
G.B. 
Industries 
Biomass 
CDM 2009 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- PKS - No 
CHP 
industrial 
user 
(rubber 
glove) 
Cash Horse 
Sdn Bhd CDM 2010 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB 12.0 No 
CHP in 
palm oil 
mill 
Maju Intan 
Biomass CDM 2010 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB 12.5 No 
Greenfield 
power 
plant 
Agni 
biopower GFTS 2011 
Planned 
not 
erected 
- EFB 10.0 No 
Greenfield 
power 
plant 
Source: Own research.  
Notes: 
1) License date refers to the date of issuance of the earliest identified approvals from authorities 
given to the individual plants, such as business license from local authorities and generation or 
supply of electricity license issued by the Energy commission in Malaysia.  
2) Abbreviations used: EFB = Empty Fruit Bunches, PKS = Palm Kernel Shells, MCF = Mesocarp Fibres.  
3) Abbreviations used: CHP = Combined heat and power.   
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Abstract 
 
Recent studies have found that further development of the MLP is needed to conceptualise 
and empirically assess the role of transnational linkages in niche development. This paper 
explores the factors that may explain the effect of twenty years of donor interventions, as 
one form of transnational linkage, in promoting the development of a palm oil biomass 
waste-to-energy niche in Malaysia. The paper contributes to the existing literature by a 
conceptual and empirical examination of this research question. With regard to its empirical 
findings the paper concludes: i) that advice on energy policy had a limited impact, mainly 
due to strong opposing interests in maintaining the existing situation; ii) that creating the 
necessary conditions for transferring a private-sector model of electricity production to 
Malaysia remained a challenge; and iii) that the short duration and unpredictability of 
interventions generally can be seen as an important impediment for programs in reaching 
their objectives.   
 
Keywords: Multi-level Perspective; Strategic Niche Management; donor programs; 
renewable energy; developing countries    
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1. Introduction  
 
The multi-level perspective (MLP) on systems of innovation is a widely adopted 
framework for analysing stability and change in socio-technical systems. While most 
empirical studies using the MLP have been conducted in developed countries, a number of 
researchers have recently taken an interest in examining niche up-scaling and transition 
processes in emerging economies. These studies have mainly been undertaken in Asia owing 
to the increasing contribution of countries in this region to global environmental problems, 
such as climate change (Rock and Angel, 2005).    
Previous studies adopting the MLP framework in Asia have found that further 
development of the framework is needed, especially for studies of niche development in 
developing countries (Romijn et al., 2010). In particular, the inability of the MLP both to 
conceptualise and assess empirically the role of transnational linkages in niche development 
and transition processes has been stressed (Bai et al., 2009; Rock et al., 2009; Berkhout et 
al., 2010, Romijn and Caniëls, 2011). Consequently, efforts to elaborate and further 
substantiate the nature of these transnational linkages have recently been incorporated into 
the MLP framework (see e.g. Binz et al., 2012; Coenen et al., 2012; Coenen and Truffer, 
2012; Raven et al., 2012). Transnational linkages take various forms, such as relationships 
with foreign technical experts and inter-firm partnerships with foreign suppliers of 
technology. By facilitating a flow of knowledge, technological and financial resources, and 
organisational capabilities, such transnational linkages between actors and institutions may 
play a key role in niche development and transition processes (Berkhout et al., 2010) 
Another prevailing transnational linkage is the technical and financial support to 
niche development from international donor interventions, as illustrated, for example, in 
Bai et al. (2009), Patankar et al. (2010), Romijn et al. (2010), Verbong et al., (2010), and Jolly 
et al. (2012). Although the effects of donor interventions were not specifically addressed in 
these studies, such interventions were generally assumed to have a significant and generally 
beneficial influence on niche development.  
While the MLP literature has thus adopted a rather uncritical perspective on donor 
interventions, another body of literature rooted in development sociology and anthropology 
and often referred to as the 'planned development literature' has developed a critical 
approach to analysis of donor interventions over the past twenty years (see e.g. Olivier de 
Sardan, 2005; Long, 2001)3. This approach, which sees donor interventions as the result of a 
negotiation between various conflicting interests, has shed light on the complexity of donor 
interventions and illustrated how high levels of conflict and unpredictability in such 
interventions often lead to low levels of the fulfilment of stated objectives (Long and Ploeg, 
1989; Mosse, 2005). This body of literature therefore contrast with the images of 
predictability, harmony and success which proliferate in the grey development literature, as 
a result of institutions continually searching for funding (see e.g. Nygaard, 2010).  
The aim of this paper is to enhance the MLP framework by bringing in the critical 
perspective on donor interventions mentioned above as part of the analysis of transnational 
linkages. This goal of enhancing the MLP framework has been accentuated by a specific 
interest in understanding why more than twenty years of donor involvement in the 
3 This article draws on insights from two research traditions that have studied the ‘interface’ between 
development actors and beneficiaries. The two approaches, which have developed in parallel fashion in the 
French-speaking and Anglophone worlds, have been termed the ‘actor-oriented approach’ (Long, 2001) and 
the ‘entangled social logics approach’ respectively (Olivier de Sardan, 2005).  
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development of a palm oil biomass waste-to-energy niche in Malaysia has generated 
relatively limited results compared to the objectives set out in project documents, not least 
the widely published expectations following the launch of the programs.   
 In the present case of niche development in Malaysia, the amount of financial 
support, technical assistance, institutional capacity-building and awareness-raising 
campaigns channelled through donor interventions has been substantial, but as described in 
our recent paper (Hansen and Nygaard, 2013), despite a short and momentary period of 
niche development during 2002-2006, the level of niche development turned out to be far 
lower than expected. An analysis based on the traditional MLP approach to the niche 
development in Malaysia identified four main factors hindering niche development: i) a 
reluctant implementation of energy policy; ii) a rise in biomass resource prices; iii) a limited 
network formation; and not least iv) the low performance levels of implemented plants, but 
the paper did not analyse further the reasons behind the apparently limited effects of donor 
interventions, which were addressing these issues both directly and indirectly.   
This paper intends to fill this gap by exploring the factors that may explain the low 
level of efficiency in donor interventions in the development of a palm oil biomass waste-to-
energy niche in Malaysia. The contribution of this paper to the existing literature on 
sustainable transitions in emerging economies therefore consists in both its conceptual and 
empirical examinations of this question.  
 The paper in structured as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical framework, 
followed by a presentation of the research methodology in Section 3. Section 4 provides the 
main analysis. These results are discussed in Section 5, before the main conclusions are 
drawn in Section 6.  
 
2. Analytical framework  
 
2.1. The conceptualisation of transnational linkages in the MLP 
 
The MLP currently conceptualises transitions as the outcome of interactions 
between three levels of social aggregation: regimes, niches and landscapes. According to 
the MLP, niche proliferation is conditional on destabilising tensions at the regime level, 
which opens windows of opportunity allowing for the proliferation of innovative niche-level 
experiments. Such tensions may arise from processes at the landscape level and/or from 
internal regime-level dynamics. In empirical studies, these three levels are often 
conceptualised using specific territorial boundaries: regimes tend to be depicted with 
national features, landscape dynamics with international features, and niches with sub-
national or local features. Therefore, the role of transnational linkages and the global 
dimension of transitions have to a large extent been encompassed in the MLP’s all-
embracing notion of the landscape concept (Geels, 2011). However, as Raven et al. (2012) 
argue, there is no reason to conceptualise the MLP levels with specific territorial 
boundaries. Social networks in niches, for example, are not necessarily exclusively local, as 
sustainability experiments and niche-level actors are often embedded within global flows of 
knowledge, technology and financial resources (Rock et al., 2009; Coenen and Truffer, 
2012). Likewise, regimes may also be transnational in their physical extent and may be 
influenced by global actor networks and institutional linkages that may either support or 
destabilise them (Smith et al., 2010). Thus, both regimes and niches may exhibit a similar 
form of multi-scalar layering in their spatial reach (Wieczorek et al., 2012). However, the 
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understanding of niche formation and transition dynamics as shaped by interactions 
between actors and institutions situated across different spatial scale has only recently been 
introduced in the MLP framework (Binz et al., 2012). This paper draws attention to the flows 
of resources facilitated through international donor interventions as one element in a 
transnational analysis of niche development processes.  
 
2.2. A critical perspective on donor interventions  
 
The term ‘donor interventions’ denotes planned development programs and 
projects that are funded either by multilateral organisations, such as the World Bank and 
agencies of the United Nations, or by bilateral donor agencies that distribute aid between 
countries. Using MLP terminology, donor interventions may influence regime-level dynamics 
and niche development processes in two distinct ways. At the regime level, donor 
interventions may provide policy advice, technical assistance and institutional support 
through training, capacity-building and techno-economic appraisals to government 
agencies, industry organisations and other key regime-level actors. Many donor 
interventions aiming to promote renewable energy in developing countries encompass such 
activities with the aim of inducing institutional changes at the regime level in order to create 
more conducive framework conditions for the development of specific niches.  
At the niche level, donor interventions may support technological experimentation 
activities by providing direct financial support to specific niche-level experiments. This 
financial support is often provided to projects aimed at demonstrating the technological and 
economic viability of such experiments. As Byrne (2011) found, donor interventions can thus 
bear the main initial investment risk for private-sector project developers, and thus 
contribute to creating a protected space in which niche development processes, such as 
experimentation and actor network formation, take place (Smith and Raven, 2012). In many 
developing countries, this is particular relevant since the financial sector may have limited 
experience with regard to renewable energy projects, making it difficult for potential 
investors to obtain financing. Donor interventions may comprise a combination of various 
elements in ‘packages’ in the form of large-scale programs. Such programs can both target 
actors and organisations at the regime level and influence processes at the niche level 
through the provision of direct financial support and technical assistance to specific 
projects.  
The analytical framework presented below is based on elements from the 
development sociology and anthropology literature, which provide a critical perspective to 
understanding the role of donor interventions in niche development.  
 
2.2.1. Donor interventions as arenas of struggle and contestation  
 
Many donor interventions are formulated as ideal-type models conceived as 
progressing from policy formulation to implementation, and resulting in a final stage after 
which ex post evaluations can be made about the extent to which the original objectives 
have been achieved. This implicitly entails that interventions are constructed to proceed in a 
linear fashion, involving a step-by-step series of activities from policy formulation to 
concrete and measurable outcomes. Such processes are often elaborated in standardised 
management models, such as the logical framework approach (LFA).  
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As part of these ideal-type constructions, donor intervention models encompass 
normative political and ideological views on desired outcomes, which are conceptualised as 
more appropriate alternatives to previous practices (Mosse, 2005). In relation to this, 
Kontinen (2004) argues that the legitimacy of donor interventions in promoting desirable 
goals rests on two main ideological premises. The first is that donor intervention objectives, 
whatever the prevailing interpretation of their ‘right’ social and economic contents, are 
thought to be achievable, desirable and beneficial to all. The second is the belief that a well-
meaning, rationally constructed intervention in a social process will lead to such 
development and that it is in everyone’s long-term interest to foster such interventions and 
development. However, these premises invite criticism for at least two underlying 
assumptions.  
First, and according to Long (2001), from a practical perspective such ideal and 
rational planning model constructions are a gross oversimplification of how interventions 
typically proceed in reality, as there is a great deal of incremental 'muddling through' 
involved. Since interventions most often address highly complex and integrated social and 
economic problems, which involve numerous feedback interactions, achieving intervention 
objectives is not foreseeable or manageable in any straightforward manner (Olsen, 2006). 
This means that, rather than simply executing an already specified plan of action with 
expected behavioural outcomes, donor intervention agencies are often engaged in 
achieving what is pragmatically and practically realisable in the given context.  
Secondly, such ideal-type (means-end) constructions obscure the more fundamental 
point that interventions should not be treated as a discrete set of activities taking place 
within a defined time-space setting. Rather, interventions should be considered to be one 
element of a continuous flow of social and economic life with on-going relations evolving 
between various social actors. Thus, following Long and Ploug (1989), interventions do not 
have sharp boundaries in time and space and are always part of an on-going, socially 
constructed and negotiated process. These on-going processes are occupied by social actors 
navigating a contested social field in which they exercise economic and political influence 
among various competing interests. The targeted ‘recipients’ or ‘beneficiaries’ of donor 
interventions are therefore not passive agents, as they actively interpret, react and position 
themselves in respect to the interests of other actors, including those of donor interventions 
(Arora and Romijn, 2012). In such contested fields, donor agencies may have limited 
operational control in steering processes in certain desirable directions owing to a lack of 
legitimacy, authority and bargaining power in relation to other influential actors. This means 
that the ‘outcomes’ that may be expected from donor interventions are greatly influenced 
by a variety of actors exercising and mobilising power in line with their heterogeneous 
interests and intentionalities (Grammig, 2002). In order to enhance their influence among 
the diversity of competing interests, donor agencies need to mobilise interests around their 
desired objectives. According to Mosse (2005), this requires donor interventions to engage 
in a struggle to persuade, negotiate and gain legitimacy from a supporting network of actors 
concerning these objectives. The perspective presented here assumes that donor 
interventions thereby open up new arenas of struggles over resources, interests, 
rationalities, interpretations and influence between various actors (see Nygaard, 2010). This 
follows the actor-oriented approach suggested by Long (2001), which, among other things, 
argues in favour of examining conflicts of interest and the contradictory motives and 
perceptions of various actors as a main element of donor intervention analysis (Bierschenk, 
1988). An analysis of conflicts of interest between donor agendas and between influential 
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local actors will inform the analysis of why donor interventions in this case do not seem to 
have fulfilled their own objectives. It should be noted that this perspective does not direct 
attention towards actor interests at an individual level, but rather attempts to highlight the 
underlying systemic rationale of ‘larger’ actor logics (Long, 2001).   
 
3. Data collection methodology  
 
The present paper is part of a wider study of the development of the palm oil 
biomass waste-to-energy niche in Malaysia, which has included numerous plant visits and 
interviews with key niche-level actors (see Hansen and Nygaard, 2013). The paper focuses 
on three main donor-funded interventions that have been particular influential with regard 
to the development of a palm oil biomass waste-to-energy niche in Malaysia, respectively 
the COGEN program (1991-2004), the DANCED/DANIDA program (1994-2006) and the 
BIOGEN program (2002-2010). These interventions were studied by consulting palm oil 
biomass and energy-sector experts in Malaysia, as well as through a comprehensive review 
of the academic and grey literature on the development of the palm oil biomass waste-to-
energy niche in Malaysia.  
The primary data collected for this paper consists of thirty interviews with: i) former 
program managers of the three donor interventions, including expatriates and 
representatives of local implementing agencies and local consultants; ii) representatives of 
different energy-related governmental agencies; and iii) palm oil industry organisations in 
Malaysia. The interviews were conducted in Malaysia and Denmark in 2010 and 2011. The 
literature review comprises a substantial number of publicly available reports undertaken 
during the programs, such as barrier analysis, baseline studies and biomass resource 
inventories conducted by local and expatriate consultants. Added to this are various 
unpublished materials and internal documents, such as internal evaluation reports and 
technical reports (including market analysis and feasibility studies), collected through 
personal contacts with various actors involved in the programs. The overall approach 
highlighting the conflicting interests of key actors in the niche formation process guided the 
review process, with due attention being given to traditional ‘source criticism’ in analysing 
the various internal and publically available documents. 
  
4. Presentation and analysis of twenty years of donor interventions 
 
The twenty years of donor intervention aimed at enhancing the use of biomass 
waste for electricity production in Malaysia consists of three programs. The first program, 
the COGEN program, was a regional program targeting the Southeast Asian region, while the 
DANCED/DANIDA and the BIOGEN programs were national programs. All programs aimed at 
capacity-building, knowledge dissemination and improvement of the enabling framework 
for investments in biomass waste-to-energy plants, while the COGEN and the BIOGEN 
programs also provided economic support in terms of loan facilities and subsidies for 
investment. COGEN and BIOGEN started as short-term programs, but ended up being long-
term interventions after subsequent phases were added or the first phase extended. The 
implementation periods of the different phases of the three programs are illustrated in 
Figure 1.  
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Fig. 1.  Overview of the different phases of the three interventions. 
 
This section provides a description of the main objectives of each of the three donor 
interventions and the measures adopted. This is followed by an analysis of the key issues 
that, according to interviews and reviews of evaluations, were ascribed particular 
importance in hindering the donor interventions in achieving their objectives. An analysis 
and discussion of the underlying factors shaping the outcome of the interventions is 
presented in Section 5.  
 
4.1. The EU-ASEAN COGEN program  
 
Within a long-term agreement to increase economic cooperation between the 
European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the EU–
ASEAN COGEN program was funded by the European Commission and completed in three 
phases in the period from 1991 to 2004. According to AIT (2004), the overall aim of the 
program was to promote proven and efficient biomass cogeneration technologies from 
European equipment suppliers to Southeast Asian countries, focusing primarily on agro 
industry-based energy generation. The COGEN program aimed at contributing to meet the 
growing energy demand in ASEAN countries by introducing more sustainable alternatives to 
the predominant fossil fuel-based energy systems.   
In the first phase of the COGEN program (1991-1994), the main aim was to identify 
the biomass energy market potential and business opportunities for European equipment 
suppliers. A number of background papers, feasibility studies and market reports were 
produced, which often highlighted a highly promising potential in the ASEAN countries, 
particularly in the Malaysian palm oil industry (see e.g. Alanoca, 1993; DEA, 1993; 
Guillaume, 1993). This provided the basis for the European Commission's decision to 
proceed with a second phase of the program (1994-1997), which focused mainly on 
engaging European technology suppliers in full-scale demonstration plants (Dewulf and 
Leelakulthanit, 1997).  
The COGEN 2 program provided financial support, in the form of a maximum grant of 
15% of the total investment, and advisory services (such as feasibility studies and advice on 
financial models) for specific projects that were considered to have a high level of 
replication potential in the individual countries. During COGEN 2, the implementing agency 
in Malaysia, SIRIM Berhad, acted as a business partnership facilitator providing potential 
investors with product information and advice to facilitate their procurement process and 
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European technology suppliers with market information. The COGEN 2 program thereby 
served as a private sector-oriented export platform for European technology suppliers, by 
identifying possible linkages with potential investors and end-users in Southeast Asia. 
Various promotional activities in the energy and palm oil sector were also undertaken 
together with the provision of institutional capacity building and assistance to energy-
related governmental agencies and palm oil industry organisations.  
The COGEN 3 program (2002-2004) continued the promotional activities undertaken 
during COGEN 2, which included information and awareness-raising campaigns, training 
seminars, conferences, and plant visits for governmental agencies, project developers, 
potential end-users and financial institutions. A main objective of COGEN 3 was to 
implement a number of full-scale demonstration plants in Malaysia and other Southeast 
Asian countries. This was done by providing direct financial support covering up to 15% of 
the total investment costs (with a maximum amount of 400,000 Euros) and by offering 
technical and institutional assistance to project developers in plants that were considered 
eligible to receive support (AIT, 2004). The construction of these so-called 'flagship' plants 
was considered essential to convince potential investors and end-users of the financial and 
technological viability of palm oil biomass waste-to-energy plants (COGEN 3, 2012).   
 
4.2. Main achievements of the EU-ASEAN COGEN program   
 
By the end of the three COGEN program phases in 2004, only three palm oil biomass 
waste-to-energy demonstration plants had been constructed and put in operation in 
Malaysia, one implemented under COGEN 2 and two under COGEN 3 (Shuit et al., 2009). 
Although the COGEN program aimed at introducing new technology into ASEAN countries, 
two of these plants were constructed at existing palm oil mills and did not diverge greatly 
from the typical cogeneration plants being installed in the palm oil industry at that time (in 
terms of fuel source used and plant efficiency) (COGEN3, 2012). An official evaluation report 
of the COGEN program, undertaken by the European Commission in 2009, notes with some 
dissatisfaction that surprisingly little concrete output was achieved in terms of the number 
of installations in operation (EC, 2009). The role of the COGEN program in stimulating the 
sale of European equipment to ASEAN countries had consequently been limited. Since the 
construction of demonstration plants constituted a main purpose of both COGEN 2 and 
COGEN 3, the evaluators of the report concluded that the COGEN program had a "poor 
implementation ratio" (EC, 2009; 50). The internal evaluation report of the COGEN program 
conducted in 2004 also indicated that the high aspirations to be found in project 
descriptions were only reflected in activities on the ground to a very limited extent, which 
"with hindsight, was too ambitious" (AIT, 2004; 50). Owing to the limited number of plants 
constructed, actual private-sector business partnerships stimulated under the COGEN 
program were also limited, even though this had also been a main goal of the program (EC, 
2009).  
The evaluation reports assessed in this paper addressing the effectiveness of the 
COGEN program in achieving its goals identified the limited duration of the individual phases 
of the program as a main impediment to the lack of progress in terms of plants installed 
(AIT, 2004; COWI, 2006; EC, 2009). Due to the limited time available, the projects found 
eligible for financial support under COGEN 2 and COGEN 3 were either at a too early stage 
of maturation or simply could not meet the deadlines. Since the program was implemented 
over a twelve-year period, in principle this long period should have made possible a longer-
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term planning period in which sustained efforts could be devoted to bringing specific 
projects towards the commissioning stage. Yet, as the program consisted of three 
consecutive phases, each lasting around three years, the short-term duration of these 
phases apparently worked against achieving the immediate goal of the program to achieve a 
high number of installations.   
Interviews with former expatriate managers of the COGEN program pointed towards 
another issue which had influenced the limited number of demonstration plants 
constructed under the COGEN program. This concerned an apparent change in the 
European Commission’s (EC) aspiration to provide direct financial support to demonstration 
projects. This change occurred from the late 1990s and was due mainly to increasing 
political concerns and criticisms about the indirect subsidisation of European technology 
suppliers through EC-funded donor intervention programs. These criticisms were raised 
internally in the EC, as well as by ASEAN country partners in the COGEN program, who 
argued in favour of redirecting these indirect subsidies towards providing institutional 
assistance. In response to this, the EC shifted the focus towards awareness-raising and 
institutional capacity-building, which led to a gradual reduction in the amount of financial 
support provided to individual projects under the COGEN program. This meant that the 
economic incentives given to project developers under the program were substantially 
reduced during the period between COGEN 2 and the implementation of COGEN 3. As an 
example of the low investment subsidy under COGEN 3, one of the plants constructed in 
Malaysia in 2004, for which the total investment amounted to RM 45 million (13.8 US$ 
million4), was awarded a RM 1.8 million (0.55 US$ million) grant corresponding to only 4% of 
the total investment.  
Two former expatriate managers of the COGEN program also mentioned the 
widespread lack of support from Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB), the national utility 
company in Malaysia, as a main explanation for the limited number of demonstration plants 
constructed under the program. According to the managers, the TNB obstructed the 
implementation of the COGEN program during all three phases and showed very little, if 
any, interest in supporting the introduction of grid-connected renewable energy projects in 
general and biomass projects in particular. This understanding was confirmed during an 
interview with a representative of the implementing agency of the COGEN program in 
Malaysia. Program managers were therefore confronted with the challenge of achieving 
important donor objectives against the interests of powerful actors in the Malaysian energy 
sector.    
Under the COGEN program, the level of awareness-raising campaigns, training and 
technical assistance, and capacity-building efforts conducted at various levels are reported 
to have been substantial (AIT, 2004), as were the amount of background reports, policy 
proposals and national strategy recommendations (EC, 2009). Yet, the evaluation reports 
emphasised that the lack of a supportive policy framework at the national level constituted 
a main obstacle to the construction of demonstration projects under the COGEN program. 
In EC (2009; 50), the evaluators stressed that "]..the lack of supportive policy environments 
at national level may have proved too large a barrier for fledgling cogeneration projects"]. 
Similarly, COWI (2006; 11) emphasised that the "]..lack of supportive national policy 
measures and economic incentives"] was a main barrier in achieving more installations 
under the COGEN program. These excerpts highlight the slow rate of implementations not 
4 Throughout this paper, an exchange rate conversion factor of 3.269 has been used to convert the Malaysian 
Ringgit (RM) to US Dollars (US$), which is based on a ten-year average exchange rate in the period 2000-2010.  
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only of installations but also of the policy seen as a precondition to make it happen, and 
they illustrate the high level of frustrations from the donor side when observing ‘good 
advice’ being neglected for political reasons that were not articulated.  
 
4.3. The DANCED/DANIDA program  
 
A main purpose of the Danish Cooperation for Environment and Development 
(DANCED) program (1994-2001) was to provide training and institutional capacity-building in 
national ministries and central government agencies in order to strengthen the 
environmental planning and management competence and to support policy and strategy 
formulation. In Malaysia, the DANCED program was implemented in two phases during 
1994-1998 and 1999-2001. In 2001, due to a regime shift in Denmark, DANCED's activities 
were taken over and continued with some redirection by Danish International Development 
Assistance (DANIDA) in the period 2002-2006 (DANCED-EPU, 2001; Hezri and Hasan, 2006). 
During the late 1990s, the DANCED/DANIDA program contributed to establishing Pusat 
Tenaga Malaysia (PTM) (the Malaysia Energy Centre), an independent research institution 
set up to undertake policy analysis and energy planning and to co-ordinate various activities 
in the renewable energy sector. Throughout the DANCED/DANIDA program, various training 
and assistance activities were provided to employees at PTM, which, from around 2005, also 
focused on enabling PTM to become the secretariat of Clean Development Mechanisms 
(CDM) projects being implemented in the energy sector.  
 In the period 1998-2001, expatriate consultants from the DANCED/DANIDA program 
provided advice to relevant government agencies in the preparatory work for a new energy 
policy, which was adopted in 2001 under the 8th Malaysia Plan (covering the period 2001-
2005)5. The new policy introduced renewable energy as a new strategic ‘fifth fuel’ resource 
under the country’s Fuel Diversification Policy and set a target of renewable energy to 
provide 5% of total electricity generation by 2005 (EPU, 2001). This target was to be 
achieved by different fiscal incentives to promote renewable energy projects, such as 
income tax exemptions of 70% on statutory income, investment tax allowances of 60% of 
capital expenditures, and import duty and sales tax exemptions on imported machinery and 
equipment. According to Kettha (2009), a report commissioned by the DANCED program in 
1999 is considered to have been particularly influential in drafting this policy, and key 
elements from this proposal, such as a tariff for renewable energy and the removal of trade 
barriers, were subsequently incorporated into its final version. The DANCED report 
considered the utilisation of biomass waste from the palm oil industry to be the most 
attractive ‘low hanging fruit’, and the final energy policy accordingly focused mainly on palm 
oil biomass as a means of achieving the renewable energy target (DANCED, 1999).  
 
4.4. Main achievements of the DANCED/DANIDA program  
 
 According to previous expatriate program managers and program evaluations 
(DANCED, 2001; DANCED-EPU, 2001), a main achievement of the DANCED/DANIDA program 
in Malaysia was considered to be the incorporation of key elements of the proposal on 
renewable energy into the energy policy adopted in 2001 under the 8th Malaysia Plan. Yet, 
5 This was prepared under the sub-component of the DANCED/DANIDA program entitled ‘Support to 
Development of a Strategy for Renewable Energy as Fifth Fuel in Malaysia’.   
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at the same time, the program managers also stressed that, subsequent to being processed 
during political negotiations concerning the financial budget in the national parliament, a 
number of important elements of the original and far more wide-ranging DANCED/DANIDA 
proposal were either excluded or watered down substantially. For example, two suggestions 
for establishing a renewable energy fund and for reducing the level of subsidies given to 
conventional fossil fuel-fired power plants were not included in the final energy policy. In 
addition, the tariff of 0.14-0.17 RM/kWh (0.043-0.052 US$/kWh) eventually offered under 
the SREP program was also much lower than had been suggested, but not least a regulatory 
scheme which would oblige TNB to purchase certain quantities of power from renewable 
energy was rejected. Rather, power-purchasing contracts were to be negotiated bilaterally 
between project developers and TNB on a ‘willing supplier, willing buyer’ basis. This created 
an unequal bargaining situation in power-purchasing contract negotiations, which largely 
favoured the interests of TNB. An earlier expatriate program manager emphasised that, 
mainly due to a lack of sufficient ‘political support’, the resulting policy turned out to be 
much less ambitious in terms of the regulatory framework that was drawn up to support 
renewable energy, leaving the full range of supporting instruments suggested in the 
DANCED/DANIDA proposal unexploited.   
 Continued resistance from TNB to support renewable energy was another main 
stumbling block, which contributed to reducing the impact of the DANCED/DANIDA 
program. Since TNB has a monopoly over electricity transmission and distribution, and owns 
around 60% of the overall generation capacity in Malaysia, support from this powerful actor 
in the energy sector was crucial. However, a former expatriate program manager explained 
that TNB was not willing to accept even the least problematic options. This included even 
apparently economically viable solutions such as co-firing of relatively small percentages of 
palm oil biomass waste in the existing conventional power plants. TNB claimed that it had 
limited incentives to purchase electricity from decentralised power plants since this would 
require investments in additional back-up capacity (Sansubari, 2010). In addition, due to a 
lack of experience in managing renewable energy in the energy system, TNB envisaged a 
number of difficulties, such as uncertainties in matching supply and demand, which made 
them react obstructively.  
A main rationale underlying the promotional activities conducted under the 
DANCED/DANIDA program was to create awareness about the commercial opportunities of 
biomass waste-to-energy generation and thus encourage palm oil producers to become 
energy producers. This should have encouraged palm oil mill companies to venture into a 
new business area, enabling them to utilise their otherwise unproductive biomass waste as 
a new, valuable and profitable resource by providing them with an additional income from 
selling electricity. However, according to several previous program managers, the main 
‘program beneficiaries’ in the palm oil industry did not see electricity production as one of 
their core business activities, and showed little interest in becoming independent power 
producers. According to consultancy reports conducted by expatriate and local consultants 
under the DANCED/DANIDA program, a main reason for this cautious attitude in the palm 
oil industry was the limited familiarity with power plant management and energy 
generation business in general, but also that energy generation was generally considered 
less commercially attractive than alternative biomass waste-utilisation options being 
investigated and tested at the time (Evald, 2005; 2006).  
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4.5. The BIOGEN program  
 
The Biomass-based Power Generation and Cogeneration Project program (BIOGEN) 
was implemented by Pusat Tenaga Malaysia (PTM) in Malaysia in the period 2002-2010 and 
was funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP). The overall objective of the BIOGEN program was to reduce the growth 
rate of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from fossil fuel-fired combustion processes in 
Malaysia by accelerating palm oil biomass-based power generation (GEF, 2001). This was to 
be achieved mainly through the provision of information and awareness enhancement 
campaigns, policy studies, institutional capacity-building and financial support to 
demonstration projects. The financial support was provided in the form of a RM 28 million 
(8.6 million US$) renewable energy fund, which would distribute soft loans to project 
developers. One of the ambitious aims of the BIOGEN program was to reduce GHG 
emissions from energy generation in Malaysia by 3.8% within the first five years of 
operation compared to a baseline without any interventions implemented (Aldover and 
Yang, 2010).   
A main emphasis in the BIOGEN program was on establishing demonstration 
projects, which were considered to comprise a key catalyser for further project replications. 
As was laid out in the project description, these demonstration projects should not only 
demonstrate the technical and economic feasibility of palm oil biomass waste-to-energy 
plants, but also showcase a number of important components of the BIOGEN program, such 
as a viable business and financing model and a workable power-purchasing agreement 
standard (GEF, 2001; Aldover and Nethi, 2004). As in the COGEN program, the 
demonstration projects were therefore considered important in building confidence for 
potential investors in the palm oil industry. Financial support for demonstration projects 
was supplemented by promotional activities in the palm oil industry aimed to encourage 
palm oil companies to engage in energy generation.  
 
4.6. Main achievements of the BIOGEN program  
 
 Among the main achievements of the BIOGEN program, the mid-term evaluation 
report conducted in 2004 (Aldover and Nethi, 2004) and the final evaluation report 
performed in 2010 (Aldover and Yang, 2010) found that the awareness-raising campaigns 
undertaken in the energy sector and palm oil industry had contributed significantly to 
increasing the familiarity with palm oil biomass waste-to-energy generation in Malaysia. The 
training and technical assistance provided under the program was also attributed an 
important role in increasing the capacity of relevant government agencies to conduct 
biomass energy-relevant planning and analysis. Furthermore, the policy studies conducted 
under the BIOGEN program were considered to have had an influence on the government's 
decision to raise the tariff level under the SREP in 2006 to 0.17-0.19 RM/kWh (0.052-0.058 
US$/kWh) and again in 2009 to 0.19-0.21 RM/kWh (0.058-0.064 US$/kWh) (Aldover and 
Yang, 2010). 
In spite of these achievements, however, the final evaluation report deemed the 
BIOGEN program to have been only "marginally satisfactory" in achieving the program 
objectives and noted that "]..the project results did not come out at the time and level as 
expected in project designs"] (Aldover and Yang, 2010; 10). A primary reason for this rather 
disappointing conclusion was attributed to the lack of progress made concerning the 
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construction of demonstration plants under the program. Despite the priority given to this 
program component, only one palm oil biomass waste-to-energy plant was constructed and 
put into operation as part of the BIOGEN program, and moreover the construction of this 
plant was substantially delayed and never reached continuous operation. Consequently, 
only RM 5 million of the RM 24 million made available from the renewable energy fund was 
used under the Biogen program’s budget to support demonstration projects.  
 According to the final evaluation report and to representatives of the implementing 
agency of the BIOGEN program in Malaysia, a continuing lack of interest from the palm oil 
industry was a main impediment to achieving a higher number of demonstration plants. The 
lack of interest was described in terms such as "negative industry perception", due to a 
"]..lack of confidence in the feasibility of biomass power generation"] (Aldover and Yang, 
2010; 15). The low feasibility also seems to have been acknowledged by the donors to a 
large extent. A report commissioned by the BIOGEN program in 2007 found the internal rate 
of return (IRR) of a 6MW plant with a total investment of RM 48.0 million to be as low as 
4.08% (equivalent to a payback period of 12.4 years), which did "]..not show a very 
attractive return for power plant development in palm oil mills..], in which ]..only a payback 
period of 3-4 years is considered attractive]" (Ngadi and Mustapha, 2007; 53). The final 
evaluation report resigned itself to stating that the resolution of this issue "]..is something 
that is not immediately within the control of program"] (Aldover and Yang, 2010; 15). The 
first phase of the BIOGEN program was initially planned to take two years, and was to have 
been followed by a second phase. However, due to the difficulties in identifying a host for 
the demonstration plants, the first phase was extended twice, and after the disappointing 
results achieved after seven years, the second phase was abandoned. 
 
5. Discussion  
 
As is evident from the analysis presented above, a number of objectives set out by 
the donor interventions to create conducive conditions for niche development were not 
achieved. While there may be many reasons for this, the discussion in this section will 
address the interests that may have constrained the fulfilment of these apparently well-
conceived and important objectives. The discussion will focus on the reluctant 
implementation of energy policy, such as suppression of fossil fuel subsidies and the 
implementation of a feed-in-tariff, as well as on the related difficulties experienced in 
attracting investment interest from palm oil mill companies.   
 
5.1. Suppression of fossil fuel subsidies 
 
Fossil fuel subsidies are important barriers to the economic viability of renewable 
energy investments and, on top of the direct effect, eliminating such subsidies could in 
principle finance other incentives for energy production from biomass waste. Suppression of 
subsidies on fossil fuel was therefore a main element in the first proposal for an enabling 
policy for biomass waste to energy policy in 1999. This policy was only implemented some 
nine years later, in 2008. Throughout this period, the continuation of fossil fuel subsidies 
was seen as an obstacle by succeeding donor programs, and program managers explained 
this with reference to a lack of political will on the part of the government. 
Addressing this phenomenon from an interest perspective shows that these 
difficulties may have been foreseen, as most groups of actors had an interest in maintaining 
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the subsidy. The industrial organisations representing the industry in general would have an 
interest in maintaining the subsidy in order to ensure low energy costs. The utility, which 
had a monopoly on electricity transmission and distribution, and which was not allowed to 
raise tariffs, also had an interest in maintaining the subsidy to reduce its losses (Sansubari, 
2010). Even palm oil mill owners’ organisations would be expected to be in favour of a 
generally low energy price for the sector rather than in uncertain future business 
opportunities as electricity producers. In fact, only the manufacturers of boiler and power 
plant equipment would have a clear interest in suppressing the subsidies, as they had a 
direct interest in an increased market for boiler equipment. Politicians, on the other hand, 
faced a dilemma: although fossil fuel subsidies weighed heavily on an already stressed state 
budget, they faced a general interest in maintaining the subsidy and thus keeping energy 
prices low. This would provide support from industry, but more importantly it would avoid 
unrest and political pressure from the population, who in a developing country context 
typically see increasing energy prices as a responsibility of the government.  
Policy proposals from donor programs and expatriate experts were therefore not 
enough to convince national politicians to go in that direction, and apparently they 
maintained the existing subsidy levels until serious increases in oil prices forced the 
government to abandon a fixed energy price policy because it became economically 
impossible to maintain it with subsidies. This example illustrates that a policy that seems 
quite obvious from a northern and western perspective can be difficult to implement in 
another context, as in Malaysia, because strong groups of actors had an interest in 
maintaining the existing system.  
 
5.2. Slow introduction of feed-in-tariffs 
 
A feed-in-tariff (FIT) obliges electricity utilities to purchase certain quantities of 
electricity from renewable energy generators, usually in a given time period and at a fixed 
price set by the government. The cost of FITs is normally assumed by utilities and then 
passed on to consumers. In a number of European countries, the use of FIT has led to the 
widespread diffusion of renewable energy, which has created extensive political interest in 
its use as an appropriate model to support renewable energy deployment (Haas et al., 
2011). This is not least the case for many donor organisations, for which FIT systems are 
congruent with the promotion of electricity sector reforms in developing countries in the 
direction of market liberalisation and support for private independent power producers 
(IPP) (Azuela and Barosso, 2011).   
The introduction of a FIT to support renewable energy in Malaysia was also proposed 
early on, in 1999, as part of the DANCED/DANIDA program. This led to the adoption of a 
general power purchasing agreement (REPPA) comprising a minimum tariff for renewable 
energy as part of the national energy policy adopted under the 8th Malaysia Plan in 2001. 
The REPPA, however, was not a FIT per se, with fixed tariffs and an obligation for TNB to 
purchase certain quantities of produced electricity. Rather, project developers and TNB 
were jointly responsible for negotiating a suitable REPPA agreement and consequently, TNB 
only accepted the lowest possible tariff rate and deliberately delayed and obstructed the 
project approval process (Sovacool and Drupady, 2011).  
Although two marginal tariff increases were made in 2006 and 2009, it was not until 
a ‘real’ FIT became operational in 2011 that the tariff for biomass energy was raised 
significantly from 0.21 RM/kWh (0,064 US$/kWh) to 0.31 RM/kWh (0.10 US$/kWh). The FIT, 
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which may partly be the result of advice and information provided through the three donor 
programs, also comprised an obligation for the utility to buy the produced electricity under 
transparent conditions. The tariffs under the REPPA and FIT are shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Development of tariffs for IPPs to the national utility (by using an 
average exchange rate conversion factor of 3.269 in the period 2000-2010). 
The average inflation rate in the period 2000-2010 was 2.1%. 
 
But how can it be explained that the FIT became operational only after twenty years 
of donor intervention in the area. Compared to the elimination of subsidies discussed 
above, which would increase energy prices for all actors, the FIT is a targeted measure, 
which would provide a financial viability to the industrial owners, with a smaller increased 
cost of electricity. This means that this measure could be expected to meet less resistance 
from the same main actors as the elimination of subsidies. On the other hand, the 
beneficiaries of the FIT – the palm oil mills and the local boiler and power plant equipment 
manufacturers – would be expected to be a strong proponent to this.  
Palm oil industry organisations have an interest in a higher tariff for at least three 
reasons: i) to improve overall business opportunities for palm oil mill companies by 
providing additional income from selling electricity; ii) as a solution to the generic biomass 
waste-disposal problem in the palm oil industry; and iii) as part of supporting a broader 
ecological modernisation process of the palm oil industry (Hansen and Nygaard, 2013). 
Therefore, not surprisingly, these organisations were influential in promoting the tariff rise 
that occurred under SREP in 2006 and 2009 (Sovacool and Drupady, 2011).  
On the other hand, from the perspective of the utility, paying a premium for 
renewable energy without being able to transfer this cost on to consumers would simply 
challenge its profitability. The obvious solution to balance this would be to abandon the 
fixed consumer tariff policy and finance the FIT by increasing the tariff by 1% (as was done in 
2011). The politicians, however, were hesitant, maybe because they feared negative popular 
reactions even to a minor increase in consumer tariffs, but most likely because they were 
sensitive to the experiences from the electricity liberalisation process in the 1990s, in which 
private IPPs were given what were seen as very lucrative (long-term) power purchasing 
contracts by the government and which had led to widespread public criticism of the 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
2001 2006 2009 2011 
US$ cent/kWh 
Max 
Min  
REPPA FIT 
143
government (Rector, 2005). According to McNish et al. (2010), the perceived risk of 
‘overpayment’ for IPPs is therefore likely to have spilled over into political discussions about 
renewable energy tariffs, and apparently, according to the preparatory work for the FIT 
elaborated in Kettha (2009), only several years of practical experience of low investment 
interest, combined with pressure from donors and palm oil mill industry organisations, were 
finally sufficient to make it happen (see also Aldover and Yang, 2010).   
 
5.3. Attracting investment interest from palm oil mill companies  
 
The overall objective of the three donor interventions was to increase the use of 
palm oil biomass waste for energy in Malaysia. This could have been done by engaging the 
national utility in using waste resources in new power plants erected by the utility, as 
happened in Denmark during the same period (see e.g. Raven, 2005). In this case, however, 
being the producers of the waste, palm oil mill companies were expected to engage as 
investors in a new business area and produce electricity. This approach conformed with the 
dominant development discourse at the time, promoting IPPs as part of the privatisation 
and unbundling of the national utilities in developing countries (Wamukonya, 2003). 
 Palm oil mill companies’ decisions on investing in biomass power plants are balanced 
between their interest in engaging in new high-risk investments and the continued 
expansion of their core business activities. Generally, palm oil mill companies had limited 
experience in energy generation, which had not been part of their core business (Evald, 
2006). Therefore, to diverge from well-known business activities and become energy 
producers would require a considerably higher level of return from investments compared 
to what could be achieved in the expansion of their existing activities.   
 In addition, palm oil mill companies were concerned about highly uncertain aspects 
of biomass energy plant investments, such as technical performance, future biomass 
resource prices and future tariffs and regulations. At a late stage development of the niche, 
the largely negative performance of the plants actually in operation added to this concern 
about the high levels of risk (see Hansen and Nygaard, 2013). Therefore, compared to 
continuing and expanding core business activities, palm oil mill companies generally 
considered the large upfront capital investments needed in biomass power plants as a 
highly risky business venture, which could only be driven by high expectations to future 
profits (Aldover and Nethi, 2004).  
  Traditionally in the utility regime, power sector investments have been considered a 
long-term and relatively secure investment, with limited capital costs due to stable and 
increasing demand, well-known technology and security of fuel supply. However, in this 
case the expectations of high risk, the difficulties of access to capital and the likelihood of 
high profitability on alternative investments such as expanding existing core activities 
proved to require high expectations of profitability in order to attract investment. The 
‘necessary’ level of return on investments required to attracting IPPs on conventional coal 
and gas technology seems to have surprised the proponent of private-sector engagement in 
the power sector in Malaysia in the 1990s, when the first IPPs achieved IRRs of up to 25% 
(Rector, 2005). Maybe unsurprisingly, this case illustrates that palm oil industry-based IPPs 
are equally concerned about the relationships between risk, profitability and alternative 
investments.  
 This example is hence adding on to a body of literature providing concrete examples 
of difficulties in attracting private-sector engagement in the power sector, especially in the 
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poorest developing countries (see e.g. Wamukonya, 2003). In this case it remains unclear to 
what extent the donor programs acknowledged from the beginning that the choice of 
private-sector involvement, benefitting from access to knowledge and capital, would also 
require much higher returns on investments than investment carried out by the national 
utility. This is doubtful, as it may be difficult for donor organisations to mobilise funds for 
investment support to large private companies while at the same time accepting 
expectations of very high profit rates (Smith, 2003). In this regard, there is a clash of 
cultures, expectations and interests, not only between the private sector, utilities and 
politicians at the national level, but also between private-sector support, the donor 
community and the donor constituency, which in practice makes investment support for 
private-sector engagement difficult. 
 
6. Conclusion, policy and conceptual implications 
   
In this case of support to niche development in Malaysia, the amount of financial 
support, technical assistance, institutional capacity-building and awareness-raising 
campaigns channelled through donor interventions has been substantial. Yet, as described 
in our recent paper, despite a short and momentary period of niche development during 
2002-2006, the level of niche development turned out to be far lower than expected 
(Hansen and Nygaard, 2013). Our analysis, based on the traditional MLP approach to niche 
development in Malaysia pointed toward four main factors hindering niche development: i) 
the reluctant implementation of energy policy; ii) a rise in biomass resource prices; iii) 
limited network formation; and not least iv) the low performance of implemented plants.  
This paper has explored the factors that may explain the low efficiency of donor 
interventions in terms of policy advice, and hence provide some insight into why the energy 
policy was only reluctantly implemented. The concluding remarks will address three 
crosscutting issues: i) the limited effect of advice and knowledge dissemination; ii) the 
challenge of transferring business models from developed to developing countries; and iii) 
the unpredictable and short-term donor interventions. Finally we will provide some 
reflections on how to address donor interventions as one of several transnational linkages in 
the MLP framework. 
 
6.1. Limited impact of advice and knowledge dissemination 
 
A large proportion of the twenty years of donor interventions has been dedicated to 
knowledge transfers, capacity building, feasibility studies and policy advice. The paper has 
shown that the three programs had high expectations regarding what could be achieved in 
terms of changes in enabling frameworks for private-sector engagement in energy 
production mainly by conveying the right information through short term programs. The 
governments’ suppression of subsidies for fossil fuels and the implementation of a FIT were 
essential achievements, which to a large extent may be attributed to the activities 
supported by the three programs. However, these measures were implemented about ten 
years after they were first suggested, and this reluctance has been instrumental in the 
falling interest from both equipment manufacturers and palm-oil mills, which again to some 
extent may have spilled over to low plant performance. The discussion in this paper shows 
that ‘facilitating’ policy implementation by donor programs is difficult and takes time. This 
may to some extent be because national governments are reluctant to receive advice from 
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what could be seen as external interests, but as in this case it is mainly because of the 
relatively weak interest of any national actors in changing policy, and strong interest of 
institutional and political actors at both the niche and the landscape levels in maintaining 
existing policy. This shows that a proper stakeholder and interest analysis is important 
before any policy-related intervention, but it also calls for prudence regarding what can 
realistically be achieved by external interventions in this area. 
 
6.2. The challenge of transferring private-sector models 
 
The continuing lack of interest of private investors in investing in electricity 
production, as shown above, can to a large extent be seen as the result of the reluctant 
implementation of an energy policy providing the necessary incentives to invest, but it may 
also to be seen as a more profound challenge in transferring a private-sector model of 
electricity production from the EU to Malaysia. The analysis above shows that investment in 
biomass waste-to-energy production proved to be attributed a much higher risk in Malaysia 
than in Europe. This was due to greater uncertainty regarding a number of key factors linked 
to the sector, such as technical performance, fuel availability and future tariffs, but it was 
also to a large extent the result of the Asian financial crisis and the generally uncertain 
investment climate in Malaysia, which is typical for developing countries. This higher level of 
risk and its effects may not have been taken sufficiently into account in the first plans 
presented by donors, and interviews indicate that, even at a late stage in development, a 
large group of actors, including donors, utilities and government, were not prepared to 
support a sufficient risk premium in order to make this model attractive for private 
investors. This shows the difficulties involved in transferring a business model from a 
developed country context to a developing country context, and calls for serious caution in 
transferring experiences from one economic and political context to another, even when 
this is in conformity with the dominant development agenda at the time. 
 
6.3. Unpredictable and short-term donor interventions 
 
A final and overarching issue of importance for the effectiveness of donor 
interventions is their unpredictability. As outlined above, the COGEN and BIOGEN programs 
started out as short term (1-2 year) interventions, and turned into being long-term 
programs, with a number of extensions, and both foreseen and unforeseen subsequent 
phases. This shows the ability of donor programs to adjust to local circumstances, but it 
certainly also indicates that local actors should be reluctant to invest too much capital, 
interest and integrity in donor-related programs, as their futures are highly uncertain. 
Projects often have a quick turnover of managers, as in the case of the BIOGEN program, 
which had five chief technical advisors during seven years of implementation (Aldover and 
Yang, 2010). As in the case of DANCED/DANIDA, programs are committed in short phases of 
two to three years and subsequent phases are uncertain, and may be depending on political 
changes in donor home countries, new international agendas and new approaches in vogue 
in the donor community. This relates to a broader discussion about the volatility of aid 
channelled through donor programs, which may position ‘recipients’ as highly vulnerable to 
over-dependency of donor support (Bulíř and Hamann, 2001). While the precise effects of 
the uncertainty of donor programs are difficult to measure, the interviews underlying this 
paper strongly indicate that the short duration of each intervention and their 
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unpredictability can be seen as an important impediment to the programs in reaching their 
objectives. This call for better program preparation, followed by long-term interventions, 
which can create the necessary trust and stability. 
 
6.4. Donor interventions, transnational linkages and the MLP framework 
 
This paper is a response to a lack of conceptual and empirical focus on the role of 
transnational linkages in niche development and transition processes in the MLP 
framework. To establish greater understanding of these issues, the paper set out to explore 
the factors that may explain the limited influence of donor interventions in the 
development of a palm oil biomass waste-to-energy niche in Malaysia. In contrast to the 
images of planning, predictability, harmony and success often conveyed in the grey 
literature on donor interventions, this paper has been inspired by a perspective that 
assumes that donor interventions create new arenas for struggle over resources, interests, 
meaning, interpretations and rationalities between various actors. This approach has in our 
view provided interesting results and the paper thereby provides a conceptual contribution 
to the understanding of transitional linkages in the MLP. Some recent studies, such as Byrne 
(2011) and Arora and Romijn (2012), have tentatively explored these issues, which, together 
with this paper, could provide a starting point for such research endeavours in the future.  
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Abstract  
 
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to advance further the emerging research agenda on 
the transfer and diffusion of low-carbon technologies in developing countries by adopting a study of the 
development of biomass power plant technologies in Malaysia. The main research question addresses 
the main factors influencing the transfer and diffusion of biomass power plant technologies in Malaysia. 
This question is explored in the four papers comprising the thesis, which are based on analyses of 
qualitative data, mainly in the form of interviews, documents and observations collected during 
successive periods of fieldwork in Malaysia.   
The thesis conceptualises the diffusion of biomass technologies in Malaysia as a niche 
development process and finds that the development of a palm oil biomass waste-to-energy niche in 
Malaysia has only made limited progress despite a period of twenty years of niche formation. The thesis 
identifies the reluctance to implement an efficient energy policy as the main limiting factor for niche 
development in this case. Although a number of donor programs have advocated the introduction of a 
stronger enabling framework for niche development, they have generally had only a limited impact on 
policy development. This was mainly attributed to the strong opposing interests of key actors in 
maintaining the existing situation, particularly the national electricity utility company in Malaysia, which 
deliberately obstructed niche development over an extended period because it was against their 
economic interests. When the government decided to improve incentive structures through a reduction 
in fossil fuel subsidies and by introducing a feed-in tariff system, the niche development momentum had 
already been lost because investors had limited confidence in project investments. Since many planned 
plants were never put into operation and those that were constructed generally showed only poor 
performance, the lack of investor confidence was due mainly to the largely negative results from 
experimentation activities in the niche. Moreover, a number of alternative biomass waste utilisation 
options gained increasing interest in the Malaysian palm oil industry, which were considered more 
commercially attractive compared to energy generation. On top of this, the increasing interest in these 
alternative usages of palm oil biomass waste led to a significant rise in biomass resource prices, which 
meant that it became difficult to negotiate long-term biomass fuel contracts. These factors turned out 
to be detrimental for niche development.   
The transfer of technology is understood in this thesis as the exchange of knowledge through 
international inter-firm linkages, which contribute to enhancing the technological capability of the 
recipient firms, thus enabling them to engage in innovation. The thesis considers whether the use of 
different learning mechanisms could explain differences in the accumulation of technological 
capabilities in the biomass boiler and power plant supplier industry in Malaysia. It is found that not only 
is differences in the levels of technological capability achieved by individual firms influenced by the 
specific combination of learning mechanisms the firms employ, but also by the differences in the relative 
levels of resources dedicated to exploiting these learning mechanisms. Firms relying on a combination of 
learning from foreign technology partners and internal learning by planned experimentation make most 
progress in terms of technological capability. Firms using a combination of learning by imitating national 
competitor firms and internal trial and error also made advances in technological capability although to 
a comparably lesser extent. The thesis also finds that CDM projects implemented in Malaysia played a 
limited role in stimulating the introduction of new technology and knowledge to Malaysian biomass 
boiler and power plant equipment suppliers. Their involvement in CDM projects did not add anything 
above and beyond what was already encompassed in the existing relationships between the firms in 
question. 
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Dansk resumé 
 
 Formålet med denne afhandling er at bidrage til at øge forståelsen af teknologioverførsel og 
udbredelse af klimateknologier i udviklingslande ved at gennemføre en undersøgelse af udviklingen af 
biomassekraftværks teknologi i Malaysia. Afhandling forsøger at besvare det overordnede spørgsmål om 
hvilke faktorer der har haft betydning for overførsel og udbredelse af biomassekraftværks teknologi i 
Malaysia. Dette spørgsmål undersøges i de fire artikler, der udgør selve afhandlingen, som baserer sig på 
en analyse af kvalitativt data materiale primært i form af interviews, dokumenter, og observationer 
indsamlet under flere feltarbejdsophold i Malaysia.    
Afhandlingen opfatter teknologiudbredelse som en niche udviklingsproces og finder at 
udviklingen at en palmeolie biomasse affald-til-energi niche i Malaysia kun har gjort meget begrænset 
fremskridt på trods af en niche udviklingsperiode på tyve år. Det påpeges i afhandlingen, at 
modvilligheden mod at indføre en effektiv energipolitik har været en central begrænsende faktor for 
niche udvikling. På trods af at en række internationale bistandsprogrammers advokerede for at indføre 
gunstigere rammebetingelser for at understøtte nichen havde dette kun en begrænset effekt på politik 
udvikling. Dette skyldes primært en stærk modvillighed fra en række hovedaktører, der havde større 
interesse i at opretholde den eksisterende situation, ikke mindst det nationale elselskab, som over en 
længere periode bevidst blokerede niche udvikling idet det var imod deres økonomiske interesser. Da 
regeringen besluttede at forbedre incitament strukturerne ved at reducere subsidierne til de fossile 
brændstoffer og ved at indføre et feed-in-tariff system blev disse iværksat på et tidspunkt, hvor 
nicheudviklingsprocessen havde mistet fremdrift på grund af investorernes manglende tiltro til 
rentabiliteten i anlægsinvesteringer. Idet mange planlagte anlæg aldrig blev idriftsat, og dem, der blev 
bygget generelt havde lave virkningsgrader skyldes manglen på investorernes tillid hovedsageligt de 
generelle negative resultater fra de idriftsatte anlæg. Desuden kom der stigende fokus i den malaysiske 
palmeolie industri på en række alternative anvendelsesmuligheder af biomasseaffald, som blev anset for 
mere kommercielt attraktive i forhold til energiproduktion. Oven i dette førte den stigende interesse for 
disse alternative anvendelser af palmeolie biomasseaffald til en betydelig prisstigning i biomasse 
ressourcen, hvilket betød, at det blev svært at etablere langsigtede biomasse brændstof kontrakter. 
Disse faktorer viste sig at være begrænsende for niche udvikling. 
Teknologioverførsel opfattes i afhandlingen som udveksling af viden gennem internationale 
virksomheds relationer, som bidrager til at forbedre den teknologiske kapacitet i modtager 
virksomhederne som gør det muligt for dem at engagere sig i innovations aktiviteter. Afhandlingen 
analyserer, om brugen af forskellige læringsmekanismer har betydning for opbygning af teknologisk 
kapacitet i biomasse kedel og kraftværks leverandør i Malaysia. Det påvises, at forskelle i opbygning af 
teknologisk kapacitet i de enkelte virksomheder ikke kun er påvirket af den specifikke kombination af 
læring mekanismer som virksomhederne anvender, men også af forskelle i omfanget af ressourcer, der 
afsættes til at udnytte disse lærings mekanismer. Virksomheder som udnytter en kombination af læring 
gennem udenlandske partnerskaber og intern læring ved planlagte eksperimenter gør størst fremskridt i 
opbygning af teknologiske kapacitet. De virksomheder, der anvender en kombination af læring via 
efterligning af nationale konkurrenter og interne forsøg gør også gjort fremskridt i den teknologiske 
kapacitet, men i et sammenligneligt mindre omfang. Afhandlingen finder også, at CDM projekter 
implementeret i Malaysia spiller en meget begrænset rolle for indførelsen af ny teknologi og viden til 
malaysiske biomasse kedel og kraftværks leverandører. Deres engagement i CDM projekter tilføjer ikke 
noget ud over hvad der allerede var omfattet i de eksisterende relationer mellem de pågældende 
virksomheder. 
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